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Abstract
DIAGNOSTIC REASONING AND PLANNING IN
EXPLORATORY-CORRECTIVE DOMAINS
Ron Rymon
Bonnie L. Webber (Supervisor)
I have developed a methodology for knowledge representation and reasoning for
agents working in exploratory-corrective domains. Working within the eld of Articial Intelligence in Medicine, I used the speci c problem of diagnosis-and-repair in
multiple trauma management as both motivation and testbed for my work.
A reasoning architecture is proposed in which specialized diagnostic reasoning and
planning components are integrated in a cycle of reasoning and action/perception:
1. A Goal-Directed Diagnostic (GDD) reasoner which is predicated on the view
that diagnosis is only worthwhile to the extent that it can a ect repair decisions
and that goals can be used to focus on such. Rather than focusing on a
diagnosis object as the primary purpose of the diagnostic process, the GDD
reasoner is tasked primarily with generating goals for the planner and with
reasoning about whether these goals have been satis ed.
2. A Progressive Horizon Planner (PHP) which works by constructing intermediate plans via a combination of plan sketching and selection/optimization
sub-processes, and then adapting these plans to reect new information and
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goals. For the plan sketching sub-part, I propose a selection-and-ordering planning/scheduling paradigm, taking advantage of the limited interaction between
goals.
I have implemented this architecture and reasoning components in TraumAID 2.0 {
a consultation system for the trauma management domain. In a blinded comparison,
out of 97 real trauma cases, three trauma surgeons have judged management plans
proposed by TraumAID 2.0 preferable to the actual care by a ratio of 64:17 and to
plans generated by its predecessor TraumAID 1.0 by a ratio of 62:9.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Reasoning and Acting in Exploratory-Corrective
Domains
This dissertation represents an attempt to address the general problem of reasoning and acting in exploratory-corrective domains by studying the requirements of a
speci c such domain { the management of multiple trauma patients. The multiple
trauma management domain both motivated my work and served as a testbed for
new ideas.
By exploratory-corrective domains I refer to domains in which an agent should intersperse exploratory activity with activity aimed directly at achieving the agent's
goals. In a way, almost every domain in which we would expect arti cial agents to
operate is exploratory-corrective. Exploration is necessary because it is unrealistic
to assume that an agent be equipped with a complete description of the environment
in which it will operate and with a precise model of the way in which the environment will change while it operates there. Further, in many domains, it is impossible
to completely pre-specify an agent's goals. These goals, or at the very least their
operational speci cation, may have to be determined through exploration. In many
1

domains agents must adopt, abandon, or re-prioritize their goals while they act, in
response to new situations or newly acquired information. What makes exploratorycorrective domains hard is that, in committing its limited resources, an agent has to
continuously choose between further exploration and characterization on one hand
and direct pursuit of its corrective goals on the other.

Certain diagnosis-and-repair domains, ones in which an agent is charged with restoring the functionality of a broken system or treating an ill patient, are excellent exemplars of such domains. The restoration goal in such domains is often far from being
well-speci ed. In medicine, for example, this goal may be phrased as abstractly as:
\make the patient healthy again", giving little or no clue about the speci cs of the
problem and what would constitute an acceptable solution. In addition to goal characterization, exploration may also be necessary to determine other conditions of the
system and characteristics of the environment that might interact with the problem
or with repair strategies. Of course, in some diagnosis-and-repair domains, complete
speci cation is possible, and rami cations of uncertainty and unpredictability can
be ignored. There probably are also domains where one can a ord complete characterization prior to repair. In this work, though, I concentrate on domains where
there is an inherent tradeo between exploration and repair and in which there is a
rich interplay between the two.

The remainder of this introduction chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2
overviews the multiple trauma management problem domain by using a fairly elaborate case-example in which its exploratory-corrective features are clearly demonstrated Section 1.3 overviews the main claims and contributions of this thesis and
Section 1.4 overviews the contents of the remainder of this document.
2

1.2 The Problem
1.2.1 The Need for Aid in Trauma Management
As of 1985, injuries, accidental and intentional, are the third largest cause of death
in the United States and result in more years of human life lost in the U.S. than any
other disease 3, 60]. Hitting young people more than all other diseases combined,
the economic loss reached $130 billion annually, in the U.S. alone.
Trunkey 153] shows a trimodal distribution of injury-related deaths:
1. immediate, as a result of the injury
2. within the rst few hours of injury and
3. as a result of later complications.
Since immediate deaths are only amenable to injury prevention, and since part of
the complications result from less than adequate earlier care, it is recognized that
the rst few hours of injury are critical to the patients' survival. Indeed, West et al.
158] found that 30-40% of trauma deaths are preventable by the delivery of rapid
expert care.
Resuscitative care begins in the site of injury and continues into the hospital's emergency room, where a patient would typically spend the rst \golden" hour in initial
assessment and resuscitation. The American College of Surgeons' Advanced Trauma
Life Support (ATLS) course 2] addresses the rst peak of injury-related deaths. It is
used to train care providers in the initial evaluation, resuscitation, and stabilization
of severely injured patients. The Guardian project 68] is aimed at monitoring patients in the intensive care unit and is thus addressing (partially) deaths associated
with the third peak. The goal of our TraumAID project 155] is to help reduce deaths
and serious morbidity in the second phase, often referred to as the initial denitive
management phase.
3

During the initial de nitive management phase, in the hospital, a patient undergoes
a more complete series of tests and treatments designed to diagnose and treat the
particular combination of problems sustained. It ends when the patient is transferred
to the operating room for major surgery, or to the trauma unit for continued care,
or when the patient is discharged.
Computerized decision support can help surgeons manage patients with major trauma
in at least three ways:
1. It can provide expertise that is otherwise lacking { for example, in rural areas,
or outside normal working hours, where a trauma patient may be admitted by
a resident and/or a physician whose main expertise does not involve trauma.
2. It can be used as an on-line Quality Assurance (Q.A.) device, monitoring deviations from the required standard of care. Real-time Q.A. is of particular
importance in trauma management since residents' lack of expertise and experience is often augmented by fatigue. After the fact, it can serve as a useful
educational facility.
3. It can be used to standardize care 148]. Standardization, if done properly, can
reduce health-care costs1.
The potential for decision support system is highlighted by the preliminary empirical
evaluation of TraumAID 2.0 (cf. Section 6.2) which shows that surgeons prefer its
management plans to those followed in actual patient care. To date however, with the
exception of TraumAID 1.0, most decision support systems for the initial de nitive
management phase have come in the form of scoring algorithms (e.g. 12, 107]). The
most widely used aide is the Trauma Score developed by Champion and Sacco 12],
which itself incorporates the Glasgow Coma Score 151], a scoring system for head
injuries. The Trauma Score system has also been used in scoring systems developed
One of the conclusions of Clarke et al. 17], for example, is that surgical residents request more
diagnostic tests than really needed.
1
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for post-hoc evaluation and quality assurance purposes 9, 13]. However, given the
large number of possible diagnoses2 , and given that a patient may su er from a
number of injuries or a number of problems caused by the same injury, these scoring
devices can hardly be expected to cover all possible combinations. A knowledgebased approach may have the potential to provide a more exible solution.

1.2.2 Exploratory-Corrective Trauma Management
Consider the following ( ctitious) case-example which, although not characteristic
in its complexity, is useful for demonstrating many of the key exploratory-corrective
features of the multiple trauma management domain and which I will revisit several
times throughout this dissertation:
JR, a male in his early forties, was brought to the Emergency Room in an
unstable condition (shock3) after being shot twice in the chest. He had
decreased breath sounds on both sides, and his neck veins were distended.
JR also su ered from a broken arm, apparently twisted when he fell to
the pavement in front of his oce building.
The above text reveals two things: (1) that when a patient arrives in an Emergency
Room, information available about the patient and his/her injuries is often incomplete and cannot support any deep diagnosis { thus the need for exploration and (2)
that trauma management often involves multiple injuries { thus the need for planning to resolve possible conicts between competing diagnostic and/or therapeutic
needs.
Initial assessment showed mued heart sounds, however normal pulses
and normal abdominal ndings. The attending physician had hypothesized that the shock resulted from a tension pneumothorax4 in one or
both sides of the chest and/or from a pericardiac injury5. Secondary
There are over 1000 dierent diagnoses 1].
By shock I generally refer to low blood pressure.
A pneumothorax is a condition in which air leaks into the chest cavity between the chest wall
and the lung to the point beyond which the return of blood to the heart is aected by the resulting
increase in pressure.
5A pericardial tamponade is a condition in which blood accumulates in the pericardial sac,
interfering with the heart's function.
2
3
4
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concerns were that a bullet may have injured organs internal to the chest
and/or abdomen.
This latter part of JR's management exempli es a routine physical examination, as
opposed to a more elaborate planning of costly and risky procedures. Also note
how a set of potential diagnoses is identi ed { a common diagnostic practice, often
referred to as hypothesis generation6 .
The most urgent need at this point was clearly the re-stabilization of JR.
Since a tension pneumothorax was determined to be the most likely cause
of shock, a needle aspiration of both sides of the chest was urgently called
for. (If that hypothesis were con rmed, a chest tube would be inserted to
further ease the pneumothorax.) A needle aspiration of the pericardial
sac was contingently planned, in case the shock was not relieved. Finally,
X-ray studies of the chest and abdomen were planned to rule out other
injuries. The arm injury was ignored at this point.
Several additional features of the multiple trauma management domain are illustrated by the above segment:
First, that active exploration is often necessary. Importantly, diagnostic activity
may also a ect the patient's state, not only our knowledge about it. In some cases,
diagnostic activity may have an adverse e ect, either directly or due to the time and
resources it consumes. In other cases, a diagnostic action may also have a certain
therapeutic e ect a needle aspiration of the chest, for instance, may provide partial
care in patients who are su ering from a tension pneumothorax.
Second, with respect to the choice of diagnostic means, hypotheses may sometimes be
testable in several alternative ways. For example, a tension pneumothorax can also
be detected on an X-ray lm. Conversely, a single test can often provide information
on more than one condition. For example, a single X-ray can often shed light on
several hypotheses. Thus, in selecting a test, there may be an eciency to be gained
by selecting tests that cover more than a single condition. Other important factors
6

See Section 7.2.
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in test selection are accuracy, expediency, the risk and pain involved, dollar cost, etc.
For example, in JR's case, an invasive needle aspiration procedure was chosen over
a less painful, but not as expedient, X-ray study.
Third, considering further interactions of competing needs, some injuries are more
urgent and/or more important than others. We have just seen that urgency can
a ect the choice of means (preferring more expedient procedures). Urgency and
importance, however, can also a ect the order in which various needs are pursued.
In the multiple trauma management domain, it is common to categorize problems as
being related to either airway, or breathing, or circulation, etc. (the so-called ABC's
of trauma management), and to attend to them in that order of importance. Thus
on one hand the immediate pursuit of the pneumothorax (urgent as a potential cause
of shock and important by virtue of being an airway-related problem), and on the
other hand the neglect of the broken arm. Also notice that diagnostic tests aimed at
competing hypotheses, e.g. pneumothorax and pericardial tamponade as alternative
causes of shock, are sometimes ordered by their assessed likelihood.
Continuing with JR's management:
The needle aspiration of the chest came up negative for the right, but
positive for the left chest. Nevertheless, despite the chest decompression, JR remained in a state of shock. The diagnostic e orts were thus
shifted to a pericardial tamponade as an alternative cause of shock. In
the meanwhile, a chest tube was inserted into the left chest to prevent
deterioration of the pneumothorax condition. In addition to aspirating
the pericardial sac, the current management plan also called for active
monitoring of the chest tube (visually and via an X-ray, to see that it was
correctly placed and functioning) and of the pneumothorax condition, as
well as for the remaining X-ray studies.
The needle aspiration of the pericardial sac proved to be e ective in
restabilizing JR, implicating pericardial tamponade as the true cause of
shock. JR's chest was now continuously decompressed, to allow further
diagnosis until a heart surgery can be performed.
In the above segment, we see a shift of attention from a positive pneumothorax to
a potential pericardial tamponade. It is an excellent example of a diagnostic action
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(aspiration of the chest) that \succeeded" but yet does not address completely the
purpose for which it was taken. This part of the management also demonstrates
occasional need to intersperse diagnosis and treatment. Intentionally incomplete
treatment is also demonstrated by the temporary decompression of the pericardial
sac. The de nitive heart surgery is postponed to allow further diagnosis and treatment of other injuries. This delay is also motivated by other planning principles:
rst, logistically, such operation can only be done in the operating room and second,
as will soon be demonstrated, future diagnoses may require operations that could be
more eciently combined with this surgery.
While the chest tube achieved its objective of relieving the pneumothorax, the massive ow of blood from the chest indicated a massive
hemothorax7. A left thoracotomy8 was then planned to treat this condition. However, given the concurrent need for a heart surgery, both
operations were slightly altered to include a single incision across the
chest such that both the heart and the left chest cavity are exposed.
We have seen before a diagnostic action with therapeutic e ects. What we see here
is an example of empirical therapy: the use of treatment as a diagnostic device by
observing the patient's response. The chest tube, which was inserted for mainly therapeutic reasons, provided important diagnostic information. We also see eciency
gained by combining treatment for two problems.
A chest X-ray, performed next, showed a hemothorax condition developing in the right chest, although not as massive as the one on the left.
It further showed one bullet, in the chest midline. The other bullet did
not appear on that lm. Two more X-rays were then taken: a lateral
chest X-ray to establish the exact location of the rst bullet near the
spine9 and an abdominal X-ray to determine if the second bullet lodged
in the abdominal cavity. At this point, the current management plan
called subsequently for a urinlaysis, and then for a chest surgery and
a laparotomy10 to repair the diaphragm and to explore other possible
injuries in the abdomen.
A hemothorax is internal bleeding in the chest cavity which results in blood accumulation
between the lungs and the chest, in turn collapsing the lung.
8A thoracotomy is a chest operation.
9The 3D location can only be determined via the combination of both X-rays.
10A laparotomy is abdominal surgery.
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An important principle demonstrated here is that of limited diagnosis. Notice that
from the information available so far, the entry wounds and the bullet locations
cannot be correlated with certainty. In particular, we are uncertain as to which
of the two bullets has made its way to the heart and which headed down to the
abdomen. As a result, we cannot determine which of the organs internal to the
abdomen were injured in particular, whether the left or right part of the diaphragm
needs to be repaired. However, since such determination would not have a ected
the management plan (it would not change the type of surgery procedure chosen {
a laparotomy), it is not pursued further.
A related phenomenon, that of parsimonious repair, is also demonstrated here. A
chest tube, normally inserted to treat a hemothorax, is excluded given that the
patient is anyway headed for a surgery that will expose the right chest.
The urinalysis came out negative, and JR nally underwent a bilateral
transverse sternotomy and a laparotomy. He was then transferred to the
Intensive Care Unit for monitoring.
To summarize, this case is characteristic of exploratory-corrective domains in the
kind of issues involved in reasoning and acting. It starts with incomplete information
and ill-speci ed corrective goals. To decide which goals to pursue, and how to pursue
them, an intelligent agent will typically have to start o with some exploration.
After reaching a certain level of knowledge, such an agent will begin pursuing repair
goals, while continuing exploration as required. As I will argue, what is probably
the most important characteristic of intelligent exploratory-corrective behavior is
that the decision whether to pursue a diagnostic test or a repair procedure, when to
pursue it, to which extent, and using what means, is ultimately based on its potential
e ect on repair objectives. Indeed, this is a most important underlying principle in
TraumAID 2.0, a new consultation system for the trauma domain. Next, after briey
describing its predecessor, TraumAID 1.0, I formalize these principles in a general
framework for diagnostic reasoning and planning.
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1.2.3 TraumAID 1.0: A Rule-Based Consultation System
Developed between the years 1984 and 1988, TraumAID 1.0 is a rule-based consultation system for multiple trauma management. Its scope consists of the initial
de nitive management of gunshot and stab wounds to the chest and abdomen. In a
rst feasibility study, management generated from a set of 122 rules for abdominal
trauma management was judged to perform better than chief surgical residents 18].
In many ways, TraumAID 1.0 was modeled after some of the leading medical expert systems of the time. Like mycin 140], the pioneer expert system for diagnosis and treatment of infectious disease11, TraumAID 1.0 used production rules. It
had two types of rules: suspect rules were used in a forward-chaining manner to
link evidence to suspicions whereas conclude rules were used in both forward- and
backward-chaining to prove, or rule out, suspicions. When used in a backwardchaining fashion, conclude rules served, much like in prolog, to control information
gathering. Simpli ed examples of suspect and conclude rules are shown below:
1. Suspect pericardial tamponade in patients that su er a chest wound and have
mued heart sounds:

5405? Pericardial Tamponade :-

Chest Wound,
Mued Heart Sounds.

2. Conclude a pericardial tamponade if, in addition, signs of pericardial tamponade are observed in an ultrasound examination and if the patient is not
(| sign) in shock:
Interestingly, Shortlie and Rennels say of mycin in the Encyclopedia of Articial Intelligence,
S. Shapiro ed., p. 589: \Although mycin is often described as a diagnostic program, its principal
motivation was therapy planning".
11
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5415: Pericardial Tamponade :-

Chest Wound,
Mued Heart Sounds,
Ultrasound Eusion(Positive),
| Shock.

TraumAID 1.0's inference and information gathering paradigms also resembled those
of internist-i 103]. internist was a major research e ort in automating reasoning in internal medicine. It used tables describing causal and associational relationships between various diseases and their symptoms. internist distinguished
four di erent inference paradigms: conclude, pursue, rule-out, and discriminate.
For evidence-gathering, internist coarsely classi ed information acquisition into
four categories: obtainable from patient's history, requiring physical examination,
non-invasive lab procedures and invasive procedures. This categorization was useful
because the kind of considerations involved in choosing to perform a physical examination are clearly di erent from those involved in picking an invasive procedure. For
its part, TraumAID 1.0 made use of a static ranking of all information-acquisition
actions to determine their respective ordering. However, since under some circumstances (combinations of injuries) this order must be altered, TraumAID 1.0 had to
resort to elaborate rule-blocking and ltering maneuvers. For example, in the above
conclude rule (5415), the no-shock provision has nothing to do with the predicating
the presence of a pericardial tamponade and is only used so as to avoid taking the
time for an ultrasound when a patient is unstable.
During TraumAID 1.0's development, especially when its scope was extended from
strictly abdominal injuries to injuries of both abdomen and chest, the awkwardness
of elaborate rule blocking and ltering became unacceptable. It was recognized that
rules are inadequate as a single representation and reasoning vehicle. TraumAID 2.0's
main contribution over TraumAID 1.0 is in the area of representation and reasoning
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for controlling actions. Instead of complicating rules with non-declarative control
clauses, as above, TraumAID 2.0 uses planning principles to coordinate activity for
a given combination of diagnostic and therapeutic needs.
It is important to note that this control problem is not unique to TraumAID 1.0. In
a recent article 30], Davis, Buchanan and Shortli e note the following:
Accommodating both procedural and inferential knowledge.
Some of the things we know appear to be fundamentally inferential (e.g.
if the patient is a college student complaining of fever and fatigue, the
disease if likely to be mononucleosis), while others have a strongly procedural character (\to change the oil in your car, rst get a large disposable
container, then ..."). Each of these of course has a natural representation the diculty arises when tasks have both sorts of knowledge. In
mycin, for example, the diagnostic task is fundamentally inferential, but
there is also an overall seven-step procedure that structures the diagnosis
24]. The diculty of dealing with both forms of knowledge at once is
displayed by mycin's relatively obscure solution to the problem: it produces the seven steps as a side-e ect of the backward chaining process
and several carefully constructed rules.
One simple reason for this implicit encoding is that rules o er no easy
way to express ordering information. A deeper reason is the dearth of
fundamental insight about representations that facilitate expressing both
forms of knowledge and allow them to work together intimately. The
issue is not simply one of providing the computational machinery to allow
rules to call procedures, or vice versa, but the lack of representational
machinery that can guide our understanding, expression and use of that
knowledge. Integration at the level of computational machinery is easy
the needed synergy is at the knowledge level.

In this dissertation I hope to have contributed, at the knowledge level, to ways in
which to represent and use knowledge in domains which require both inferential and
procedural reasoning. The Exploratory-Corrective Management (ECM) reasoning
architecture and the accompanying diagnostic reasoning and planning frameworks
(Chapters 2-4) provide a computational machinery that I believe can be used to \intimately" integrate reasoning of both types. In Chapter 5, I outline some knowledgelevel guidance as to how to decompose the domain knowledge (both representationand reasoning-wise) to e ectively use this framework.
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1.3 Claims and Contributions
As exempli ed by JR's case (Section 1.2), arti cial agents working in exploratorycorrective domains will have to continuously reason to characterize their environment, and to formulate their objectives and intentions. They will also have to
continuously decide which actions to take. My central claim in this dissertation
is that Arti cial Intelligence diagnostic reasoning and planning capabilities can be
integrated e ectively in a reasoning architecture for exploratory-corrective agents. In
Chapter 2, I rst show that to be e ective such agents must continuously cycle between diagnostic reasoning, planning, and action. I then present an architecture for
such agents in which the overall reasoning task is decomposed into that which is diagnostic in nature and that which is concerned with the choice and ordering of action
(planning), with goals serving as a natural interface between the two. In Chapters 34, I t this architecture with speci c diagnostic reasoning and planning paradigms
which I developed to address the particular needs of exploratory-corrective domains.
In Chapter 5, I discuss a methodology for e ectively encoding exploratory-corrective
behavior in this architecture.
To support this claim as a whole, I have implemented TraumAID 2.0 { a consultation
system for the trauma management domain which employs an Exploratory-Corrective
Management (ECM) architecture. During its construction, TraumAID 2.0 was validated on 270 hand-crafted cases covering many combinations of penetrating injuries
to the chest and abdomen. Then, in a later study described in Chapter 6, management plans proposed by TraumAID 2.0 for real trauma cases were compared to the
actual care as well as to plans proposed by TraumAID 1.0. A panel of three trauma
surgeons, not otherwise associated with the project, judged TraumAID 2.0's plans
to be signi cantly superior to both the actual care and TraumAID 1.0's plans.
With respect to a particular form of diagnostic reasoning suitable for diagnosisand-repair domains, I have pointed out in Section 1.2 that in managing trauma
patients, diagnosis must only be pursued so long as it can a ect repair decisions.
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This principle, which becomes even more important when considering diagnostic
activity, can be extended to repair decisions: repair is only worthwhile to the extent
that it can a ect the nal outcome. In Chapter 7, I identify similar patterns of
behavior in several abstract diagnosis-and-repair strategies.
I claim that, in diagnosis-and-repair domains, the more important role of reasoning
is to recommend appropriate actions. I therefore claim that it is more bene cial for
a diagnostic reasoner to focus on goals than on a characterization of the patient's
condition. I also claim that, in addition to their role as a natural interface between
a diagnostic reasoner and a planner, goals can also facilitate focusing diagnostic and
therapeutic activity. In Chapter 3, I show that reasoning for goal specication and
reasoning about goal satisfaction are natural characterization tasks if one distinguishes one's belief in whether a statement holds from one's attitude towards acquiring information about it, or toward achieving a state in which it holds. I present a
logical calculus which cleanly separates belief from attitude. I then use this calculus
to formalize Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD), a formulation of diagnosis in which
goals are explicitly targeted by the diagnostic engine. There, and later in Chapter 7,
I show that GDD can be used to focus activity on goals that are both relevant and
potentially contributing. An early version of GDD is implemented in TraumAID 2.0.
The particular formulation presented in Chapter 3 has been implemented and tested
separately.
With respect to the interaction between the diagnostic reasoner and the planner, I
claim that explicit representation and reasoning about goals can sometimes facilitate
a reduction in the number of goals that need to be planned for. In particular, in
Chapters 3, 5, and 7, I present examples where the interaction between goals can be
resolved in the goal-level, without forcing the planner to consider alternative means
for addressing each goal. In TraumAID 2.0, I represent a goal hierarchy which
allows inhibiting some goals at the presence of others. Chapter 5 discusses goal-level
resolution in further detail.
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With respect to particular forms of planning which are suitable for exploratorycorrective domains, I claim that the planning process should be partial-global. Planning must be partial since some relevant goals may yet have to be determined. In
addition, given the current computational complexity of planning, a reasonable planner will likely also be partial in its search for a plan. Nonetheless, in domains such
as trauma management, a planner must also be global in that its plans must always
address all known goals. On one hand, complete plans provide a constructive way
to evaluate the relative value of alternatives to individual steps when combined with
steps aimed at other needs. On the other hand, spelling out a complete plan is
also essential for attaining a reasonable level of communication with the interacting
physician. In Chapter 4, I propose an incremental planning framework in which
intermediate plans are constructed in each cycle of the ECM architecture, followed
partially, and then adapted to reect new information and changes in goals. In constructing intermediate plans, this Progressive Horizon Planning (PHP) framework
rst computes a plan sketch, and then invests its computational resources in improving the plan's initial segment. The reasoning behind this approach is that not only
are they next to be executed, these rst few actions in the plan are also least likely
to be a ected by uncertainty and/or unpredictability. I have implemented the PHP
framework in TraumAID 2.0.
For the purpose of the plan sketching process, I claim that it is useful to represent
goals so that their interaction is limited to competition for resources, and compatibility considerations. In Chapter 4, I show that under these assumptions, alternative
sub-plans (procedures) and sub-strategies (conditionalized progressions of such) can
be pre-constructed and prioritized for each goal individually. In that case, the planning problem turns out to be that of mediating between competing diagnostic and
therapeutic needs. That is, the choice of a combination of procedures for a given combination of goals and the ordering of these procedures in a plan. In Chapter 4, I show
that the choice and ordering sub-tasks can be formulated separately and then operationally interleaved in a simple selection-and-ordering planning algorithm. Chapter 5
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expands on a representational methodology for exploratory-corrective behavior in the
ECM architecture that is accommodated by the limited interaction assumption. The
selection-and-ordering algorithm is also implemented in TraumAID 2.0's planner.
Finally, in Chapter 7, I show that important diagnostic strategies, and strategies that
mix diagnosis and repair can be implemented in a goal-directed way. I show that goals
play a very important role in these strategies and that it is thus only natural to encode
them in GDD. This study has also resulted in an intriguing collection of diagnosisand-repair strategies, which I expect to be useful to test other hypotheses and/or
methodologies developed for assembling or critiquing action plans in exploratorycorrective domains.

1.4 An Overview of the Remainder
Chapter 2 presents the Exploratory-Corrective Management (ECM) reasoning architecture. Chapter 3 presents a formulation of the Goal-Directed Diagnosis framework which is based on Ginsberg's Multi-valued logics. Chapter 4 formulates the
planning framework used in TraumAID 2.0: Section 4.1 describes the Progressive
Horizon Planning technique, and Section 4.2 describes the Selection-and-Ordering
plan sketching framework. Then, in Chapter 5, I describe a methodology in which
these two frameworks can be used: on-line mediation of explicitly encoded individual
strategies.
Chapter 6 rst exempli es TraumAID 2.0 using JR's case, and then presents empirical results from a comparative study in which TraumAID 2.0's plans were compared
to the actual care provided in trauma cases, as well as to those of its predecessor
TraumAID 1.0.
Chapter 7 presents a catalogue of diagnosis-and-repair strategies and discusses their
implementation in the ECM framework.
Chapter 8 concludes and suggests future research directions.
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Chapter 2
A Reasoning Architecture for
Exploratory-Corrective Domains
Whether for exploration or repair, exploratory-corrective agents will need to reason
\diagnostically" to characterize world states, as well as their objectives. Since action
is likely to be necessary for both diagnostic and corrective tasks, such agents will also
have to possess some planning capabilities. Here, I will rst argue that diagnostic and
therapeutic action must often be interspersed in diagnosis-and-repair domains. Then,
I will present an agent's internal architecture in which the overall reasoning task is
decomposed into that which is diagnostic in nature and that which is concerned with
actions (i.e. planning). Throughout its mission (in our case, throughout a diagnosisand-repair session), the agent will interleave diagnostic and therapeutic activities
by cycling between these two reasoning sub-components and an action/perception
module (or, in our case, by interacting with the physician).
First, from JR's case, it is evident that in exploratory-corrective domains such as
trauma management it is often hard to separate exploratory activity from activity
aimed at repair, whether conceptually or operationally. In particular

 Exploration and repair cannot be temporally separated. For example, faced
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with multiple potential injuries, it is often impossible to rst explore, and only
then act to achieve corrective goals. Urgent repair may have to precede further
exploration whereas diagnostic activity may be useful during and after repair
for monitoring purposes and to verify actual results

 The distinction between exploratory and corrective activity may be blurred,

and is often based on intention rather than actual e ect. For example, in JR's
case it was demonstrated that a diagnostic test may have a certain therapeutic
e ect and that, on the other hand, the response to a therapy may have some
diagnostic importance

 Most importantly, exploration and repair are very much co-dependent. On one

hand, the decision whether, when, and what to explore, to which extent, and
using what means, clearly depends on which repair goals have been identi ed.
On the other hand, those very repair goals can only be determined through
exploration.

Thus, since one may have to act to repair before all exploration is concluded, diagnostic reasoning may be put on hold until after this corrective activity is concluded.
Another reason to intersperse diagnostic reasoning and planning is that the former
may require information that can only be acquired via action. From the other side,
corrective action may require reasoning of a diagnostic nature throughout: rst to
determine the goals that lead the planner to select it, and then to monitor intermediate and nal response and verify goal satisfaction from actual evidence. The
mutual dependency between exploratory and corrective activities is yet another reason why an exploratory-corrective agent must continuously cycle between diagnostic
reasoning and planning.
In the Exploratory-Corrective Management (ECM) architecture, reasoning is decomposed into two components:
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1. A diagnostic reasoner which is iteratively charged with characterizing what is
true (the diagnosis) what needs to be determined (the diagnostic goals), and
what needs to be achieved (the corrective, or therapeutic, goals)
2. A planner which via the selection and respective ordering of actions for multiple concurrent diagnostic and therapeutic goals serves as a mediator between
competing diagnostic and therapeutic needs.
Control in the ECM architecture cycles between these two reasoning components
and an action/perception component.
In exploratory-corrective domains, both exploration and repair compete for the same
resources. In particular, they both compete for action. Planning is a natural point
at which to mediate between a variety of exploratory and corrective needs for action.
As the output of a diagnostic reasoner, explicitly speci ed goals provide a uniform
representation for both types of needs, and also serve as a natural interface with the
planner.

TraumAID 2.0
Reasoner

goals

Planner

characterization
evidence

Physician

plan

Figure 2.1: ECM architecture: basic cycle of Reasoning, Planning and Action
Figure 2.1 depicts the ECM architecture of TraumAID 2.0 and its interaction with
the physician. Reasoning modules are represented in rectangular boxes rounded
rectangles represent various information-types or knowledge used by the system
directed arcs are used to indicate ow of control, whereas undirected ones indicate
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simple access. Information types drawn on control-ow arcs are the architectural
duty of the preceding module, and the triggering input of the subsequent one.
TraumAID 2.0's ECM architecture employs a basic cycle of reasoning and action
which is repeated after each action and/or after new information is acquired and
reported by the physician. A cycle begins as initial information (evidence) is provided by the physician. From this evidence, the reasoner draws conclusions as to
what problems the patient may have, and proposes a set of diagnostic and therapeutic goals. Importantly, goals and not conclusions, recommendations and not
mere characterization, are the reasoner's architectural duty. In its turn, the planner
decides how to address each of the proposed goals and in what order. By selecting
means to address the current combination of goals, and by scheduling them to reect urgencies, priorities and other constraints, the planner is e ectively mediating
between the various needs. The plan it produces is then presented to the physician
who is expected to carry out its rst action, or rst few actions, and then report
back results, as well as any relevant evidence that becomes available. A new cycle of
diagnostic reasoning, planning and action is then initiated with this new evidence.
In this new cycle, the characterization of the current state and the current set of
goals may both change to reect new information and the results of recent actions.
A new plan is then constructed to reect this change.
Given its structure as a closed-loop control system, and given its particular decomposition of the reasoning task, the ECM architecture satis es the following desiderata
deemed necessary by Section 1.2's analysis of JR's case:
1. It allows interleaving diagnosis and repair
2. In the beginning of each cycle, it allows the diagnostic reasoner to set diagnostic
and therapeutic goals in the end of each loop, it allows it to monitor actions
and other events, verify actual goal achievement, and adapt goals as necessary
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3. It positions the planner to mediate between concurrent diagnostic and therapeutic needs, and also to dynamically adapt plans according to changes in
goals and/or other knowledge.
Next, in Chapters 3-4, I will instantiate the ECM architecture with suitable diagnostic reasoning and planning sub-components.
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Chapter 3
A Goal-Directed Formulation of
Diagnostic Reasoning
3.1 Overview
Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD) is a formalization of the diagnosis task which begins from the principle that diagnosis is only worthwhile to the extent that it has the
potential to aect subsequent repair decisions, and similarly that repair is only worthwhile to the extent that it can positively aect the eventual outcome. This principle
is essentially a qualitative analogue of a utility-maximization approach to diagnosis.
Per my claims in this dissertation, the key to the GDD logic-based formalization
is that explicit representation and reasoning about goals can facilitate focusing on
worthwhile exploratory-corrective activity. I therefore refer to this principle as the
GDD principle.
Keeping to the common view of a diagnosis object as a characterization of what is
true, I augment the diagnostic task with a requirement that goals be characterized
as well. To address this requirement, throughout a diagnosis-and-repair session, the
GDD reasoner aims to establish and maintain both a belief (a characterization of
22

what is true), and an attitude (an encoding of relevance) towards the achievement
of certain knowledge and/or physical states.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 overviews related work. Then,
Section 3.3 describes the basic GDD framework Section 3.4 extends the framework to
handle multiple, possibly contradictory, sources of information Section 3.5 presents
a view of the diagnosis process as search in a space of attitude-belief assignment
and Section 3.6 discusses goal inhibition. Section 3.7 exempli es use of GDD and its
various features in a simpli ed version of TraumAID 2.0's strategy for the diagnosis
and treatment of a tension pneumothorax. Section 3.8 outlines a potential extension
of GDD with default rules. Finally, Section 3.9 discusses the implementation of GDD
in TraumAID 2.0.

3.2 Related Work
Diagnosis (Oxford Dictionary) Determining the nature of (esp. a disease) from observations of symptoms.

Diagnosis (Webster Dictionary) 1: the art or act of identifying a disease

from its signs and symptoms. 2: investigation or analysis of the cause or
nature of a condition, situation, or problem (diagnosis of engine trouble).

Diagnosis (Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary) 1: The art of distinguishing one disease from another. 2: The determination of the nature
of a case, or a disease.

In line with the above de nitions, it is common to take a diagnosis object to be a
characterization of a state of a airs, e.g. the determination of the exact problem in
a faulty device. The diagnostic task is thus commonly taken to be the determination
of such a characterization.
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Diagnostic reasoning has been an important area of Arti cial Intelligence, and has
resulted in a number of methodologies and techniques. This large body of research
can be categorized along many dimensions for example

 the number of faults subject to diagnosis especially whether or not a single
fault assumption is made

 the number of alternative explanations sought in particular, whether a single
explanation (e.g. most plausible, or most probable) is sought, or is it the case
that all possible hypotheses that explain, or even are just consistent with the
observed behavior, are of interest

 what is modeled: whether an explicit (\deep") model of the diagnosed system
is used, or is it a model, or imitation of the behavior of, a human diagnostician

 how it is modeled: whether formal methods are used (e.g. based on logic

and/or probability), or is it a model in which proven domain-speci c heuristics
are encoded

 whether or not observations are actively sought: some paradigms are concurrent, that is they try to work from a given set of observations, whereas others
are sequential and so guide the user in acquiring necessary information

 the assumptions made about the state of the system and/or the fault: some
assume a static system, whereas others model change over time, or at least
allow for such change some assume the fault is static whereas others allow for
non-monotonic or intermittent faults.

Considering these attributes, the GDD framework is aimed at multiple fault situations. It is a discrete logic-based formalization of an expert's reasoning. While
itself a concurrent framework in which one explanation is sought, viewed in conjunction with the ECM architecture it is used for active sequential diagnosis and repair.
24

It aims at a single explanation which is continuously revised. While it allows for
non-monotonicity, it lacks explicit reasoning about change.
Next, I overview related formalizations of diagnosis, taking the perspective of an
exploratory-corrective domain. I will then discuss AMORD, an early Arti cial Intelligence system in which goals are made explicit in order to facilitate better control
of the system's forward-chaining inference engine.

3.2.1 Related Formulations of the Diagnostic Task: An
Exploratory-Corrective Perspective
Recent years have seen signi cant advances in approaches for formalizing diagnosis, with various formalizations di ering along the dimensions just mentioned. In
particular, two distinctions which are currently regarded by the community as very
important are:
1. what is formalized, i.e. is it human expertise that is modeled, or is it the
function of the diagnosed device (model-based 29]) and
2. the formalization method, i.e. discrete (e.g. rules, consistency-based, abductive, etc), or probabilistic (e.g. Bayesian classi cation, inuence diagrams,
decision- or utility-theoretic, etc.).
What is common to most all of these new formalizations is that they all take a
diagnosis object, roughly de ned as some characterization of the current state of
a airs, as a solution and therefore as their objective. In formalizing GDD, I take the
view that the recommendations that result from a diagnosis are important. Thus,
characterization of the appropriate goals, and not merely of what is true, is taken to
be the objective of a GDD reasoner.
An important observation made by Poole and Provan 120] is that the optimality of
a diagnosis must depend on post-diagnosis goals. Provan and Poole 124] advocate
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the use of utilities. In 121], Poole and Provan further note that there is often no
need for a complete explanation and that the granularity of a solution depends on
its uses (and also on available tests). A similar observation is made by Leake in
his work on explanation evaluation 95]: \An explainer's reasons for explaining have
profound e ects on the information that a good explanation must provide." Leake
presents a taxonomy of explanation purposes and shows how each one results in a
di erent explanation of the same anomalous event.
In some domains, explicitly speci ed utilities can be used to structure diagnostic
process decisions. However, while utility-theory is increasingly used in Arti cial Intelligence in general and medical decision making in particular, it also requires a level
of completeness and precision in characterizing a domain that is often impossible or
very hard to obtain. The GDD principle can be viewed as a qualitative analogue of
a utility-maximization principle. The GDD framework supports the implementation
of utility maximizing behavior in ECM agents by explicitly representing and reasoning about goals. In particular, alternative actions can be ruled in or out depending
on interactions among competing goals and among alternative actions for addressing
these goals, e.g. suppression, subsumption, compatibility, preferences, etc.
I have argued that diagnosis and repair are often inseparable in exploratory-corrective
domains. GDD is therefore proposed as part of a total approach. Recent work by
Friedrich et al. 51] and Sun and Weld 149] shares much of this view. Friedrich
et al.'s theory, for example, has no explicit notion of a diagnosis object. Instead,
a sequence of tests and repair actions is sought that if applied to the current state
will imply (as in a logical proof) a restoration of the diagnosed system to a proper
working condition. Presented not as a theory of diagnosis but as a theory of repair
planning, their work applies a possible-models planning approach (Winslett, 161])
to a diagnostic domain. Friedrich and Nejdl 52] describe a set of algorithms for
diagnosis-and-repair plans. Sun and Weld use uwl, a strips-like language, in an
approach which integrates gde-style diagnosis and strips-style planning. The link
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between diagnosis and repair planning in real applications is also emphasized by
Pepper and Kahn 118]. Also related, although to a lesser extent, is work by Rushby
and Crow 132] who formalize recon guration, a form of repair, using an extension
of Reiter's theory of diagnosis 131]. In GDD, goals are used to focus on repairworthy issues. In the ECM architecture, direct interactions between goals can be
resolved using GDD rules (goal-level resolution) indirect interactions between goals
are resolved by the accompanying planner (see Chapter 5).
An agent may often have to act in order to obtain diagnostic information. An
important observation from the multiple trauma management domain is that such
diagnostic activity may a ect the actual state of the patient and not only our knowledge about it. As evident in JR's case, in some instances the very condition a given
diagnostic action attempts to diagnose may be a ected by it. In most sequential
diagnosis frameworks, the decision to act is based on the potential, or expected,
discriminatory power of a given piece of information, with little or no consideration
to the potential rami cations of the diagnostic activity. Some sequential frameworks
use a cost measure to model the e ect of actions. However, as noted by Genesereth
54], this approach is way too simplistic. In this work, rather than worrying about
more accurate models of action, I claim that if properly integrated diagnostic research can simply rely on planning research. Goals, diagnostic and therapeutic, are
the architectural duty of the GDD reasoner and serve as a natural interface with an
accompanying planner.

3.2.2 AMORD
AMORD 32] is a general purpose problem solver where a reasoning component is
accompanied with truth-maintenance and planning facilities. The main thesis behind AMORD's reasoning component is that combinatorial forward-chaining can be
avoided via meta-reasoning, i.e. if the problem solver reasons explicitly about its own
reasoning strategy. In particular, AMORD's reasoner posts inference goals to itself.
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These goals, distinct from those posted to its planner, serve to control reasoning, i.e.
to limit or prioritize the potentially vast space of hypotheses considered. By explicitly encoding the reasoner's control, de Kleer et al. hope to focus the reasoning on
more promising problem-solving avenues and avoid irrelevant or useless inferences.
GDD shares this intuition.
Technically, given a set of facts or beliefs, both machineries compute new beliefs
and goals. The key to the di erences between the two are their distinct objectives:
AMORD's objective is to control reasoning whereas in the ECM architecture the
purpose is to control actions. AMORD's reasoner distinguishes two types of goals:
inference goals which are aimed at controlling its own inference, and action goals
which are simply posted to the planner. GDD is not concerned with inferences at
all whenever it is invoked, it carries out a complete inference1. It only posts action
goals, which are then addressed by the system's planner. Interestingly enough, some
of these action goals are aimed at knowledge, much like AMORD's inference goals.
The distinction, however, is that diagnostic (knowledge) goals are only posted when
action is required.
Key to encoding strategies in AMORD is that goals are inferred from facts, and from
other goals. In the ECM architecture, while some of the relations between goals (e.g.
sub-goal generation, suppression, inhibition) are encoded in GDD rules, much of the
interaction between goals (i.e. the overall strategy) is resolved by the planner. As
further explained in Chapter 5 goals are used to represent choice points (with respect
to alternative actions) in local strategies and to facilitate the planner's mediation
and coordination between a combination of strategies. Furthermore, this is done
implicitly, i.e. on the y, and based on general principles.
As a side note, when appropriate, computation can be represented as activity and thus be
considered explicitly. This is a major area of current research, e.g. 133], but beyond the scope of
my current work.
1
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3.3 The Basic Framework
3.3.1 Underlying Framework: Multi-Valued Logics (MVL)
Ginsberg's Multi-Valued Logics (MVL) is a formal framework for inference in which
each proposition is assigned not only a truth value, corresponding to the strength of
belief in that proposition being true or false, but also a knowledge assessment, measuring roughly the amount of knowledge used in deriving this belief 58]. Bilattices
in which one partial order corresponds to the truthfulness measure and the other to
the knowledge assessment are used in MVL as domains.
My rst formalization of GDD 135] used a three-valued logic: true, false and unknown. Here, I present an MVL-based reformulation of GDD, the immediate result
which is the ability to consistently extend the inference paradigm to more expressive
domains. In Section 3.4, I show it to be useful in explicitly representing and reasoning about contradictory information. In Section 3.8, I outline an extension which
facilitates reasoning with defaults.
In this new formalization of GDD, each proposition is assigned a value drawn from
the cross product of two bilattices: one representing belief, the other representing
attitude. The notion of belief is interpreted regularly, representing one's belief in
whether a certain propositional statement is true or not. The attitude component
is used to represent problem-solving control information and measures the relevance
of acquiring information about, or achieving the condition described by, the particular proposition. The belief bilattice still has the truthfulness and knowledge partial
orders whereas the attitude bilattice has relevance and knowledge dimensions respectively.
Within Ginsberg's paradigm, domain knowledge is expressed by general rst-order
formulae, and thus requires an underlying theorem prover. In contrast, TraumAID 1.0 used a rule-based representation. In formalizing TraumAID 2.0, rather
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than adopting Ginsberg's formulation in full, and then having to completely reconstruct the domain knowledge, I have specialized MVL to the rule-based case. Besides
tting my needs, I believe that the specialized theory may be useful for others wishing to convert other rule-based systems to MVL. While the material presented next
is self-contained, the reader is referred to 58] for a more complete coverage of MVL.

3.3.2 Attitude and Belief
During the diagnostic process, the GDD reasoner will maintain and update an attitude and a belief for a set of propositional statements. To remain general, propositions
may be any fact about the patient or the world that the reasoner may know to hold,
may know not to hold, may assume, may want to know whether it holds, may want
to achieve, may be confused about, etc. As just mentioned, the problem solver's belief in whether a proposition holds is separated from its attitude towards acquiring
this knowledge. For example, the perceived relevance of determining whether or not
a patient su ers from a pericardial tamponade2 is separated from the current belief
about the patient's condition. As expected, the problem solver's attitude towards
and/or belief in a given proposition will change over time as a result of new information becoming available, new inferences being drawn, activity being carried out,
etc.

Denition 3.3.1 A Lattice
A lattice is a triple (L,^,_), where L is its domain, ^ (\meet") and _ (\join") are

binary operations from L onto itself that are
1. idempotent, i.e. a^a=a, a_a=a
2. commutative, i.e. a^b=b^a, a_b=b_a

A pericardial tamponade is a condition in which blood lls the pericardial sac, interfering with
the heart's operation.
2
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3. associative, i.e. (a^b)^c=a^(b^c), (a_b)_c=a_(b_c) and
4. obey the absorption laws, i.e. a^(a_b)=a, a_(a^b)=a.
Alternatively, a lattice can be de ned as a partially ordered set (poset), any two
elements of which have a greatest lower bound (glb) and a least upper bound (lub).
The two de nitions coincide by taking lub(a b) = a _ b, and glb(a b) = a ^ b. A lattice
is said to be complete if lub and glb can be de ned for any subset of the lattice's
elements. (In particular, a complete lattice has minimal and maximal elements.)
Thus, any lattice with a nite domain is complete.

Denition 3.3.2 A Bilattice
A bilattice is a sextuple (B,^,_,,+,:) such that:
= (B,^,_) and L2 def
= (B,,+) are both complete lattices and
1. L1 def
2. ::B ! B is a mapping such that:
(a) :2 = 1 and
(b) : is a lattice homomorphism from L1 to its dual L1 def
= (B,_,^) and from
L2 to itself.
Knowledge

F

T
U
Truthfulness

Figure 3.1: Basic Truth-Knowledge Bilattice
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Ginsberg discusses bilattices that are based on two partial orders: truth-wise ( t),
and knowledge-wise ( k ). That is, each proposition is described by how strongly we
believe it is true, and by how much knowledge was involved in inferring this belief.
The smallest nontrivial bilattice (Figure 3.1) has four points: T (absolute truth),
F (false), U (unknown), and ? (contradictory). In that bilattice, the t partial
order de nes one lattice (B,^,_), whereas the k de nes another lattice (B,,+). In
any truth-knowledge bilattice, negation reverses the truth capacity of a proposition,
leaving its knowledge capacity unchanged. In particular, within the basic bilattice,
: maps T to F and vice versa, leaving U and ? untouched.
Two, possibly distinct3, bilattices are used in GDD as domains for attitude and belief
respectively:

Denition 3.3.3 Attitude and Belief
Given a set of primitive propositions H def
= fhigni=1,

 an attitude maps H to an attitude bilattice BA
 a belief maps H to a belief bilattice BB
 an attitude-belief combines the two and maps H to the cross product BA  BB.
Alternatively, it can also be viewed as a pair hA B i of attitude and belief.
For the most of this paper, we will presume both BA and BB to be 4-point bilattices
such as those in Figure 3.2. The belief bilattice, following Ginsberg's suggestion, is
de ned by the truth-knowledge partial orders. In the attitude bilattice, a proposition
is described by its relevance ( r ) and the knowledge used to derive this relevance
( k ). Note that one's knowledge with respect to the truthfulness of a proposition
need not equal one's knowledge with respect to the relevance of that same proposition. The extreme points in the belief bilattice are labeled T and F, whereas same
Given the features of a certain domain, it may conceivably be useful to choose an attitude
bilattice that is more or less expressive than the belief bilattice.
3
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Knowledge

Knowledge

T

F

R

I
U

U
Truthfulness

Relevance

Figure 3.2: Four-point Belief and Attitude Bilattices
points are labeled R (for relevant) and I (for irrelevant) in the attitude bilattice.
Extensions to more complex bilattices, in which defaults can be represented, will be
discussed in Section 3.8.

3.3.3 The Interpretation of an Attitude-Belief Assignment
(and What Are Goals)
Throughout all stages of a given diagnosis-and-repair session, an attitude-belief value
will be assigned to all propositions known to the system. This attitude-belief assignment will then be updated whenever, and in accordance with, any new information
which becomes available.
Semantically, the belief assignment to a given proposition is interpreted as an assessment of whether or not we believe the statement denoted by this proposition holds
or not. For example, if B (Hemothorax)=t, then we believe that the patient su ers
from a hemothorax. Similarly, if B (Hemothorax is Relieved=t, then we believe
that the hemothorax has in fact been relieved.
The notion of \goal" is derived from the attitude assignment to a given proposition. Generally speaking, a proposition p is a goal if its attitude assignment is
high on the relevance partial order (in our 4-point bilattice if A (p)=r). Note
that there is no syntactic distinction between a diagnostic (knowledge seeking)
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and a therapeutic (state achieving) goal. For example, the relevance of knowing whether or not a patient su ers from a hemothorax is indicated via the attitude assignment A(Hemothorax)=r and similarly the relevance of achieving a
state in which the hemothorax is achieved is indicated via the attitude assignment
A(Hemothorax is Relieved)=r.
Of course, not every relevant proposition becomes automatically an operational goal.
For example, if B (Hemothorax)=t then it is already believed that the patient does
su er from a hemothorax and thus, as a knowledge goal, it is already satis ed. An
important distinction between a diagnostic and a therapeutic goal is that while the
latter is often regarded satis ed when any concrete belief can be assigned to the
given proposition, the latter is only achieved when a positive determination is made.
For example, the Hemothorax goal is satis ed when it is assigned a belief value of
either t or f, whereas the Hemothorax is Relieved goal is only satis ed when it is
assigned a belief value t.
In general, in more complex bilattices, one has to de ne which combinations of
relevance and achievement levels need be addressed, in what order of preference, etc.
However, since its inference is purely syntactic, the GDD reasoner is indi erent to
these semantic subtleties. Thus, in the ECM architecture, it is the planner's role to
decide which goals to pursue.

3.3.4 Knowledge Representation
GDD uses rules to represent knowledge. Two types of rules are used: one for inferring
belief, the other for inferring attitude. Antecedents in both types of rules are stated
in belief terms, the interpretation of which is soon to be speci ed. A rule's consequent
(header) must be either a proposition p or its negation :p. An inference procedure,
soon to be presented, will specify the way in which belief and attitude assignments
are inferred for a rule's consequent given its antecedents.
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Denition 3.3.4 An Antecedent
An antecedent is recursively de ned as either:
1. a proposition h
2. relevant(h), where h is a proposition
3. :a, where a is an antecedent
4. true(a), false(a), unknown(a), or contradictory(a), where a is an antecedent or
5. known(a), unless(a), or compatible-with(a), where a is an antecedent.

Denition 3.3.5 Rules
A rule R has two parts: a body, or a premise, which is a set of antecedents, and a
header (or consequent) which is a single proposition. Let Anti denote an antecedent,
and let d denote a consequent. GDD has two types of rules:
1. Evidential rules are used to de ne and compute belief. They map evidence and
lower-level conclusions to conclusions and take the form:
Ant1 ^ Ant2 ^ : : : ^ Antr ) d
For example, the following evidential rule serves to conclude a possible ischemic
spinal cord injury:
Loss of motor in legs ^
Thoracic aortic injury ^
:Compound fracture vertebra
) Ischemic spinal cord injury
2. Goal Setting rules are used to de ne and compute attitude. They map evidence
and conclusions to attitude and take the form:
Ant1 ^ Ant2 ^ : : : ^ Antr > d.
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For example, the following goal-setting rule concludes whether it is relevant to
know whether a patient has hematuria4.
Gunshot wound to abdomen ^
Bullet in abdomen
> Hematuria
A fact may often be provable in several alternative ways. Similarly, a goal may
need to be set in a variety of contexts. The same conclusion can therefore be drawn
through di erent evidential rules, and the goal can be set through di erent goalsetting rules.
Conversely, a proposition p can head di erent goal-setting and evidential rules. In
particular, a goal-setting rule headed by p is used to convey that it is worth acquiring
knowledge about p or that it is worth achieving a state in which p holds (depending
on p's semantic interpretation as a diagnostic or repair goal). An evidential rule
headed by p is used to conclude whether or not it holds, or put di erently whether
or not it has been satis ed.

Example 3.3.6 Consider the diagnosis and repair of a pericardial tamponade.
Throughout this process, the following diagnostic and therapeutic goals are instantiated, addressed, and satis ed:
1. Rules for setting a diagnostic (knowledge) goal:
The need to investigate a pericardial tamponade will rst be triggered by such
observations as mued heart sounds or observable injury to the sternum, and
rules of the form:
(: : : ) > Pericardial Tamponade
\It is relevant to know if the condition holds".
Hematuria is a condition in which blood appears in the urine, probably indicating some internal
bleeding.
4
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2. Rules for satisfying a diagnostic (knowledge) goal:
This diagnostic goal will then be addressed by the planner, recommending an
ultrasound e usion or a needle aspiration of the pericardial sac depending on
the patient state. Such test will then be incorporated into the overall plan,
considering other concurrent needs as well. Results from such test will then
serve to actually determine whether or not the patient su ers a pericardial
tamponade, using rules of the form:
(: : : ) ) Pericardial Tamponade
\Conclude whether the condition holds".
3. Rules for setting a therapeutic goal:
If the patient is determined to su er a pericardial tamponade then, possibly
depending on other conditions s/he may su er, a therapeutic goal of treating
the condition may be set, using rules of the form:
(: : : ) > Relieve pressure pericardial sac
\It is relevant to address the condition".
4. Rules for satisfying a therapeutic goal:
The actual results of the treatment can then be used to determine whether or
not it was successful, using rules of the form:
(: : : ) ) Relieve pressure pericardial sac
\Conclude whether the condition has been successfully addressed".
Note again that there is no syntactic distinction between the encoding of rules used to
set diagnostic or knowledge goals and conclude that they are satis ed and rules used
to encode the same for therapeutic, or state achieving goals. The sole distinction
between diagnostic and therapeutic goals is a semantic one. A goal's nature a ects
what is done when it is set, and the conditions under which it can be regarded
satis ed. In the ECM architecture, both are to be determined by the planner.
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While rules used by GDD to express knowledge have their antecedents expressed
solely in belief terms, it may often be useful to predicate whether a proposition is a
goal based on the relevance (or irrelevance) of another goal. To facilitate this within
the belief-based antecedent calculus which will soon be introduced, a mapping can be
added from the attitude bilattice to the belief bilattice (denoted attitude-to-belief),
roughly modeling the belief in the relevance of a given proposition.

8>
>> T
a=R
<
attitude-to-belief(a) def
= >F
a=I
>>
:a
otherwise
This mapping is clear when BA and BB are isomorphic. However, in general, one has

to make sure that relevance information is not lost in the transformation (e.g. if the
relevance bilattice was chosen to have a ner granularity than the belief bilattice).

Denition 3.3.7 A Diagnostic Problem
A diagnostic problem is a quadruple P def
= hH,RB,M0,OBSi such that:

 H=fh1 h2 : : : hng is a set of propositions
 RB is a set of evidential and goal-setting rules
 M0 H is a set of observations
 OBS : M0 ! BB , is a partial belief function.

3.3.5 Solving a Diagnostic Problem
Solving a diagnostic problem will require computing an inferential closure of the
observations given the evidential and goal-setting rules. The basic form of inference,
presented next, is simpler and more intuitive than that in 58]. In Section 3.4, I
extend it to a form that is closer to Ginsberg's in order to support reasoning about
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contradictory information. Before de ning the basic inferential closure, I rst de ne
the semantic interpretation of rules:

Denition 3.3.8 Belief Assignment for an Antecedent
Let hA  B i be the current attitude-belief (de ned on propositions). For any antecedent Ant, the inferred belief in that antecedent, B (Ant), is de ned as follows:
1. If Ant is a proposition h, B (Ant) def
= B (h)
2. If Ant is of the form relevant(h), B (Ant) def
= attitude-to-belief(A (h))
3. If Ant is of the form :Ant0, where Ant0 is an antecedent, B (Ant) def
= :B (Ant0)
4. If Ant is of the form f (Ant0), where Ant0 is an antecedent, then

 If f is a belief predicate (true,
8 false, unknown, contradictory), then
>< T B (Ant0) = T
B (true(Ant )) = >
: F otherwise
8>
< T B (Ant0) = F
B (false(Ant0)) def
= >
: F otherwise
8
>
0
def < T B (Ant ) = U
0
B (unknown(Ant )) = >
: F otherwise
8
>
0
def < T B (Ant ) = ?
0
B (contradictory(Ant )) = >
: F otherwise
0

def

 Otherwise

8>
>> F B (Ant0) = U
<
{ B (known(Ant0)) def
= > ? B (Ant0) = ?
>: T otherwise
= :B (Ant0) _ :B (known(Ant0))
{ B (unless(Ant0)) def
{ B (compatible-with(Ant0)) def
= B (Ant0) _ :B (known(Ant0))
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Belief predicates map belief-terms to fT,Fg and are useful where reasoning in absolute terms is necessary. Examples of this are presented in Sections 3.4.4, 3.6, and 3.8.
Thus, note that h and true(h) are interpreted di erently and the same is true of :h
and false(h). Similarly, :known(h) refers to any situation in which a concrete belief
cannot be reached whereas unknown(h) describes the particular situation in which
h is assigned a belief value U, denoting lack of information. In the basic bilattice,
? is also categorized as :known(h) in Section 3.4, I will use ? to denote unknown
due to co-presence of contradictory information.

Denition 3.3.9 Belief Assignment for a Rule's Body
Let hA  B i be our current attitude-belief, and let R be a rule with a collection
fAntigki=1 of antecedents in its body. We will interpret a rule's body as a simple
conjunction by de ning:

B (body(R)) def
= ^ki=1 B (Anti)

Denition 3.3.10 Consistent Inference
An attitude-belief hA B i is a consistent inference for a diagnostic problem P i
1. It coincides with OBS, i.e for all h2M0 B (h)=OBS(h)
2. For any proposition d2H{M0, let fRigli=1 be the set of evidential rules with d
as their header and let B (Ri) denote the evaluation of Ri's body as in De nition 3.3.9, then these rules are interpreted disjunctively:

B (d) = _li=1 B (Ri)
3. Similarly, for any proposition d2H, let fRigli=1 be the set of goal-setting rules
with d as their header and let B (Ri ) denote their evaluation, then
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A(d) = attitude-to-belief;1 (_li=1B (Ri))

Example 3.3.11
1. Consider the evidential rule in De nition 3.3.5. If
B (Loss of motor in legs)=T
B (Thoracic aortic injury)=T, and
B (Compound fracture vertebra)=U
then

B (:Compound fracture vertebra)= :B (Compound fracture vertebra)=U
and therefore

B (Ischemic spinal cord injury) = T^T^U=U
2. Consider the goal-setting rule in De nition 3.3.5. If the rule's antecedents
evaluate to T, then

B (Hematuria) = attitude-to-belief(T)=R
Solving a diagnostic problem requires computing a consistent inference. While in
general, there is no guarantee that such an inference is unique or computable, or
that it even exists, the following straightforward (and thus inecient) procedure has
worked so far.

Algorithm 3.3.12 Computing an Inferential Closure
1. Start o with the observations, by setting

A (h) def
= U, for all h2H

8
>
def < OBS (h) h 2 M0
B (h) = >
:U
otherwise

2. Forward chain on the rules, enforcing conditions 2 and 3 of the Consistent
Inference de nition (De nition 3.3.10), until reaching a xed point.
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It is the formal de nition of a solution in the GDD framework which di erentiates
it from other formulations of diagnosis. Let us rst de ne a diagnosis:

Denition 3.3.13 A Diagnosis
Let hA  B i be an inferential closure for a problem P, then B , its belief part, is a
diagnosis for P.
Indeed, most formalizations of diagnosis take a diagnosis as their solution. In GDD,
however, we associate more importance with the goals (and consequently the actions)
adopted during the diagnosis process. We shall therefore de ne a solution as follows:

Denition 3.3.14 A Solution to a Diagnostic Problem
A solution to a diagnostic problem P is the complete inferential closure hA  B i.
Consider, for example, the situation in Example 3.3.11 where it is unknown whether
the patient su ers an ischemic spinal cord injury. The diagnosis is thus de cient
in that regard. However, if according to the goal-setting rules for this particular
situation, A(Ischemic spinal cord injury)=i (irrelevant), or even u (unknown),
then it may not be relevant and the solution is thus satisfactory.
In the ECM architecture, solving the current diagnostic problem has an operational
purpose too: it de nes the goals to be pursued next by the planner and hence the
relative importance of goals. In the ECM algorithm (Algorithm 3.3.15), the GDD
reasoner is invoked whenever new information is acquired. The solution it provides
is subsequently used to guide the planner in the choice of activity which, in turn,
may provide new information to start a new cycle.
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Algorithm 3.3.15 Diagnosis-and-Repair in the ECM Architecture
1. Initialize hA B i to coincide with OBS
2. Compute an inferential closure for hA  B i
3. Construct a plan P for the combination of goals indicated by that closure
4. Until P is empty do

 Execute P until new evidence arrives
 Update hA  B i to reect this evidence
 Go to step 2
Note that the termination criterion is not necessarily related to the completeness of
of the working diagnosis. The process terminates when the plan is empty, i.e. when
all goals have been addressed, or no means are available for addressing remaining
goals, etc. On the other hand, while goals are the \architectural duty" of the GDD
reasoner, the belief part of the solution (characterization) is still important serving
two purposes: rst, to human users, it is useful for the system to be able to explain
its decisions. Second, beliefs can be useful for planning separate from the goals they
give rise to, as they might a ect choice of means and/or ordering decisions.

3.4 Reasoning about Contradictory Information
In this section I rst motivate explicit representation and reasoning about contradictory information. Then, I extend the representational language and inference
paradigm to support such reasoning.
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3.4.1 Motivation
Even though ? is part of both the belief and the attitude bilattices, it cannot be
assigned to a proposition in the framework developed thus far this follows directly
from the fact that propositions are never initialized with ?, the fact that truth
assignments are computed using _ and ^ only, and the fact that ? is not in the
closure of fT F U g under ^ and _. On one hand, this is a good feature of the
representation and inference scheme. Ginsberg, for example, notes that ? tends to
\pollute" an interpretation. That is, when ? is assigned to one proposition, it will
often propagate to many other dependent propositions. On the other hand, I will
argue that ? is important as an explicit record of contradictory evidence and will
suggest a few technical ways to overcome the pollution problem.
Consider two alternative methods used by TraumAID 2.0 to diagnose a tension
pneumothorax (tp):
1. X-ray shows Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
) Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
2. Needle aspiration shows pressure in chest(Side=S)
) Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)

If one follows a conrmation strategy5 then positive results in one test justify a
diagnosis. However, what if one test is negative, and the other has not been taken?
By the semantic interpretation of the above rules, tp is unknown (computed as
F_U). It is not proven, but cannot be dismissed since not all the rules have failed.
On the other hand, in standard medical practice, a negative test suces to rule out
TP so long as no other indication contradicts these test results. Furthermore, it is
medically incorrect to perform the other test just for complete vindication. Insofar
as this other test is not performed and provides contradictory evidence, tp should
be assumed absent (note the non-monotonicity). This reasoning may be encoded in
5

See Section 7.2.
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the following augmented GDD rules:
1'. X-ray shows Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S) ^
compatible-with(Needle aspiration shows pressure in chest(Side=S))
) Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
2'. Needle aspiration shows pressure in chest(Side=S) ^
compatible-with(X-ray shows Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S))
) Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)

With the addition of a new antecedent, each of these rules will now fail if either
test is negative. Otherwise, if either or both tests come up positive, and there is no
contradictory evidence, tp is positively concluded.
Now consider the case in which the two tests are performed and provide contradictory
evidence. Given the rst set of rules, tp will be concluded. Given the modi ed set,
both rules will fail: one due to the explicit requirement for a positive result, the other
due to the compatibility requirement. tp will thus be concluded absent. However,
although it may well be the case that tp is absent, in such instances medical practice
defaults to treatment as if tp was present.
So far, a proposition is true or false if it is so asserted or concluded. It is labeled unknown if it is not reported or cannot be concluded. In other words, unknown arises
from lack of knowledge. Contradictions belong to a dierent class of unknowns.
Commonly arising in practice, while themselves representing an inconsistency (either in what one observes or in one's interpretation of what one observes), it is
important to represent and cope with them in a consistent manner. In order to do
so, I rst extend the rule representation to allow explicit negative conclusions and
then generalize the inference accordingly.
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3.4.2 Explicit Negative Conclusions
Reconsidering the original set of rules for tp, two rules can be added in which tp is
ruled out whenever either of the two tests indicates its absence:
3. :X-ray shows Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
) :Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
4. :Needle aspiration shows pressure in chest(Side=S)
) :Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
tp is now concluded if either test is positive, while :tp is concluded if either test is
negative. A conict arises if we want to interpret :tp as the negation of tp, namely

when both tests are taken and one succeeds whereas the other fails. In such instance,
both tp and :tp will be assigned a truth value T. Ginsberg suggests a more general
rst-order framework under which conicts can be represented. The extended form
of inference presented next is a specialization of his approach to the propositional
rule-based case.

3.4.3 Inference
Inference must now be rede ned to allow for rules that explicitly falsify a proposition
and for the need to combine positive and negative contributions. In 58], the full rstorder formulation of MVL assigns to a statement a truth-value that combines the
results of all possible proofs for that statement and its negation. Theoretically, such
determination may be undecidable in practice, it may often be cumbersome. In
contrast, in the propositional rule-based case, proofs need not be searched for since
they are given explicitly by the corresponding rules.
In the new de nition of consistent inference (De nition 3.4.1), the body of each rule
headed by a given proposition p or its negation :p is rst evaluated. The resulting
values for p and :p are then combined using the + operator. This interpretation
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is natural because one can view each rule as a separate argument for or against p.
Combining them is thus a synthesis of knowledge sources, and + is the operator that
\adds" along the bilattice's knowledge dimension. Since conditions for both p and
:p are speci ed explicitly, \negation as failure" is unnecessary. To avoid negation
by failure, each rule's body is padded with U. Thus, a proposition p evaluates to F
only if at least one of the rules for :p succeeds, but not necessarily when all rules
for p fail.

Denition 3.4.1 Consistent Inference (Redened)
An attitude-belief hA B i is a consistent inference for a diagnostic problem instance

Pi

1. It coincides with OBS, i.e for all h2 M0 B (h) = OBS(h)
2. For any proposition d2H{M0, let fRigki=1 be the set of evidential rules with d
as their header and fRigli=1 the set of evidential rules with :d as their header.
Let B (R) denote the evaluation of a rule R body as in De nition 3.3.9, then

B (d) = Pki=1(B (body(Ri)) _ U ) + Pli=1(:B (body(Ri)) ^ U )
3. Similarly, for any proposition d2H, let fRigki=1 be the set of goal-setting rules
with d as their header and fRigli=1 the set of goal-setting rules with :d as their
header. Let B (R) denote a rule's evaluation, then

A (d) = attitude-to-belief;1 (Pki=1(B (Ri ) _ U ) + Pli=1(:B (Ri) ^ U ))
Using the above inference scheme and the four rules for tp, a positive determination
(T) will be made if either or both tests come up positive. A negative determination
(F) will be made if one test is negative and the other is either negative or has not
been taken. Finally, if the two tests contradict each other, then tp will be assigned
a ? value.
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3.4.4 Dealing With Contradictions
Two major concerns need to be addressed in representing and reasoning about contradictory information. The rst problem concerns the semantic interpretation of
a contradiction. Let p be a proposition for which a contradiction (?) has been inferred. (I describe this in terms of belief, but unless said otherwise, the same applies
to attitude.) Consider rules whose antecedents refer to p. The following two cases
should be distinguished:
1. Antecedents of the form f (p), where f is a predicate, will either contribute T,
if f is the contradictory predicate (cf. De nitions 3.3.4, 3.3.8) or F otherwise.
Such antecedents do not present a problem since they map ? back to the more
conservative set of values.
2. Antecedents of the form p, :p, :known(p), compatible-with(p), unless(p) or
unknown(p) yield ? when evaluated on ?, and thus propagate it. This is the
\pollution" phenomenon.
Prior to assessing the rami cations of pollution, consider the problem of what to do
when a proposition is assigned a ? belief. Unfortunately, the answer varies. In some
cases, a positive (or negative) default is appropriate. For example, when asked if
Tweety can y, given the two contradictory rules for birds and penguins, a negative
default should be preferred. In other circumstances, none of the conclusions can be
safely made and further investigation is warranted. When tests have low reliability,
for example, a third test may be taken or one of the tests may be repeated. In yet
other cases, a conclusive decision may be irrelevant (e.g. vis-a-vis the GDD principle), or a default to a particular treatment may be preferred. For example, when
diagnosing tp, one will default to treating as if tp was positively diagnosed. Note
however the distinction between defaulting to positive conclusion versus defaulting
to positive treatment.
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The GDD principle frees us from resolving irrelevant contradictions. Otherwise, the
contradictory predicate can be used to explicitly specify the desired behavior. For
example, the following rule concludes the need to treat as if tp is positive:
contradictory(Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S))
> Rx Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)

As for the pollution problem, it is insignicant when the proposition to which a
? belief was assigned has no other propositions dependent upon it, or when this
proposition and its dependents are all irrelevant. Otherwise, a ? belief must simply
be tolerated as a type of unknown. If well programmed, pollution of relevant propositions in the ECM architecture is by de nition a temporary phenomenon whose
resolution is attempted in subsequent cycles. Finally, the spread of pollution can be
blocked by padding rules with antecedents of the form :contradictory(p) where p is
a proposition which may be polluted. This scheme can either be applied across the
board (as a macro expansion) or tailored to particular situations.

3.5 Diagnosis-and-Repair as Search
So far, the discussion has been limited to individual diagnostic problems. However,
embedded in the ECM architecture, the GDD reasoner will have to solve a number of
such problems in each diagnosis-and-repair session. In this section, I discuss possible
changes in an agent's attitude-belief through a complete management session. I rst
portray the diagnosis-and-repair process as a search through a space of mental states,
namely attitude-belief assignments. Then, given the GDD principle, I will discuss
restrictions on the directions this search can take.
One way to view the overall diagnostic process is as a path-traversal in an AttitudeBelief (AB) space. Each transition on that path corresponds to a change in the
reasoner's previous attitude-belief assignment. Such change can either be the result
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of new observations, volunteered or acquired, or they can be the result of recent
inferences.

Denition 3.5.1 Updated Attitude-Belief
Let ; def
= hA B i be an attitude-belief. We de ne ; j B (h)=v to be an attitude-belief
that is the same as ; except that the belief in h is updated to v (where v2BB).
Similarly, we de ne ; j A(h)=v to be the same as ; except that the attitude toward
h is updated to v (where v2BA).
Denition 3.5.2 Accessibility Relation in the AB-space
The immediate accessibility relation in the AB-space corresponds to a single change
in attitude or in belief with regard to a single proposition h. Let ; def
= hA  B i be
a state, h a proposition and v the new attitude or belief for h, then
Result(;, h, v) def
= ; j A(h)=v , when the change is in attitude or
def
Result(;, h, v) = ; j B (h)=v , when the change is in belief.
The accessibility relation Result generalizes Result to a sequence of updates. Given
an initial state ; def
= hA B i and a sequence of updates fhi vigni=1, we recursively
de ne
8
>< Result(; h1 v1)
if n = 1
Result (; fhi vigni=1) def
= >
: Result(Result (; fhi vigni=1;1) hn  vn) otherwise
Adopting this convention, a diagnostic session can be mapped to a traversal in the
AB-space which starts from an initial state, one that describes the initial observations
when diagnosis commences, to a goal state, one which corresponds to some desired
or acceptable state of a airs. Some transitions correspond to inferences made by the
GDD inference procedure, whereas others correspond to information that is either
volunteered or obtained via action. Importantly, while at a given state, a number of
transitions may be valid however, many fewer will also be worth taking, i.e. when
combined, will reliably and e ectively bring the agent to a goal state.
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Figure 3.3: Concreteness Partial Order ( c)
Re nement is a binary-relation that de nes one type of transition. First, given
the t partial order, we say that one belief is more concrete than another if it is
closer to either T or F. (Figure 3.3 illustrates graphically the concreteness relation
in the basic bilattice.) Informally, if two attitude-beliefs are concrete, then they are
equally re ned. If neither is concrete, then one is more re ned than the other if that
de ciency is restricted to less relevant ( r ) propositions. Formally,

Denition 3.5.3 Attitude-Belief Renement
Let hA1 B1i and hA2 B2i be attitude-belief assignments and let h be a proposition.
hA2 B2i is an immediate renement w.r.t. h of hA1 B1i (denoted hA2 B2i <h hA1 B1i)
i

1. for all h02H;fhg, hA2 B2i coincides with hA1 B1i and
2. for h, either of the following holds:
(a) B2(h)

c

B1(h) or

(b) B1(h),B2(h) 2 fU, ?g, and A2(h)

r

A1(h).

Note that <h is a partial order (transitive and anti-symmetric). Let < def
= h2H <h
then hA2 B2i is an immediate renement of hA1 B1i (without referring to a particular
proposition) i hA2 B2i < hA1 B1i. Let < denote the transitive closure of <.
hA2 B2i is a renement of hA1 B1i i hA2 B2i < hA1 B1i.
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While useful for better characterization, re nement is often costly too. Thus, according to the GDD principle, active re nement should be con ned to issues that
are likely to a ect repair. More generally, one wants to control any wasteful activity.
For example, one may want to avoid repair activity that will not make a worthwhile
di erence to the patient state6.

Denition 3.5.4 Other Transition-types
Let ; def
= hA  B i be a state, h a proposition, and v an attitude or belief value.
1. An inference transition in the AB-space is one that is licensed by simple inference:

 InferRB(;, h, v) is the transition from ; that is licensed by a one-step
inference

 Infer-AllRB(;) denotes an exhaustive sequence of inferences that starts at
; (using an inference procedure such as 3.3.12).

2. An action transition-sequence in the AB-space is a sequence of transitions that
is licensed by an action (or lack thereof).
Acta(;) is a transition-sequence resulting from new information acquired by
performing the action a in the state ;. More generally, such transitions can be
represented stochastically with several possible outcomes.
3. An action-and-inference transition-sequence in the AB-space is a sequence of
transitions that correspond to an action (or lack thereof) and to subsequent
exhaustive inferences.

Before proceeding, I should concede that non-active renement may also require signicant
resources and may thus have to be controlled too. Inference, for example, may require substantial
computational resources, and time. While it may seem that I am ignoring computational complexity
issues altogether, it is important to note that computation can also be represented as activity, if
need be considered as such. I distinguish activity not so much because of what it requires from
the agent, but more because of its potential eect on the patient. Interestingly enough, in trauma
management, one does not even want to control all activity: bed-side questions, for example, are
conveniently regarded as free and riskless.
6
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PerformaRB(;) is a transition-sequence resulting from new information acquired or inferred as a result of an action. In particular, PerformaRB(;) def
=
Acta(;) Infer-AllRB(;'), where ;' is the state resulting from Acta(;).
For the purpose of controlling activity, it suces to attend to an abstraction of
the AB-space according to the Perform relation. That is, all transitions that are
not in that relation can be ignored, and likewise all states that are not linked to
any otherwise legitimate state by it. Given a speci c attitude-belief describing the
current state, we can also further constrain ourselves to states that are reachable from
that state. The result is a situation calculus 101] in which situations are described
as an attitude-belief assignment to a set of propositions, and in which Perform serves
as an accessibility relation.
Given this situation-calculus and a current state, the problem is to decide on a
sequence of action(-and-inference) transitions. Note however that, in this level of
generality, this is precisely the basic planning problem with which we started, and
which is unrealistically hard. What is new is that each of the state descriptions
includes information about the relative relevance of acquiring certain knowledge and
achieving certain conditions (goals).
In the ECM architecture, via the explicit encoding of goals, I hope to be able to avoid
some of the complexity of that search. In particular, as further elaborated in Chapter 5, activity is controlled via three mechanisms in two levels. At the goal level, we
have goal setting rules to distinguish relevant action transitions from irrelevant ones
and goal inhibition rules (cf. Section 3.6) to inhibit relevant but non-contributing
or non-essential transitions. In the action level, the planner (cf. Chapter 4) uses
goals to index sets of alternative procedures, and uses choice- and prioritization
principles to select and order action transitions for a combination of goals. All three
mechanisms, and combinations thereof, are rendered useful in important diagnosisand-repair strategies catalogued in Chapter 7.
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3.6 Goal Inhibition
One dimension along which strategies can be categorized is whether they are constructive or eliminative. While strategies are often designed to provide constructive
advice, the on-going interplay between diagnosis and therapy in trauma management
may sometimes require that pursuit of certain goals be delayed or even inhibited.
While goal interaction can naturally be addressed by a planner, the planning task
is notoriously complex, and it may thus be advantageous if unnecessary or noncontributing goals can be inhibited before they are passed on to the planner.
The basic approach to goal inhibition is to qualify goal-setting rules by the negation
of any inhibition condition. Consider, for example a patient with a right lumbar
wound. Normally, such injury would suggest a possible duodenal injury:
Right lumbar wound > Duodenal injury

A standard test for duodenal injury is a CT scan. However, this lengthy and costly
procedure should not be pursued once there is a perceived need for a laparotomy
since the surgical procedure will expose the duodenum anyway. Thus, one could
qualify the above rule as follows
Right lumbar wound ^
unless(Laparotomy required) > Duodenal injury

While correct, the problem with such inhibition scheme is that if the inhibition condition is complex, rules become even more complex and hard to maintain. In addition,
overloading rules makes them less interpretable: the separate function of each of a
rule's antecedents becomes unclear (cf. 21]). Instead, inhibiting relationships between goals and between goals and conclusions can be specied separately. For each
goal g, we can de ne an inhibition clause which will then be compiled (as a macro
expansion) into all of that goal's goal-setting rules.
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Denition 3.6.1 Goal Inhibition Clause
Given a goal g, inhibit(g) speci es the condition(s) under which g has to be inhibited.
Technically, the macro expansion procedure for a goal inhibition clause creates a new
internal proposition called inhibit(g) and a set of rules headed by that proposition
that correspond to the condition itself. In the above example, the following new rule
is added:
Laparotomy required ) inhibit(Duodenal injury)

Then, every goal-setting rule for g will be padded as follows: Let body(R) be the
original body of a goal-setting rule R, replace body(R) with

body0(R) def
= body(R) ^ :true(inhibit(g))
An alternative, more elegant, approach to goal inhibition is based on the extension
of GDD proposed in Section 3.4. In the extended framework, a goal-setting rule with
a negated header can be thought of as representing an argument against pursuing
that goal exactly what we mean by inhibition. Taking that view, a goal inhibition
rule is considered together with all reasons for its pursuit. Under this approach, goal
inhibition rules are constructed as follows:
Let g be a goal, and let inhibit(g) be an inhibition clause for g. Add a goal-inhibition
rule:
inhibit(g) > :g
Under the inference procedure of Section 3.4, a contradictory attitude (?) will be
assigned to a goal for which both a goal-setting and a goal-inhibition rule have
succeeded. In our previous example, we will write:
Laparotomy required > :Duodenal injury
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A third approach to eectively inhibit goals which is sometimes preferable in implementing diagnostic strategies is to \force" a concrete value (i.e. T or F) on the goal's
underlying proposition. Such an approach is likely to be preferable when the belief
in the inhibited goal can be inferred from the inhibiting condition scaled diagnosis,
discussed in the next example, is a case in point. Otherwise, this approach may not
be elegant. For example, in the previous example, we could not conclude whether or
not the patient su ers a duodenal injury. The net e ect of that approach is that the
goal remains relevant, but is regarded achieved by the planner and thus not actively
pursued.

3.7 Example
In this section, I present a simpli ed version of TraumAID 2.0's diagnosis-and-repair
strategy for tension pneumothorax (tp). The rules presented here were transformed
from TraumAID 2.0's original knowledge base for the purpose of testing an implementation of the MVL-based formalization of GDD presented in this chapter. Rules
are numbered, and appear in the order in which they were designed. The numbers,
however, serve no purpose other than referential.
Diagnosis of tp follows a general strategy which I call scaled diagnosis, and which is
further discussed in Chapter 7. Briey, in this strategy, diagnostic activity proceeds cautiously by rst acquiring information of low cost. Figure 3.4 presents
the rst two stages of the diagnostic part of this strategy. It starts with a report of a chest wound. Rule 400 initiates the rst diagnostic (knowledge) goal,
Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax (ptp), by labeling its attitude r. When
this goal is referred to the planner, and maybe depending on other needs, the planner may ask whether the patient is in shock and/or whether the patient su ers
from distended neck veins. (The fact that each of these ndings is an alternative
means of satisfying this goal is represented in the planner's knowledge base.) If
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 A chest wound initiates the process by setting first knowledge goal
400

Chest_Wound (Side . S)
> Possibility_of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

 Initial physical evidence is gathered and used to continue or rule out
401

Chest_Wound (Side . S)
Shock
=> Possibility_of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

402

Chest_Wound (Side . S)
Distended_Neck_Veins
=> Possibility_of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

 In the case of positive evidence, the diagnostic process gears up
500

Possibility_Of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
> Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

 ...and more examination takes place
501

Possibility_Of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
Decreased_Breath_Sounds (Side . S)
=> Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

 enough clinical evidence to justify testing
600

Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
> Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

Figure 3.4: Diagnosis of Tension Pneumothorax { Part 1
positive, any of these ndings will con rm that there is a ptp, and the next knowledge goal, Likely Tension Pneumothorax (ltp), will be instantiated. Note that if
it was immediately volunteered that the patient was in shock, then reasoning could
immediately \leap" to that latter stage. If that was the case, then ptp's attitude
would still have been labeled r, but it would not have been pursued since its belief
would have been concrete (t in this case). To pursue ltp, again depending on other
concurrent needs, the patient breath sounds would be assessed. The nal diagnostic goal, labeled accordingly Tension Pneumothorax (tp), is instantiated if ltp is
con rmed.
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 Alternatives: TP can be diagnosed via either X-ray or needle.
601

Tension_Pneumothorax_On_X-Ray (Side . S)
=> Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

602

Needle_Aspiration_Chest_For_Pressure (Side . S)
=> Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

603

not Tension_Pneumothorax_On_X-Ray (Side . S)
=> not Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

604

not Needle_Aspiration_Chest_For_Pressure (Side . S)
=> not Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

 Recommendation part. If unsure, treat "as if" positive.
700

Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
> Rx_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

701

conflicted Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
> Rx_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

Figure 3.5: Diagnosis of Tension Pneumothorax { Part 2
Figure 3.5 presents the nal diagnostic stage, which was already discussed in Section 3.4 in the context of the reasoning about potentially contradictory evidence.
Recall also that the therapeutic goal Rx Tension Pneumothorax (rtp) was recommended both when tp was con rmed, and also when there was contradictory evidence with respect to its presence.
Figure 3.6 describes the therapeutic part of that strategy. Notice that therapeutic
goals are only labeled satis ed when there is actual evidence to that e ect. Also note
that there are two therapeutic goals, depending on whether the patient is stable or
not. Finally notice the interaction of the therapeutic sub-strategy with the diagnostic
sub-strategy in cases where a needle is used in the latter: a patient that was diagnosed
through a needle aspiration does not need further decompression.
Goal inhibition knowledge is encoded in Figure 3.7 following the scheme by which
lower-level goals are being subsumed by their successors when the latter are being
concluded directly.
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702

Chest_Tube (Side . S)
unless Persistent_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
=> Rx_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

 If in shock, relieve it before proceeding with definitive treatment.
800

relevant Rx_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
Shock
> Decompressed_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

 if a needle was used for diagnosis then already decompressed.
801

Needle_Aspiration_Chest_For_Pressure (Side . S)
=> Decompressed_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

 that's not a good way to do it, but will achieve the goal.
802

Chest_Tube (Side . S)
=> Decompressed_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

Figure 3.6: Treatment of Tension Pneumothorax

10400 Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
=> Possibility_Of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
10401 relevant Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
=> Possibility_Of_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
10500 Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
=> Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
10501 relevant Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)
=> Likely_Tension_Pneumothorax (Side . S)

Figure 3.7: Tension Pneumothorax: Hierarchical Organization of Goals
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3.8 Reasoning with Default Rules
Defaults have been shown to be useful in non-monotonic reasoning 130], and Ginsberg presents a corresponding default bilattice for his MVL framework (Figure 3.8).
An advantage of using MVL as an underlying framework is the ability to replace the
4-valued bilattice with the default bilattice as the domain for belief and attitude.

k

F

T

*
df

dt

U
t

Figure 3.8: Basic Default Bilattice
In the default bilattice, dt and df represent a degree of truthfulness-knowledge that
corresponds, respectively, to positive and negative default conclusions. With respect
to the t partial order, dt (and respectively df ) is in-between the absolute unknown
U, and the absolute truth, T (respectively F). Likewise, with respect to the k partial
order, both dt and df are inferior to either T, or F but represent more knowledge
than U. Another new point is introduced, *, corresponding to a contradiction of
default rules.
Defaults bilattices can also be extended to represent a number of prioritized defaults
(i.e. which would one rather believe rst, which second, etc.) Linearly ordered
by the t partial order, di erent default values can also be viewed as discretized
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probability measures and may be useful in implementing diagnostic strategies in
which a determinate conclusion cannot be made and a decision has to be made
based on the most likely diagnosis. Figure 3.9 depicts a prioritized default bilattice.
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T
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*n-1

dfn
dfn-1

dtn
dtn-1

.
.
.

df2

*1

dt2
dt1

df1
U

t

Figure 3.9: Prioritized (Ordered) Default Bilattice
Any number of positive/negative defaults can be de ned. In fact, one can even have
a continuum of positive and negative default points. Consider a mapping of the
truthfulnessknowledge values of positive default points into the 0,1]0,1] interval
and the negative default points into the -1,1]0,1] interval, such that the point (0,0)
denotes the bilattice u point, (1,1) denotes the t point, and (-1,1) denotes the f point
(Figure 3.10). It is only important that monotonicity in both t and k is kept along
both lines. An additional line of \contradictory" points extends up from the u point,
taking values (0,k) for 0 k 1, with the ? point denoted by the point (0,1). Points
in this bilattice are combined according to a k and t partial orders which are
usually de ned by the truthfulness/knowledge coordinates. The only exception in
the de nition of k is that in case of equal \knowledge" coordinates, points along
the contradictory line are de ned to be superior. Thus, use of the + operator to
combine two points with equal knowledge value k but distinct truthfulness values
yields the a \contradictory" value (0 k).
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Figure 3.10: Bilattice with Continuous Defaults
GDD uses two bilattices, as domains for belief and attitude. However, as noted in
Section 3.3, in extending a system's representation to a default bilattice, it is not
necessary that both bilattices be the same. When the two bilattices are di erent, either the relevant functor or the attitude-to-belief function may have to be interpreted
as a non-covering homomorphism from one bilattice to the other.
Of course, having a default bilattice as an underlying domain for belief and attitude
is only useful if default rules can be written and used to manipulate such assignments.
At present, TraumAID does not use any default rules (at least not explicitly). Next,
we adopt Reiter's convention 130] by which a default rule has the form:
:1:::n
!
where  i ! are simply formulae.
The model-based semantic interpretation of this rule is as follows: if  holds, and
if i's are all consistent, then one should default to models in which ! holds. More
restrictive forms of default rules are normal (of the form !:! ) and supernormal (of
the form :!! ).
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Given a default rule, speci ed as above, it can be automatically translated (preserving its semantic interpretation) into a corresponding GDD evidential-rule7 as
follows.

Algorithm 3.8.1 Representing a Reiter-style Default Rule
Let R def
= 1:::n!:1:::m be a default evidential rule, where !, i, i are all
propositions, and i are interpreted as a conjunction. Translate R into the following
GDD evidential rule.
R' def
= true(1) ^ : : : ^ true(n) ^ :false(1) ^ : : : ^ :false(m) ^ dt ) !
For negative defaults, we do the same, only with :! in the header8.
Inference remains as before. Thus, default rules are merely another source of information, only one with a weaker con dence (which in Ginsberg's formulation, is
represented by lesser knowledge capacity). Note that by that inference, if p is a
proposition for which we have defaulted to dt, then if p is proved (respectively refuted) by another non-default rule, then p will be assigned T (respectively F). If,
on the other hand, there is another applicable default rule for :p, then * will be
assigned to p.
Having introduced an intermediate truth capacity, the goal interpretation issue arises
again, i.e. should a proposition for which a dt relevance was assigned be adopted as
a goal? For adopted goals, what is an acceptable degree of satisfaction with their
achievement: is it enough to conclude dt for a goal proposition? This is, of course,
highly subjective and should thus be left to implementation.
Similar procedure applies for goal-setting rules.
Note that this is dierent from using df as the rightmost antecedent of a rule with ! in its
header.
7
8
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3.9 Goal-Directed Reasoning in TraumAID 2.0
TraumAID 2.0's diagnostic reasoner embodies most of the ideas of the GDD paradigm
just described, but not its formal details. The latter is, in fact, a later formalization
of the kind of reasoning used by TraumAID 2.0. Next, for the sake of completeness,
I will describe the details of this implementation. This description should also convince the reader that the GDD formalization captures and distills the principles and
spirit of TraumAID 2.0's diagnostic reasoning, although presents them in a more
general and elegant way. The MVL-based formalization of GDD was implemented
separately.
Built on top of TraumAID 1.0's inference engine, TraumAID 2.0's diagnostic reasoner
uses facts to represent primitive propositions9 . The rst di erence between the
implementation and the formalization is that each such fact is assigned a single
truth value (roughly speaking, representing belief), compared with an attitude and
belief in the formalization. In addition each such truth value is restricted to the
set f T, F, U g. Thus, TraumAID 2.0 does not have the richness of conicts and
defaults.
Here too, rules are used to represent knowledge. As in Section 3.3, rules are only
allowed to have positive headers. A rule may succeed, if all its antecedents are known
to hold (i.e. T , or F ), fail, if one of its antecedents is known not to hold (F ), or
be inapplicable if one of its antecedents is unknown. Inference follows a forward
chaining paradigm10 where a proposition is assigned a truth value T if one of the
rules for which it serves as a header succeeds. It is assigned a truth value F , if
all such rules fail. Otherwise, if some but not all of such rules fail (others being
Facts may have attributes associated with them. Although those attributes may be existentially
quantied, we can safely regard facts as primitive propositions since the domains for attributes are
nite, and often small.
10While for the most part inference follows the forward chaining paradigm, TraumAID 2.0 still
has some leftover backward chainers. In TraumAID 1.0, backward chaining was used for information acquisition. While in TraumAID 2.0, planning is used for that purpose, some rules which
are backward chained to acquire bed-side questions were left. Imposing a planned information
acquisition process on those is possible and was not done solely as a matter of convenience.
9
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inapplicable), it is assigned a U value.
TraumAID 2.0 has rules of a single type, which are used to implement both goalsetting and evidential reasoning. The semantic distinction is made by separating
two types of facts: conclusions and goals. Di erent facts represent a condition
(e.g. Pericardial Tamponade), and goals associated with that condition (for example, RO Pericardial Tamponade the goal of learning about that condition, and
Rx Pericardial Tamponade, the goal of treating it once it was diagnosed). Since conclusions and goals are represented in di erent facts, additional machinery is used to
link them (for example, in order to avoid the pursuit of the diagnostic goal when one
already has knowledge about the disease by other means).
Consider again the diagnosis and treatment of a pericardial tamponade (Example 3.3.6). The corresponding rules in TraumAID 2.0 are:
1. Rules for setting a diagnostic (knowledge) goal:
(: : : ) ! RO Pericardial Tamponade
\It is relevant to know if the condition holds".
2. Rules for satisfying a diagnostic (knowledge) goal:
(: : : ) ! Pericardial Tamponade
\Conclude whether the condition holds".
3. Rules for setting a therapeutic goal:
(: : : ) ! Relieve Pressure Pericardial Sac
\It is relevant to address the condition".
4. Rules for satisfying a therapeutic goal:
(: : : ) ! Successfully Relieved Pressure Pericardial Sac
\Conclude whether the condition has been successfully addressed".
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TraumAID 2.0 has another mechanism, called goal-hierarchy, made of goal inhibition clauses which are automatically compiled into the rules. Initially, inhibition
conditions were limited to a description of a partial order (hierarchy) among goals.
For a given goal, these indicated at the presence of which other goals it should be
inhibited. These inhibition clauses took the form:
(inhibited-goal (inhibitive-goal-1    inhibitive-goal-n))

where the inhibited goal is to be inhibited whenever any of the inhibitive goals is
determined to be relevant.
For example, this hierarchy could be used to represent a goal-specialization relationship by inhibiting a general goal at the presence of any of its specializations, as in
.
(RO Possibility Of Esophageal Injury)
((RO Lower Thoracic Esophageal Injury)
(RO Upper Thoracic Esophageal Injury)))

Since it may sometimes be useful to inhibit a goal when a certain fact holds, the
syntax of an inhibition clause was then extended to allow any fact in the antecedent
part.
To summarize, TraumAID 2.0's embodies an implementation of GDD that is similar
to, albeit not the same as, the MVL-based formalization presented in this chapter.
In the formalization, which chronologically followed the implementation, I tried to
create a version of GDD that is cleaner and more elegant than the original implementation, while preserving the original avor.

66

Chapter 4
An Approach to ECM Planning
4.1 Progressive Horizon Planning
4.1.1 Planning as Search in a Situation-Action Space
Classical planners originated from theorem-provers and search-based problem solvers
such as GPS 63, 111, 43]. There are several ways in which planning can be viewed
as a search task: Classical planners (e.g. Strips 44], Noah 137], Sipe 159], Hacker
144], Nonlin 150]) view planning as a search in a space of plans. In a plan-space,
states represent plan structures and transitions correspond to transformations that
take one plan structure and transform it into another (e.g. add or remove action,
impose or change order, re ne the detail, etc.1) Alternatively, planning can also
be viewed as search in a space of world state descriptions, connected with edges
representing world state transformations (e.g. 101, 88, 59, 161]).
While in the context of planning action-based transformations are clearly of special
interest, other operators may also be relevant. Consider, for example, the AttitudeBelief (AB) space of Chapter 3. It quali es as such space as its states can be viewed
As aside, there is a common distinction in the planning community between those planners
who work in the space of partially ordered plans, and those that consider linearized plans (see 106]
for a relevant discussion).
1
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Figure 4.1: Situation-Action Tree.
as subjective (and also introspective) world descriptions. In addition to action-based
transformations, it also has transformations based on internal inference, volunteered
information or unexpected events, etc.
By a Situation-Action (SA) space, I mean a space of world descriptions as above,
which is abstracted to only reect agent-controlled action-based transitions (including the special no-action transition). Assuming for a moment that world descriptions
are complete, and yet manageable, and ignoring the e ects of uncertainty and unpredictability, a planning task can be de ned as follows:
Given an initial state, a repertoire of actions, and a goal-state description, nd
a sequence of actions (path in the SA-space) that transforms the initial state
to a goal state.
Viewed that way, planning can be accomplished via simple search for a goal state in
a (possibly in nite) directed tree2, rooted at the initial state. I call this the SA-tree.
Figure 4.1 depicts a simple SA-tree.
Obviously, planning by simply searching an SA-space representation is not a practical enterprise. However, since it so closely resembles a simulation of reality, plans
I simplify here as this may actually be a graph, and may even contain cycles, i.e. sequences
of actions that \cancel out" one another. However, I will only use the SA-tree as a presentation
metaphor, and so this simplication does not represent a problem.
2
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constructed using other representations may easily be transformed into the SA-space,
making it attractive as a common ground for evaluating arti cial (and also human)
planning techniques.
One way in which the SA-space resembles a simulation of reality lies in how it can
capture uncertainty and unpredictability. As a matter of terminology, by uncertainty
I refer to lack of knowledge which can be remedied via exploration, whereas by unpredictability I refer to unexpected events or outcomes that can only be determined
after the fact. Alternatively, of course, both uncertainty and unpredicatability can
be dealt with by making plans that are more robust and/or by conditionalizing one's
plans to accommodate multiple outcomes. In the SA-space, unpredictability means
that a given action performed at a given state may result in one of a number of possible states, each corresponding to a di erent outcome. Search-wise, unpredictability
results in an increased branching factor. Uncertainty means that one may not know
what exact state one is in, so one may have to expand the plan to include more
diagnostic activity.

Consider the e ect of uncertainty on the previous example, as depicted in Figure 4.2.
If the agent does not know whether a is a block or a pyramid, it has one of two options: either to go ahead with a plan that does not verify a's nature, or expand
the plan with an exploratory move. Note, however, that if not for the uncertainty,
exploratory actions could have been eliminated without any adverse e ect on the
plan's correctness. Uncertainty thus contributes to the length of the plan. Unfortunately, in a simple brute force search, the plan's length is exponentially related to
the size of the search space, and consequently its run-time.
The Perform-abstracted AB-space (cf. Section 3.5) is an example of such SA-space.
69

Clear(a)
On(a,table)
Block(b)
Clear(b)
On(b,table)

?Block(a)

a

b

PutOn(a,b)
PutOn(b,a)

Clear(a)
On(a,b)
Block(b)
~Clear(b)
On(b,table)

a
b

~Clear(a)
On(a,table)
Block(b)
Clear(b)
On(b,a)
-----~Pyramid(a)

Shape?(a)

Clear(a)
On(a,table)
Block(b)
Clear(b)
On(b,table)
-----~Block(a)

b
a

a

Pyramid(a)
Clear(a)
On(a,table)
Block(b)
Clear(b)
On(a,table)

Block(a)
Clear(a)
On(a,table)
Block(b)
Clear(b)
On(b,table)

b
PutOn(a,b)

PutOn(a,b)
PutOn(b,a)
Block(a)
Clear(a)
On(a,b)
Block(b)
~Clear(b)
On(b,table)

Block(a)
~Clear(a)
On(a,table)
Block(b)
Clear(b)
On(b,a)

a
b

Pyramid(a)
Clear(a)
On(a,b)
Block(b)
~Clear(b)
On(b,table)

b
a

a
b

Figure 4.2: SA-tree with Uncertainty

4.1.2 Complete Plans that are Optimized to a Horizon
While the SA-space-based characterization of the planning task is methodologically
useful, it is hardly useful in an algorithmic sense. Given the complexity of planning
as search, in both the plans-space and the situation-action space 14], much of the
research in that area has focused on ways to reduce search. Some common tactics
includes:

 Use of heuristics in focusing the search, e.g. 66, 43]
 Resource-bounded search, e.g. 89, 91, 134]
 Means-ends analysis, e.g. 44]
 Search for partially-ordered plans, e.g. 137, 150, 160]
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 Least commitment approach, e.g. 142, 74]
 Abstraction of plan and operator descriptions, e.g. 136, 85, 152, 46]
 Defaults and approximate planning, e.g. 41, 62].
 Search-space decomposition, e.g. 94, 109, 157], operator decomposition, e.g.
86], and competence level decomposition, e.g. 10].

 Reactive planning via o -line computation, e.g. 47, 55, 138], or use of deictic
representations, e.g. 6].

 O -line and on-line learning, e.g. 45, 65, 105]
Many of these approaches are partial in one way or another. For example, the search
performed by a planner may be incomplete, it may produce parts of plans only (e.g.
next action models), or it may rely on unproven or default assumptions.
Progressive Horizon Planning (PHP) is an incremental planning framework. It works
within a cycling architecture, such as the ECM architecture, in which planning is
strongly coupled to a characterization-oriented reasoner and to an action/perception
component. In PHP, planning is an on-going task: the eventual plan (The Plan)
is being shaped while it is executed. In particular, intermediate plans, constructed
in each cycle, are partially followed and then adapted based on the response and
other events. Note that since part of the purpose of action in exploratory-corrective
domains is to determine goals, it is unlikely that any of the intermediate plans will
be complete. However, while each intermediate plan is thus partial in the sense that
not all goals are known, in PHP all known goals are somehow addressed in every
intermediate plan. PHP is thus partial-global.

I have already made the point that a plan must at least be reassessed whenever a new
and relevant piece of information becomes available. Since in the ECM architecture
this may happen in every cycle, intermediate plans must be re-constructed (or at
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least adapted) many times throughout a management session. Given the computational complexity of planning, PHP planners focus their computational e ort on an
intermediate plan's initial segment. In the case of TraumAID 2.0, this approach is
supported by characteristics of the multiple trauma management domain, and of the
ECM architecture within which its PHP is embedded:

 First, note that \The Plan" | the sequence of actions that is actually followed

by the agent { is intended to be the ordered concatenation of the initial segments of the individual intermediate plans3. Thus, we can be less sensitive
to a given intermediate plan being less than optimal if its inadequacy can be
corrected later.

 Second, with respect to dependencies between earlier and later actions, practice

standards in the trauma management domain provide well-de ned constraints
on the relative urgency and importance of problems. In addition, the limited interaction between goals in the trauma domain (cf. Section 4.2) reduces
the chance that the overall plan would be adversely a ected by a premature
decision in addressing a most urgent, most important, goal.

 Third, note that uncertainty and unpredictability mean that any plan, unless

specifying all contingencies, may become obsolete during execution. Since unpredictability increases with the time between conception and execution, later
parts of the plan are more prone to it. Similarly, since earlier parts of the plan
may be aimed at removing uncertainty in support of later decisions, one expects
less uncertainty closer to the time in which such decisions have to be made.
Thus, focusing on a plan's initial segment is sensible. In a way, we are taking
a computational advantage of the uncertainty-unpredictability disadvantage.

The term horizon is often used to describe the depth of search, and is commonly
determined by the available computational resources. Famous is Korf's Real-Time
3

Intended, but not necessarily, since the agent can choose not to follow these plans.
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A 89], a planning algorithm which is based on the Iterative Deepening A search
technique4 and searches an action-based search space to a horizon. If a goal state
is encountered during search, then actions along the path from the initial state to
that state make up a plan. Otherwise, if a goal state has not been reached, the
distance between the node at the horizon and a goal state is heuristically evaluated.
The node which is thought to be closest to a goal is picked, and the actions along
the path from the root to that node make up the chosen plan initiation. Given the
above characteristics of the multiple trauma management domain and of the ECM
architecture, RTA is clearly a strong candidate for an ECM planner.

Recall however that we required that intermediate plans be global, i.e. that they
will address all known goals. In the context of consultation, plan completeness is
important to sustain a person's cooperation. In addition, as will be demonstrated
next, sketching a complete solution can ensure a certain level of consideration for
later parts of the plan.
As in RTA , the rst basic idea in PHP is to focus computational e orts on the
plan's initial segment. The second basic idea is that it is often easy to construct an
approximate plan, or a plan sketch. Plan sketching is strongly related to abstraction
speci cally it represents an abstraction along some \goodness" metric (as opposed
to the plan's completeness, or level of detail). In my analysis, I will assume that
sketching of entire plans, or of plan completions, can be done eciently. Plan sketching will allow us to consider and present complete plans. In Section 4.2, I describe
an accompanying technique for plan sketching.
Suppose then that we have an ecient plan sketching algorithm. One approach to
PHP is essentially a variant of RTA :
Iterative Deepening A (IDA ) 87] is a general-purpose search technique which, via a number
of depth-rst passes, simulates A but avoids its space requirements. More recent linear-space
A -like algorithms, e.g. 91, 134] can also be used in RTA .
4
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Algorithm 4.1.1 RTA -based PHP
 Search as in RTA when evaluating a node (at the horizon) do the following:
1. Sketch a completion to the plan initiation represented by the actions along
the path from the root to that node
2. Evaluate the completed plan.
This view of PHP is advantageous primarily because it lends itself to complexity
analysis: the order of complexity added to RTA by the plan completion sketching
represents an additional factor, since it has to be applied to every node at the horizon.
Since we assume plan sketching to be cheap, the addition is minor compared to a
complete search. Figure 4.3 illustrates the complexity graphically. It depicts an
SA-tree rooted at the initial state a plan which is a path in that tree leading from
the initial state to a goal state and the PHP horizon. Making some regularity
assumptions on the tree's structure, let a be the tree's branching factor, let n be the
plan's length, and let Copt be a constant denoting the depth of the search horizon,
then
1. Assuming it is done breadth- rst, a complete run-time search requires O(an )
time. It is geometrically represented in the gure by the triangular area of the
entire tree, from the initial state down to the depth of the plan
2. Reactive planning techniques that pre-plan for all contingencies may require,
for similar reasons, O(an ) space (and therefore so much pre-processing run time
as well) 61]
3. In RTA , assuming a constant-time evaluation function, O(aCopt ) time is required, represented geometrically by the area of the mildly shadowed triangle
at the top of the SA-tree
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4. In the RTA -based PHP, one needs to sketch a completion for each node.
Assuming that plan completion can be done in time that is linear in the length
of the plan, then this process takes O(n  aCopt ) time. In the gure, the added
cost is represented by the area of the dark-shadowed rectangle spawned from
the horizon down the SA-tree.
Initial State
Planning Horizon

Goal State

Figure 4.3: Complexity of PHP versus Complete Planning and RTA
A second approach to PHP, which is also the one that is actually used in TraumAID 2.0, involves a two stage construction:

Algorithm 4.1.2 2-Stage PHP
1. Sketch a complete plan
2. Optimize that plan to a horizon
Repeat steps 1,2 if necessary.
In this approach, a complete plan sketch is rst constructed, and then a number of
horizon-restricted optimizations is applied to it. These optimizations, while applied
to the plan's initial segment, can and should consider interaction of this segment with
later parts of that plan sketch. Optimization routines can often be described as plan
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transformations5. They can be either domain speci c or general to the particular
plan representation and/or sketching algorithm, but should importantly be local, i.e.
a plan-space search is not expected. In Section 4.3, I will present examples of such
optimizers taken from TraumAID 2.0's PHP algorithm.
This two-stage process may then have to be repeated. Speci cally, sketch completion
may have to be repeatedly applied if the post-optimization plan is incomplete, i.e.
does not address all goals. The optimization step may have to be repeated in case
where the post-optimization horizon changes and is now made of di erent actions.
The run-time of the 2-Stage PHP is harder to analyze than that of the RTA -based
variant without assuming a certain cap on the number of times the two-stage process
is repeated. However, under the very weak assumption that it is not repeated more
times than the overall number of possible plan initiations ( aCopt ), and under the
additional assumption that optimization and sketching are both linear, this time is
well bounded below the RTA -based variant's run time. More commonly, the 2-stage
process will only be repeated a few times, resulting in a linear algorithm.

4.2 Planning as Means-Selection and Ordering
Most planners take planning as the construction of a sequence of actions, or of
another representation of a similar function (e.g. conditional plans), to satisfy a
given set of goals. In Section 4.1, I argued that this assumption does not hold
in general in exploratory-corrective domains where goal characterization is part of
the purpose of planning, and have therefore suggested the ECM/PHP framework.
Nevertheless, within the ECM framework's plan sketching process, goals (some of
which are indeed exploratory in nature) can be assumed given. In this Section, I
focus on a particular formulation of an ECM plan sketching problem in which the
planning task is functionally divided into two sub-tasks:
5

Note that we essentially move to the plan-space now.
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1. The Selection sub-task in which a set of procedures has to be chosen which
parsimoniously (with respect to some pre-de ned measure of preference and
cost) address the current combination of goals and
2. The Ordering sub-task in which these procedures have to be ordered with
respect to one another to form a single overall plan, taking into account each
procedure's urgency, priority, compatibility, etc.
Such functional separation is attractive in part because each of the sub-tasks can be
formalized as a well-studied, abstract, domain-independent problem. Speci cally, the
selection sub-task can be formulated as a set-covering problem whereas the ordering sub-task can be formulated as a constraint-based scheduling problem. In what
follows, I rst review related work and identify some of the assumptions that are
necessary to support this formulation. Then I present the formulation itself. Finally,
given that selection and ordering are often co-dependent, I present a selection-andordering planning algorithm which interleaves the two.

4.2.1 Assumptions
In the planning literature, the term conjunctive goal is often used to describe a
situation in which a plan has to satisfy several goals. Many planners, including
most of the pioneering work as well as many later domain-independent planners
(e.g. 44, 14, 100]), make few assumptions on the nature of sub-conjuncts and their
interaction with one another.
In many of these planners, sub-conjuncts are taken simply as describing various
aspects of the goal-state, and are treated equally. In some other frameworks, these
description-parts are categorized and serve di erent purposes in the planning/execution
algorithms. Schoppers' Universal Planning algorithm 138], for example, distinguishes between sub-goals and qualiers.
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While the e ect of goal interaction is commonly acknowledged by planning researchers (for example \interactions between steps, are] a common cause of bugs"
144]), few have studied interactions in more than a general form. Commonly, interactions are resolved by way of search backtracking, or via the application of critics
after the plan is constructed. Exceptions include work by Drummond and Currie 40]
exploring various goal-ordering schemas to be applied while planning, and work by
Cheng and Irani 15] formalizing intra-operator sub-goal ordering and showing that
some constraints can be inferred even before planning starts. In more recent work,
Barret and Weld 7] have studied the e ect of goal \serializability", i.e. the extent
to which the order in which goals are attended a ects the e ort required to solve
the problem, on various types of planners. Hayes' work on Machinist 67], a domaindependent planner which uses interactions to guide its search, is another interesting
exception. Hayes pinpoints the diculty: \the ability to identify a goal interaction
eciently by looking at a problem speci cation requires intimate knowledge about
that problem domain".
Nau et al. 109, 162] present a planning framework in which a limited interaction
assumption is adopted, and show it results in a signi cant reduction in search. In
my framework, consistent with the ECM architecture's decomposition of reasoning,
I can assume that goal interaction is limited to competition for activity and other
resources6. This allows a much simpler formulation and solution of the planning
problem.
My rst assumption is thus that multiple goals represent multiple objectives and not
multiple aspects of the same goal state and that goals are independent except for the
fact that they compete for the same resources, e.g. the agent's attention, time, etc.
In particular, I assume there are no clobberers/white knights 14], nor causal links
100] between actions aimed at di erent goals.
My second assumption is that it is not hard to a priori construct plans to satisfy
6

The framework will actually allow other forms of interaction as well.
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individual goals I call these procedures or protocols. These procedures can be computed on-line, as in 94, 109] for example, or simply pre-speci ed. I take planning
to be the problem of combining individual plans into a single ecient plan (see also
48]).
Most importantly, my third assumption is that the domain of application can often indicate certain constraints and preferences. Of particular importance for our
formulation are choice alternatives and preferences (among goals, among alternative
procedures for an individual goal, among alternative combinations of procedures,
etc.), and ordering preferences and constraints (among goals, among procedures for
di erent goals, and between parts of procedures). Muscettola and Smith's HSTS
108], a system for planning telescope observations, also integrates planning and
scheduling techniques among other things, HSTS provides a domain description
language.
The assumptions and intuitions of Nau et al.'s framework are very close to mine.
Although di erent, their formalization and algorithm seem to make a suitable alternative to the ones I am about to propose. The forms of interactions considered by
Nau et al. are:

1. action-merging interaction by which a set of actions A can be replaced by a
merged action m(A), which has a lesser cost. In my set-covering framework,
such interaction is handled by seeking covers which are minimal with respect
to some individually de ned cost function
2. action-precedence interaction by which a certain action a in one sub-plan P
must precede another action a0 in another plan P 0. Both frameworks handle
action precedence via the introduction of ordering constraints
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3. identical-action interaction occurs when one action appears in several subplans. This interaction is problematic because it may create contradictions (cycles) in the action-precedence graph. We will handle this sometimes by choosing alternative procedures or, when possible, by relaxing the action-precedence
requirements
4. simultaneous-action interaction, when di erent actions must occur at the same
time. We will not have such interaction in our framework.
My framework allows other constraints between procedures and also between their
respective goals that I believe are not supported by Nau et al.'s. For example, one
may demand that an action aimed at an urgent goal not be preceded by a lengthy
action (elapsed time as a resource I treat time in a way that is similar to Vere's
deviser 154]). Other examples include compatibility constraints, preferences, etc.
In principle, though, Nau et al.'s framework can be easily extended to accommodate
such constraints.
Both frameworks permit alternative plans for a given goal. In both frameworks such
procedures can be ranked, which is useful for search prioritization. One di erence,
however, is that in my framework procedures are ranked by both by their preference
for an individual goal and, independently, by their respective cost/risk. This is useful
because it allows specifying a partial treatment as a less desirable, although often less
costly, alternative. In such instance, my algorithm will opt for the partial treatment
if none of the complete treatments is feasible given the interactions with other goals.
In both frameworks, an ecient plan is sought. This is possible because both frameworks assume that a goal can be satis ed via a number of alternative plans. In
my framework, most of the eciency is derived from the fact that a single procedure may often be used for several goals (although possibly not at the same level
of preference for all). Nau et al.'s framework is more general: such eciency is
de ned for combinations of procedures using the m(A) operation. Finally, while
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my set-covering formulation de nes a whole space of cost-ranked solution-plans, the
plan-sketching algorithm is limited to a greedy depth- rst search in that space. Nau
et al.'s algorithm can be viewed as a more complete best- rst approach.

4.2.2 Means-Selection as Generalized Set Covering
Given a certain combination of goals, each of which can be addressed via a number
of alternative procedures, a set of procedures is needed which addresses them all.
In cases where multiple solutions exist, one may wish to maximize some preference
criterion, de ned over all such sets. For example, one that minimizes risk or cost,
maximizes the likelihood of success, etc. Presented at this level of abstraction,
this problem resembles many abduction problems, e.g. abductive explanation and
diagnosis 129, 119, 11, 28, 97]. Set-Covering 78, 75, 16] is an abstract mathematical
problem which was previously used to formalize abductive reasoning (e.g. 129, 4]),
and which I next use to formalize the means-selection sub-task.

Denition 4.2.1 Goal-Procedure Mapping
Let goals def
= f gigni=1 be a set of goals, procs def
= f pj gmj=1 a set of procedures. A

goal-procedure mapping is a function from goals to the power set of procs which
indicates, for each goal, all the procedures that can alternatively be used to address
it:

addressable-by(g) = fp j p can address gg
Conversely, each procedure can be associated with the goals it \covers":
addresses(p) = fg j p2addressable-by(g) g
Note that each goal is addressed alternatively by a number of procedures, whereas a
procedure addresses simultaneously several goals.
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Denition 4.2.2 The Procedure Selection Problem
An instance of a Procedure Selection (PS) problem includes a set of goals a set
of procedures and a set of goal-procedures mappings as above. In addition, a cost
function is individually speci ed for every procedure. Then, given a subset of goals
g goals, the problem is to nd a subset of procedures p procs that satis es the
following conditions:
1. completeness criterion: all goals in g are addressed by at least one procedure
from p
2. cost optimality: p has a minimal overall cost among all subsets of procs
satisfying condition 1
As stated, the PS problem is isomorphic to an optimization version of an NPComplete problem called Set Covering.

Denition 4.2.3 The Set-Covering Problem
Let F be a collection of subsets of a nite set A, such that ni=1 Si =A, and let B A.
A cover of B in F is a subset F 0 F such that Si 2F Si=B . Given F , B , and an
integer k, is there a set F 0 such that
1. F 0 is a cover of B in F
2. jF 0j k.
The isomorphism is obtained by identifying goals with A, g with B , the set
faddresses(p)gp2PROCS with F, assuming uniform cost, and nally taking p to be
the procedures corresponding to the subsets chosen for F 0. Since this isomorphism
can be computed in polynomial time, the PS problem is NP-Hard 53]. While as
stated above, the PS problem is more general than the Set-Covering problem, optimization versions of Set-Covering do exist and use cost functions in a way that
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Diseases/Goals:
Planning

addressed-by

Procedures:

Plan Recognition

Diagnosis

Symptoms:

Figure 4.4: Diagnosis, Planning and Plan Recognition as a Set Covering Problem
is similar to their use in the PS problem. Interestingly, albeit the notorious NPHardness, Chvatal 16] shows that a greedy algorithm performs pretty well on a
similar optimization version of Set-Covering.
Using Set Covering to formalize the selection sub-task is also interesting because of
its use in formalizing the related tasks of diagnosis and plan recognition:

 Reggia et al. 129] formulate diagnosis as a set-covering problem in which a set

of diseases has to be selected such that it \covers", or explains, a given set of
observed symptoms. Diagnostic problems are represented as bi-partite graphs
with diseases in one of its partitions, and symptoms in the other. Each disease
is connected to all the symptoms it may cause.
Thus it may be interesting to conceptually model both diagnosis and planning
as a two-stage set-covering problem. Figure 4.4 illustrates a process in which
a set of symptoms is mapped, via set-covering, to a set of possible/veri ed
diseases (diagnostic/therapeutic goals), which are then mapped to a set of
procedures.

 A plan recognition problem can be de ned as follows: given a set of obser-

vations, including but not limited to symptoms and actions taken by another
agent, try to hypothesize that agent's goals. Considering Figure 4.4 again, plan
recognition can also be formalized as a set covering problem, this time from
observed symptoms and procedures to goals. Such view is related to Kautz's
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formulation of plan recognition 82], except that it represents a much simpler
form of circumscription.

4.2.3 Ordering as Constraint-Based Scheduling
Consider a given set of procedures. Ordering them into a single coherent plan represents a classical scheduling problem. For the purpose of this section, I will take
a plan to be a partially ordered set of procedures represented in a plan graph { a
directed acyclic graph in which nodes correspond to procedures and arcs represent
a precedence order. The formulation presented is simple but can be extended without much diculty to support a richer notion of resources, stochastic durations of
processes, richer representation for overlapping processes, etc.

Denition 4.2.4 Precedence Constraints
A precedence constraint is a pair (Pi,Pj ), where Pi , and Pj are procedures, representing that Pi should precede Pj .
Some precedence constraints are xed, e.g. a given procedure must always precede
another, whereas others are dynamic and can only be determined by the context
in which the two procedures are called for, e.g. by the respective urgency of the
goals for which they were selected. Precedence relations are used to reect interactions between the actions, their respective goals, resources, etc. One way in which
precedence relations can be represented is in a plan-graph:

Denition 4.2.5 A Plan-Graph
Given a set of procedures procs and a set of precedence relations C , a plan-graph
is the directed graph G(procs,E ) in which each precedence relation (Pi,Pj ) in C is
represented in E as a directed arc from Pi to Pj in C .
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Thus, a given set of procedures and a corresponding set of precedence constraints
de ne a plan-graph. However, given a set of constraints, there might be no plan that
meets all constraints. In other cases, there might be more than a single plan which
satis es all constraints.

Proposition 4.2.6 Given a set of procedures procs and a set of precedence con-

straints C , a valid plan exists i the plan-graph G(procs,C ) contains no cycles.
Multiple valid plans exist if an arc can be added to the transitive closure of C without creating a cycle.
P1

P2

P1

P2

P1

P2

P3

P4

P3

P4

P3

P4

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 4.5: Plan Graphs

Example 4.2.7 Consider, for example, a set of four procedures: P1    P4, with the

following set of precedence relations: (P1,P3), (P2,P3), (P2,P4). The corresponding
plan-graph is depicted in Figure 4.5(a). This plan-graph is consistent with ve
linearized plans: P1-P2 -P3-P4, P1-P2 -P4-P3, P2-P1 -P3-P4 , P2 -P1-P4-P3 , and P2-P4-P1 P3. However, if we then add another precedence constraint: (P4,P1) (Figure 4.5(b),
then there is only one linearized plan consistent with the plan-graph: P2-P4 -P1-P3.
Finally, if we add a fth constraint: (P1,P2) (Figure 4.5(c)), then a cycle is created
(P1, P2, P3) and there is no valid plan consistent with the plan-graph.
Given this characterization, the plan sketching algorithm presented next will reject
plan-graphs with cycles. To restrict the number of plans considered, preferences can
be speci ed as another type of precedence relation. Unlike constraints, satisfaction
of a preference relation is optional a plan will not be outright rejected if it does
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not satisfy a given preference. I therefore also refer to preferences as \soft" constraints. However, such plan could eventually be rejected if there is a plan that
clearly dominates it, i.e. that satis es all of the preferences satis ed by the former,
and more.

Denition 4.2.8 A Plan-Graph (with Constraints and Preferences)
Given a set of procedures procs, and sets of constraints C and preferences P on
procs, a plan-graph is a directed graph G(procs,C P 0), where P 0 P .
As before, such a plan-graph will be regarded valid only if it is acyclic. As just
mentioned, multiple valid plan-graphs may exist, each corresponding to the inclusion
of a di erent subset of preferences. These di erent plan-graphs may in fact be
indistinguishable with respect to the partial order of procedures, e.g. when the
ordering imposed by one arc can be inferred via transitivity from others, or of little
or no importance, e.g. when the order in which two actions are taken is unimportant.
A dominance relation can be de ned over plan-graphs in which those with maximally
(with respect to set-inclusion, cardinality, etc.) satis ed preferences are preferred.
In TraumAID 2.0, preferences are notably used to linearize plans for the purpose of
presentation.
Another type of constraint (or similarly preference): a compatibility constraint, can
be implemented as an anti-symmetric pair of precedence constraints between the
respective procedures. For example, if procedures P1 and P2 are incompatible, a pair
of precedence relations (P1,P2), and (P2,P1) can be added to the set of constraints.
Thus, whenever the two procedures are included in one plan, a cycle will emerge in
its plan-graph forcing the rejection of such plan.

4.2.4 A Selection-and-Ordering Planning Algorithm
While it is conceptually useful to distinguish a selection and ordering functions, it
was already established (cf. Section 1.2) that the two are mutually dependent on
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one another, and thus must be operationally interleaved. The planning algorithm
presented next interleaves selection and ordering.
Before actually describing the algorithm, a few more de nitions are necessary. First,
I will extend the Procedure Selection (PS) problem, de ned in Section 4.2.2, with
preferences on goals, and on use of procedures to address individual goals.

Denition 4.2.9 Goal-Procedure Mapping (extended)
Goal-procedure mappings used to enumerate alternative procedures which can be
used to address individual goals (De nition 4.2.1). We can extend this de nition
with a ranking of alternative procedures (not necessarily strictly) by their respective
preference if the given goal was present alone.

Denition 4.2.10 The Extended Procedure Selection Problem
An instance of a Procedure Selection (PS) problem includes a set of goals a set
of procedures and a set of goal-procedures mappings as above. In addition, a cost
function is individually speci ed for every procedure. Then, given a subset of goals
g goals, ranked by their priority, the problem is to nd a subset of procedures
p procs that satis es the following conditions:
1. biased completeness criterion: ideally, all goals should be addressed. A goal
g will only not be addressed by p if all of its procedures are in conict with
all possible combinations of procedures that can be chosen to address goals
ranked higher than or equal to g
2. individual preference optimality: except for multiple-goal optimization and conicts with goals of higher priority, a goal is always addressed by its procedure
of preference let g be a goal, and p be the procedure which addresses it in
p, then if p addresses only g then if p0 is an alternative procedure for g then
either p is preferable to p0 for g, or p0 is incompatible with procedures chosen
for goals ranked higher than g
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3. biased cost optimality: p has minimal cost among plans satisfying 1, and 2.
The purpose in de ning the extended PS problem is to use the local preferences expressed by the respective ranking of goals, of the alternative procedures for a given
goal, and of the individual procedures independently from their use, for the purpose
of ranking complete plans by their desirability. Thus, the biased completeness criterion indicates that we prefer plans which are complete but, if bound to have an
incomplete plan, will prefer a plan that is incomplete with respect to a less important
goal. The individual preference optimality criterion indicates the desire to address
each goal with the best procedure for that goal, but the willingness to sacri ce this
desire if such procedure does not sit well with a preferred way of addressing a more
important goal. Finally, the biased cost optimality criterion calls for reduction of
overall cost via the use of procedures which address multiple goals at once.
The extended PS problem is clearly NP-Hard it becomes identical to the original
PS problem by simply choosing uniform preference and imposing no constraints. It
introduces preferences on goals, and on the use of procedures for individual goals, to
underconstrained plan-graphs. These preferences, or soft constraints, will also play
a role in TraumAID 2.0's greedy algorithm.
The selection-and-ordering algorithm presented next also goes deeper in the level
of speci cation of the desired activity. That is, it does not schedule procedures,
but rather the actions that comprise them. In its representation, each procedure is
broken into a sequence (or more generally partially ordered set) of actions.

Denition 4.2.11 Procedure-Action Mapping
Let procs def
= fpigmi=1 be a set of procedures, actions def
= faj glj=1 a set of actions.
A procedure-action mapping is a function from procs to the set of partially ordered
subsets of actions, which indicates the action components of each procedure and
their respective ordering requirements. The following relations can be de ned:
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part-of(a) = fp j a is an action component of pg
actions-of(p) = fa j p2part-of (a) g
precedes-in(p) = f(a1 a2) j a1 precedes a2 in pg
When a procedure is scheduled, its actions must keep their respective order, as indicated by the precedes-in relation. However, actions that belong to other procedures
can be interleaved between them. Scheduling actions, rather than procedures, also
gives rise to new opportunities in the choice of procedures. It often happens, for
example, that procedures share component actions. In such cases, it is sometimes
possible to reduce the overall cost of a plan by merging the procedures' actions,
rather than simply carrying out one procedure after the other. In the PS problem,
the cost optimality criterion must therefore be restated for actions.
Scheduling constraints and preferences can thus be determined at
1. the goal level: any action aimed at one goal must precede any action aimed at
another
2. the procedure level: all actions in one procedure must precede all actions in
another or
3. the action level: a particular action should precede another.
These levels of constraints give rise to certain diculties with shared actions: it may
not always be easy to determine the true role of such actions and the characteristics
of which procedures they should inherit. In particular, it may be impossible to keep
both the intra-procedural and inter-procedural constraints. (An example from the
multiple trauma management domain is presented in Section 4.3.1.) This problem is
partially solved in TraumAID 2.0 by allowing actions to carry their own characteristics that distinguish them from the procedures they participate in, and by allowing
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additional scheduling information to be associated with each action (for example
that is is not essential for it to meet a one type of procedural constraint or another).
The planning algorithm, described next, interleaves selection and ordering. Given the
intractability of both sub-tasks, it is greedy in nature. It employs local backtracking
only (with respect to the choice of procedure for the current goal), and uses goalpreference and goal-procedure preference as a heuristic.

Algorithm 4.2.12 A Greedy Selection-and-Ordering Planning Algorithm
1. Given a set of goals, they are rst sorted by their priority
2. Then, a plan graph % is built incrementally by iteratively choosing  , the
highest-ranking goal that is not yet addressed by %, and  the procedure of
highest preference for  . 's actions are then incorporated into % with all the
appropriate constraints. If that works, the next goal is being considered. If 
cannot be incorporated into %, then the algorithm backtracks to the next-best
procedure for  . If none of  's procedures can be incorporated into % then it
is left unaddressed
3. Finally, soft constraints (preferences) are added to %.
This algorithm has been instantiated in TraumAID 2.0's planner, which details are
presented next.

4.3 TraumAID 2.0's Planner
TraumAID 2.0's planner follows the PHP approach. The actual course of action
it recommends is constructed incrementally, allowing for feedback and adaptation,
and is made of the initial segments of multiple intermediate plans. In each cycle, an
intermediate plan is constructed in a two stage process that is repeated if necessary:
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1. A plan is rst sketched using a selection-and-ordering algorithm
2. This plan is then optimized to a horizon (currently consisting of only one
action).
The speci cs of each step is discussed next.

4.3.1 Plan Sketching
The plan sketching algorithm accepts as input a set of goals. Each of these goals are
characterized by:
1. Urgency. Di erent goals need be addressed within di erent time frames. For
example, instability and its sources need be addressed immediately whereas
a de nitive operation may sometimes be delayed until further examination is
completed. In general, urgency denotes the time frame within which a goal
has to be addressed. A 3-level urgency scale is currently used, corresponding
to goals that have to be addressed within 2, 20, or 200 minutes.
2. Priority. In trauma management it is common to prioritize problems by their
category. The ABC's of trauma management7 call for the treatment of airway
problems rst, then those concerned with breathing, then circulation etc.
As per Section 4.2, the relationship between goals and procedures is given by goalprocedure mappings. Figure 4.6 illustrates one such mapping graphically: abdominal
bleeding can be diagnosed using either a lavage or a CT scan. The preference,
represented by the numbering on the arcs, is to use a lavage. That preference can be
altered by the combination of goals presented, particularly if a CT scan is anyway
required.
7

ABC stands for Airway, Breathing, Circulation.
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Abdominal Bleeding?
2

1

Get Peritoneal Lavage

Get CT Scan

Figure 4.6: Alternative Procedures for Diagnosing Abdominal Bleeding
In TraumAID 2.0, each procedure is a sequence of actions, and is represented in
a procedure-action mapping. Figure 4.7 illustrates one such mapping graphically:
a standard treatment for simple pneumothorax includes, in that order, inserting a
chest tube, observing the ow from it, and obtaining an X-ray to verify its placement
and e ectiveness.
Standard Care
Simple Pneumothorax

Primary Tube
Thoracostomy

Primary Tube
Flow Report

Post Tube
X-Ray

Figure 4.7: Actions for Standard Care Simple Pneumothorax
For each action, the following is represented:
1. Duration. In general, for scheduling purposes, it might be useful to represent
the actual duration of actions. In TraumAID 2.0, a 3-level scale is used (categorizing actions that can be completed in 2, 20, or 200 minutes), corresponding
to levels of urgency for goals. In the scheduling algorithm, these are used to
constrain the use of lengthy procedures prior to the satisfaction of urgent goals.
2. Cost/risk factor. When there are multiple valid plans, one wishes to select the
most preferable one. In general, preference is a function of the combination of
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goals, actions, and the state of the patient. In TraumAID 2.0, a simple cost
function is used to model preference. The cost of a plan is taken to be the
total cost of its individual actions.
3. Resources and logistic considerations. In addition to time and physician attention, di erent actions may require di erent resources which may a ect their use
and respective scheduling. In TraumAID 2.0, certain actions are mandatorily
performed only in certain sites, e.g. CT scan in the X-ray room, operations in
the operating room, etc.
Following Algorithm 4.2.12, TraumAID 2.0's selection-and-ordering algorithm proceeds as follows:

Algorithm 4.3.1 Interleaved Selection and Ordering in TraumAID 2.0
1. The set of goals is rst sorted by their urgency and priority.
2. Then, a plan graph % is built incrementally by iteratively choosing  , the
highest-ranking goal that is not yet addressed by %, and  the procedure of
highest preference for  .
In incorporating 's actions into %, the following constraints are imposed:
(a) a lengthy action is not allowed before an action that is aimed at an urgent
goal
(b) when placing an action in a certain site, it must follow all actions in
preceding sites and precede all actions in later sites
(c) within a site, actions are ordered by the priority of their respective goals
(d) nally, actions are required to satisfy intra-procedural order.
If a cycle is created by the constraint arcs, then the new procedure is incompatible with the previous plan, and is therefore rejected. The algorithm backtracks
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to the next-best procedure for  , or the next possible site for the current procedure, and try again. If none of the procedures for the given goal is compatible
with the current plan, then this goal is left unaddressed.
Note that since goals were originally sorted by their urgency and priority, a
goal is left unaddressed when its satisfaction is in an apparent conict with the
satisfaction of a more urgent-more important goal. Goal preference is thus a
heuristic used by the greedy selection-and-ordering algorithm. Note however,
that it is possible that a di erent choice for the latter would have allowed the
satisfaction of the former, and so the greedy algorithm does not guarantee that
the biased completeness criterion be satis ed whenever possible.
3. Finally, % is linearized by incorporating soft constraints (preferences) in the
form of a static, pre-de ned, order on the set of actions.
Note that while the current use of resources is not very rich, there should be no
methodological problem with extending it. For example, TraumAID 2.0's representation can be extended with resources that are either unavailable or are unlimited.
Examples of such resources would be medical expertise or equipment. To adapt
TraumAID for operation aboard a submarine, for example, all that had to be done
was to mask out the procedures which require unavailable resources 99]. Other
scheduling techniques would allow planning with limited resources.
As already discussed in Section 4.2, reasoning in the action level allows procedures
to be merged, with the ordering of the urgent sub-parts of multiple procedures before their less-urgent parts. It also allows unifying common actions. Consider, for
instance the standard procedure for treating a hemothorax condition. It comprises
a sequence of ve actions: administration of antibiotics, setup of an auto-tranfusion
device, thoracostomy and leakage (ow) report, and post-tube X-ray. Figure 4.8
depicts the plan graph (without soft constraints) for a patient with a hemothorax
on both sides.
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Tube_Thoracostomy(Right)
Setup_AT(Right)

Leakage_Rep(Right)
Post_Tube_X-Ray

Antibiotics

Leakage_Rep(Left)

Setup_AT(Left)

Tube_Thoracostomy(Left)

Figure 4.8: Plan Graph for Patient with Hemothoraces on Both Sides
Reasoning in the action level also presents some challenges. For example, when an
action is shared by procedures which address goals of distinct priority, one has to
decide which of the features of these goals this action inherits. In the case of a patient
with both a pneumothorax (Figure 4.7) and a hemothorax, for instance, a conict
may arise with the respective scheduling of the antibiotics and the thoracostomy.
On one hand, the antibiotics precedes the thoracostomy within the hemothorax
procedure. On the other hand, the thoracostomy should precede the antibiotics as it
addresses a problem of higher priority (the pneumothorax). To partially circumvent
this problem, actions are each allowed to carry its own characteristics and scheduling
information. For example, we do not require that the administration of antibiotics
satis es priority constraints.

4.3.2 Plan Optimization
The plan sketching algorithm just described is a greedy one, and thus cannot guarantee an optimal plan. To improve the quality of its plans, in addition to the ECMbased adaptation, TraumAID 2.0's planner performs a one-action deep optimization.
In that optimization step, potential replacements of the procedure to which the rst
action in the plan belongs, with procedures which address other goals as well, are
considered. The e ects of various replacements are evaluated using the overall cost
as a metric.
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I distinguish general optimizers from domain-specic ones8. I have identi ed two
general scenarios in which, being greedy, TraumAID 2.0's selection-and-ordering algorithm makes wrong coverage decisions. Those are depicted in Figure 4.9 where
goals are indicated by circles and procedures by rectangles. The numbers on the arcs
represent order of preference. For simplicity, assume that all procedures are equal
in terms of their risk, cost etc. In both situations, the greedy algorithm will select
procedure 1 for addressing goal A and procedure 2 for goal B. However, a quick
glance at the rst example shows that procedures 1 and 2 can be both replaced
with procedure 3. Similarly, in the second example, procedure 2 can serve both
purposes. To address these shortcomings, TraumAID 2.0's optimizer considers all
possible replacements for the currently optimized procedure.
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Figure 4.9: Selection Weaknesses in the Greedy Algorithm
So far, in addition to these general optimizers, two domain-speci c optimizers were
needed. The rst optimizer calls to avoid inserting a prophylactic tube in patients
scheduled to undergo an operation soon9 . Like the general ones, this optimizer can
also be represented as a subsumption operator.
The second optimizer, called Rush-to-OR, applies when a patient is in the emergency
room (ER) and an urgent procedure must be done in the operating room (OR) within
a restricted time frame. At such point, even if planned management has some actions
that may be carried out in the ER, it is preferable to immediately transfer the patient
Note that by general I mean domain-independent those optimizers are still representation- and
algorithm-dependent.
9Anecdotally, this optimization was not well-received by some surgeons (see Section 6.2).
8
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to the OR, and then continue management there. (All actions schedulable in the ER
can also be scheduled in the OR.) The Rush-to-OR optimizer takes a plan after all
subsumption operators have been applied.

4.4 Summary
In this chapter, I have presented a planning framework for the ECM architecture
which I called Progressive Horizon Planning (PHP). In the PHP framework, intermediate plans are constructed in a partial-global manner, followed partially, and
then reconstructed to reect new information and goals. Intermediate plans are
constructed via a combination of plan sketching and partial optimization.
I have also presented a planning paradigm in which the planning task is functionally
factored into choice of means for addressing a combination of goals, and ordering chosen means into a single overall plan. I have presented an algorithm which interleaves
the two functions.
This PHP framework is implemented in TraumAID 2.0's planner, where an instantiation of the selection-and-ordering algorithm is used for plan sketching.
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Chapter 5
Use of the ECM Architecture and
Reasoning Components
5.1 Overview
Most of the discussion so far has focused on the function, but not the use, of the
ECM architecture and its reasoning components. Next, I propose a framework for
\programming" the ECM architecture's components to produce a desired behavior.
In particular, in accordance with the suggested decomposition of reasoning in the
ECM architecture, I propose
1. that local patterns of behavior (or strategies) be explicitly encoded
(a) in GDD rules, using goals as milestones and choice points, and using goalsetting and evidential rules to represent progress within a local strategy
(b) in pre-de ned local procedures: sequences of actions that can be used to
locally satisfy a given goal and
(c) in mappings from goals to a set of alternative procedures, ordered by their
respective local preference for the given goal (i.e. independently of other
needs)
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2. that constraints and preferences on combinations of goals, procedures, and
actions, be speci ed as much as possible in the form of general principles and
nally
3. that given a combination of goals, these principles be used by the planner to
implicitly merge a corresponding combination of local strategies, as necessary.
In this chapter, I put together the diagnostic reasoning and planning frameworks
described in Chapters 3 and 4. I will rst discuss local strategies that can be encoded
explicitly in GDD rules and goal-procedure mappings, and then mechanisms for
combining a number of such strategies on-line. I conclude by pointing to potential
uses of this methodology for managing JR's case (cf. Section 1.2).

5.2 Local Strategies
In programming arti cial agents, we try to provide them with a strategy { the capability to respond appropriately to each of the situations in which they may nd
themselves1.
A strategy can be represented explicitly, e.g. as an enumeration of states and responses implicitly, e.g. as a computation procedure that can be applied to a state's
representation to compute a response or as a combination of explicit and implicit
representations. In general, di erent representations of strategies follow from di erent tradeo s between the time and space needed to construct, represent, and use a
given strategy. Thus, in choosing a representation, one has to consider the tradeo s
that are appropriate for the problem at hand.
Consider for example the AB-space of Chapter 3, where states are attitude-belief
assignments and where transitions correspond to changes in attitude or in belief
I take strategy as commonly dened in the game theory literature, e.g. \a strategy is a rule
that tells the player] which actions to choose at each instant of the game given his information set
... a player's strategy is a complete set of instructions for him, which tells him what actions to pick
in every conceivable situation, even if he does not expect to reach that situation." 128].
1
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that are either volunteered, inferred, or acquired via action. Taking attitude-beliefs
to be the basic states on which a strategy has to be de ned, there is more than
one way in which this can be done. On one extreme, one can explicitly enumerate
all attitude-belief states that the agent could ever be at, designating a response (an
inference or an action) for each. On the other extreme, given an attitude-belief, a
response can each time and again be computed on-line from rst principles.
In many domains, trauma management included, an agent's task can be broken down
into a combination of several sub-tasks, each of which is not very complex. The
complexity of the overall strategy in such domains is thus the result of the potential
interactions between sub-strategies. I propose that in such domains it may be useful
to explicitly specify each of the sub-strategies, while using more implicit reasoning
to compute response to combinations thereof. This approach is particularly useful
in domains in which a large number of sub-strategies are potentially applicable but
only a few, albeit possibly di erent ones each time, are likely to be concurrently
pursued.
I call each of these sub-strategies a local strategy. In the trauma management domain, strategies can be localized around smaller problems. For example, Section 3.7
enumerates states2 which are of relevance to the diagnosis and treatment of a tension
pneumothorax. In other domains, local strategies can be organized around a certain
resource or expertise, e.g. planning a series of X-rays vs. planning an operation, or
describing work done by a physician vs. that done by a nurse. Localization is often
domain-speci c, and one may therefore have to rely on an expert's intimate knowledge of the domain. More generally, the use of localized strategies in the proposed
methodology is a simple matter of divide-and-conquer and so it can also accommodate automatically generated sub-plans (as in 162, 94, 48]), as well as combinations
of automatically generated sub-plans and explicitly speci ed sub-strategies.
An important distinction of our local strategies is that while inference-responses are
To be precise, rules enumerate equivalence classes on states. They do not describe a single
state, but rather the set of states which meet the rule's antecedents.
2
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explicitly speci ed in GDD rules, action-responses are not. Instead, local strategies
specify goal-responses, and a set of alternative procedures/actions that can be used
with the intention of satisfying these goals (and thereby bringing about the local
strategy's next state, or conclusion). There are two issues here. First, it is not
required that action-responses, eventually computed from goal-responses, necessarily
achieve a pre-determined e ect. While it is intended that a procedure satisfy the
goal(s) for which it was chosen, it is also acknowledged that an action can result in
one of a number of outcomes (therefore the requirement that a local strategy be closed
with respect to all such outcomes). Second, using goals one can specify alternative
choices of action for each, and state one's preference with regard to their choice.
These choice points in a strategy add to the planner's ability to merge several local
strategies, particularly to its capability of taking advantage of potential synergies.
In addition, as will soon be demonstrated, the use of goals may sometimes pay o
relieving some of the computational complexity of planning. Next, I discuss merging
local strategies, in the goal- and procedure/action-level.

5.3 Implicitly Combining Local Strategies
The way in which local strategies are combined in the ECM architecture is implicit
in two ways. First, the combined strategy is never represented explicitly. Rather,
it is constructed on the y, as it is executed. Second, for the most part, what is
encoded are combination principles, as opposed to a recipe as to how to merge any
particular combination of strategies.
Strategies can be combined in two levels:
1. In the goal-level, one can specify when a certain goal suppresses, inhibits, or is
prioritized with respect to another, and when a certain combination of goals
can be replaced with a generalizing goal or set of goals
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2. In the procedure/action-level, one can specify a preference for one procedure
over another with respect to a certain goal a preference for a certain combination of procedures for a certain combination of goals and compatibility and
ordering constraints between two or more procedures or actions.

5.3.1 Combining in the Goal-Level
Many times, local strategies can be combined at the goal level, without having to
reason about possible choices of action for these goals. Of particular interest are
negative relationships between goals that would result in a reduction in the number
of goals that need subsequently be considered by the planner. Consider for example,
the following relationships:

 Suppression: The emergence of one goal subsumes another. This can be be-

cause one goal is a specialization of another, e.g. need for an abdominal operation for unknown reason versus need for an abdominal operation to repair
the duodenum it can be because a certain treatment subsumes another, or
render it inappropriate, e.g. an emergency room thoracotomy will subsume
any other diagnosis and/or treatment with diagnostic goals, it can be because
any information that can be acquired by any action aimed at one goal would
also satisfy the other goal, e.g. an exploratory laparotomy and some of the
abdominal investigations.

 Inhibition or prioritization: The current pursuit of one goal inhibits or delays
the pursuit of another, e.g. pursuit of abdominal bleeding as a possible cause
of shock is inhibited in some patients if a tension pneumothorax possibility has
not yet been pursued. Note that the only di erence between inhibition and
suppression is that an inhibited goal may be resumed after the inhibiting goal is
satis ed. A special case is prioritization, when one goal shall be pursued before
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another, e.g. a pneumothorax should often be pursued prior to an esophageal
injury.
Such relationships are encoded in the ECM architecture using goal inhibition clauses
which are then expanded into GDD rules, e.g.

 the desire to suppress g2 in the presence of g1 is expressed as:
inhibit(g2) = relevant(g1)

 the desire that g1 inhibits g2, until or unless g1 is determined negative is expressed as:

inhibit(g2) = relevant(g1) ^ :false(g1)

 the desire to prioritize the pursuit of g1 over that of g2 is expressed as:
inhibit(g2) = relevant(g1) ^ :known(g1 )
Basic prioritization information is encoded in goals' features, which are used to
determine their respective ordering by the planner. For example, since a pneumothorax's priority is airway, its diagnosis and treatment will usually precede that of
an esophageal injury which priority rank is contamination. In TraumAID 2.0's planning algorithm (Algorithm 4.3.1), such priorities translate into (a) preferred choice,
in that the greedy algorithm rst chooses a procedure for higher-ranking goals, and
(b) precedence, in that actions aimed at goals of higher priority are often scheduled
prior to actions aimed at goals of a lower one.

5.3.2 Combining in the Procedure/Action-Level
In the ECM planner, procedures and actions for concurrently pursued local strategies
are merged in the selection-and-ordering algorithm using the following combination
principles:
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1. Preference for addressing one goal versus another is encoded in the principles
by which goals are rst sorted. In TraumAID 2.0: a goal's urgency and priority.
2. Preference among alternative procedures for a given goal is speci ed in a goalprocedure mapping for each goal individually.
3. Some restricted forms of preference among combinations of procedures for combinations of goals are speci ed via the cost measure used by the parsimonious
set-covering model. More complicated forms may require explicit speci cation
either in GDD rules which manipulate goals, or in optimization transformations
which are later applied to the plan sketch.
4. Constraints and preferences on co-presence and ordering of several procedures
within a plan can be speci ed for the scheduling algorithm. TraumAID 2.0 uses
constraints based on the respective urgency and priority of the corresponding
goals and on the site in which a procedure is selected to be performed at a
general linearizing preference is also used.

5.4 Example
Consider again JR's management (Section 1.2), presenting an interplay of several
local strategies such as diagnosis and treatment of a tension pneumothorax (cf. Section 3.7), diagnosis and treatment of a pericardial tamponade (cf. Example 3.3.6),
general abdominal examination, treatment of a hemothorax, and others.
First notice that the di erent strategies are triggered at di erent times during management and that each proceeds in a di erent pace. Also note that the combined
strategy is not represented per se, but is rather implicitly and incrementally constructed via an on-going mediation between the local strategies.
Most of the explicit and implicit encoding mechanisms are represented in this single
case, in particular:
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1. The goal of inserting a chest tube for the right hemothorax is suppressed by
the goal of operating the chest
2. The goals of investigating the pericardial sac and abdomen for causes of shock
are inhibited/prioritized until after the investigation of a tension pneumothorax
as an alternative explanation is completed
3. Their respective features indicate that the goal of diagnosing a tension pneumothorax is more urgent and has a higher priority (airway vs. circulation) than
the goal of investigating the abdomen
4. The goal of diagnosing a pericardial tamponade can either be addressed with an
ultrasound, or via a needle aspiration. This order of preference for alternative
procedures is local though, and is often violated in favor of compatibility with
other needs. In fact, in JR's case a needle is used due to the incompatibility
of the ultrasound procedure with the present urgency
5. Preference for a parsimonious combination of procedures for the combination of
goals is exempli ed by the choice of a bilateral operation as a single operation
that can be used to gain access to both the heart and the left chest
6. Finally, the use of constraints in the on-line merging of local strategies is exempli ed by the following:

 Constraints based on goal features are exempli ed by ordering the aspi-

ration of the chest prior to the aspiration of the pericardial sac, and also,
as per (3), by ordering it prior to the abdominal X-ray studies

 Constraints based on logistic considerations are exempli ed by scheduling

the abdominal X-ray prior to the thoracic arteriogram. The arteriogram
is later discarded, but at rst it is scheduled later because it requires
access to machinery that is only available in the X-ray room
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 Constraints based on time/urgency issues are exempli ed by the selection
of an otherwise less-preferable needle aspiration as a means of diagnosing
a pericardial tamponade. The ultrasound, which is usually preferable,
conicts with the urgency of this and other goals

 Constraints that result in an total incompatibility are exempli ed in that
the arteriogram, as well as the investigation of a potential esophageal
injury, are not pursued at all once JR is transferred to the operating
room.
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Chapter 6
TraumAID 2.0 { Implementation
and Empirical Results
TraumAID 2.0 is a consultation system for the multiple trauma mangement domain.
It is a successor to TraumAID 1.0 (cf. Section 1.2.3), and was implemented in
Common Lisp on a Symbolics Lisp machine. It was recently ported by Jonathan
Kaye to a Sun-based X-windows environment as well as to a Macintosh platform.

TraumAID 2.0
Reasoner

goals

Planner

characterization
evidence

Physician

plan

Figure 6.1: ECM architecture: basic cycle of Reasoning, Planning and Action
TraumAID 2.0 implements the ECM architecture (Figure 6.1). Its diagnostic reasoning follows a Goal-Directed Diagnosis framework (see Section 3.9). It uses a
Progressive Horizon Planner with a Selection-and-Ordering sketching algorithm (see
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Section 4.3).
This chapter follows step by step as a management plan is being developed for JR's
case (cf. Section 1.2) by TraumAID 2.0. Then, it presents results from an empirical
study in which management plans produced by TraumAID 2.0 were compared to
those produced by its predecessor TraumAID 1.0 and to the actual care delivered to
these patients in a trauma center. Finally, it pauses on a few particular cases which
illustrate di erences between TraumAID 2.0 and TraumAID 1.0.

6.1 TraumAID 2.0 { Example Case
Section 1.2 presented the case of JR, a trauma patient who was admitted to the
emergency room in an unstable condition as a result of two gun shot wounds to
the chest. In this section, I present snapshots from TraumAID 2.0's interface as it
handles JR's case.
TraumAID 2.0's X-Windows interface uses a number of windows to convey information and interact with the physician. Figure 6.2 presents most of them, as appearing
at the time when JR's management is complete. Most of the computer-guided interaction occurs on windows that pop up with a question or instruction and disappear
immediately after the input is recorded in the appropriate summary windows. There
are two command panels, shown at the upper left side of the screen. A Conclusions window presents conclusions and suspicions. Two other windows present goals:
Projected and Pursued. (Note that even though JR's management has already been
concluded, four goals were left unattended, subsumed by the de nitive surgical procedure.) Another window, labeled Assumptions presents evidence which was provided
to the program throughout the management. Procedures that were performed are
recorded in another window. In addition to these windows, and the computer-guided
interaction window, a plan window will also appear during management. Since the
initial de nitive management is complete, the plan is empty.
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Figure 6.2: JR's Management Concluded
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Let us begin at the point in which JR presented to the emergency room. After
the two wounds are reported to TraumAID 2.0, it begins asking all relevant bed side
questions. Bed side questions are pieces of information which are not associated with
a costly, risky, painful, or time consuming procedures, and which are therefore not
planned for but rather are surfaced as they are determined to be of possible relevance.
TraumAID 2.0 asks those in a pre-determined order, grouping related questions for
coherence. JR's ndings include: shock, distended neck veins, decreased breath
sounds on both sides, and mued heart sounds. JR is not unconscious or obtunded,
does not su er from hemoptysis, and has no ileus or abdominal scarring. His pulses
are all normal. Figure 6.3 presents the Assumptions window after the initial bed-side
questions.

Figure 6.3: After Initial Bed-Side Questions
While no diagnoses other than a penetration of the chest are made, a number of
goals, mostly diagnostic, are instantiated. Figure 6.4 presents the Projected Goals
window.
TraumAID 2.0's Plan is presented in Figure 6.5. The plan represents a partial order
on the selected set of actions, which is then linearized when presented according to a
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Figure 6.4: Initial Projected Goals
pre-determined xed order. It is organized by the hospital sites in which actions are
recommended. Actions are further ordered by their respective urgency and priority
and by their order in their respective procedures. Urgent actions are marked with
an asterisk.
The plan rst calls for covering the wound. Although this is not an urgent action, it
can be done quickly enough to allow its scheduling prior to urgent ones. This ordering
is done in the linearization step, and is based on the soft ordering constraints. In
the partial order based on the hard constraints, wound covering is unordered with
respect to the urgent actions.
The rst important goal, per the plan, is locating the cause of shock. Three actions
are directly aimed at this goal, the aspiration of both sides of the chest and the
aspiration of the pericardial sac, which is ordered after the former because it is related
to circulation problems and not airway. Notably, another action which can also be
used for that purpose appears on the plan, although for other purposes: the survey
chest X-ray, a standard procedure in chest injuries, can be used to diagnose a tension
pneumothorax, however is inappropriate in unstable patients. The abdominal X-ray
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is used to diagnose abdominal injury. The preferred diagnostic procedure for shock
from abdominal bleeding, a peritoneal lavage, appears late in the plan because the
urgent goal of diagnosing shock of abdominal origin is inhibited by the investigation
of a tension pneumothorax and/or a pericardial tamponade. A few more studies:
a urinalysis, an arteriogram, and a barium swallowing study, are planned for later
stages.

Figure 6.5: Plan after Initial Assessment
The needle aspiration of the chest revealed a tension pneumothorax on the left
side, but JR remained in shock even after the aspiration has relieved the pressure
in the chest cavity. TraumAID 2.0 recommended aspirating the pericardial sac,
immediately after inserting a chest tube to prevent a deterioration in JR's condition.
The aspiration of the pericardial sac revealed a pericardial tamponade. Figure 6.6
presents the current plan.
Note that, at this point, given that a need for an urgent heart operation was identi ed, JR was moved to the operating room for the remainder of the management.
Also note that all lengthy studies, e.g. barium swallow and arteriogram, were removed from the plan. Note the interleaving of the pneumothorax treatment strategy,
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Figure 6.6: The Plan after Diagnosis of Pericardial Tamponade
which includes the chest tube insertion and subsequent ow monitoring and posttube X-ray, and the treatment for the pericardial tamponade condition, including
the decompression and the heart repair itself.
JR's pericardial sac was decompressed. Then, the ow o the chest tube has revealed
a massive hemothorax. The next plan, presented in Figure 6.7 prepares for a left
thoracotomy.

Figure 6.7: The Plan after Diagnosis of a Massive Hemothorax
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Figure 6.8: A Survey Chest X-Ray
Note that, at the moment, both a left thoracotomy and a bilateral thoracotomy are
planned. TraumAID 2.0's planner knows that the left thoracotomy is subsumed by
the bilateral operation, but will only consider that when they are included within its
horizon. In the meanwhile, the autotranfusion device is installed at the chest tube,
and a survey chest X-ray is taken (Figure 6.8).
The survey chest X-ray reveals an additional hemothorax on the right side. It shows
one bullet only, triggering the suspicion that the other bullet is in the abdomen.
Figure 6.9 presents the new plan.
The new plan aims at locating that other bullet in the abdomen through an abdominal X-ray, or maybe nding another exit hole. It also schedules a lateral chest X-ray
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Figure 6.9: Plan After Chest X-Ray
to locate the exact location of the bullet in the chest, and calls for insertion of a
chest tube in JR's right chest to treat the hemothorax condition. This chest tube,
however, will not be inserted when it gets within the optimization horizon, one of
the planner's optimizers will discard it due to the proximity of the chest operation.
After the lateral chest X-ray reveals that the bullet is lodged at the vicinity of the
spine, a few more bed-side questions are asked to rule out neurological damage.
The abdominal X-ray, taken next, shows the missing bullet in the abdominal cavity,
and a need for a laparotomy is established. The next plan, depicted in Figure 6.10,
is not looking for the bullet anymore. The previously scheduled peritoneal lavage
has been removed from the plan given that a need for a laparotomy has already been
established.
After a urinalysis is determined negative, the chest operations are merged into a single bilateral surgery (Figure 6.11). Finally, an exploratory laparotomy is performed,
in which both sides of the diaphragm are checked for penetration and repaired if
necessary.
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Figure 6.10: Plan After Need for Laparotomy is Established

Figure 6.11: Plan Combining Chest Surgeries

6.2 A Comparison of Computer-Generated Protocols and Actual Care
Subsequent to the development of TraumAID 2.0, a retrospective study was carried
out in which actual management plans were compared to those that would have been
recommended by TraumAID 2.0 and TraumAID 1.0 20]. In a blinded test, three
trauma surgeons from the Medical College of Pennsylvania, who are not otherwise
associated with the TraumAID project, were asked to compare actual care provided
in 97 real trauma cases to alternative management plans generated by TraumAID 2.0
and by TraumAID 1.0.
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Over a period of 15 months, 97 trauma cases of otherwise healthy adults who presented to the Trauma Center of the Medical College of Pennsylvania were collected.
Each of the patients was stable or stabilized, and su ered gunshot or stab wounds
con ned to the chest and abdomen. Patients who were never successfully resuscitated to receive de nitive care were excluded from the study. Also excluded were
patients who su ered injuries other than gunshot or stab wounds and/or su ered
serious wounds to other parts of the body.
Management plans were transcribed to have the same \look and feel". For control
purposes, judges were asked to try to identify whether a given plan was generated by
a computer. A set of 4 cases was selected by a consultant to be discussed with the
judges prior to them being presented with the real cases. These cases were analyzed
by a regional quality-assurance committee and comprise one case in which care is
clearly acceptable, one case in which care is clearly unacceptable, one case which was
acceptable by majority vote, and one which was unacceptable by a majority vote.
Further, another set of 5 cases which the judges have analyzed in the past as part of
a previous validation study, were presented to the judges in order to test consistency.
To further check consistency, 10% of the cases were resampled and presented again
to the judges. Finally, cases in which there was no consensus between the judges
regarding acceptability were presented to them again for reconsideration.
Each judge was rst asked to rate each management as being Acceptable (ACC),
Acceptable with no errors of major consequence (NME), Acceptable with reservations
(RES), or Unacceptable (UNACC).
Program
ACC NME RES UNACC GPA
Actual Care
3
39
41
14
2.39
TraumAID 1.0 3
39
50
5
2.44
TraumAID 2.0 17
53
23
4
2.85
Figure 6.12: Absolute Rating and GPA
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Figure 6.12 summarizes results of the absolute rating of each of the 97 cases. The
grade for each case management was averaged over the three judges, with a grade of
4 for ACC rating, 3 for NME, 2 for RES, and 1 for an UNACC rating. For example,
a case graded by the three judges as ACC, NME, and UNACC respectively would
have an overall grade of (4 + 3 + 1)/3 = 2.67. In the table, cases with overall
grade of 3.5 or more are counted as ACC, between 2.5 and 3.5 as NME, between
1.5 and 2.5 as RES, and below 1.5 as UNACC. The gure denotes the number of
cases falling into each category for each of the three management alternatives, and
the overall Grade Point Average (GPA) for each of the management alternatives,
i.e. the average over all 97 cases. Figure 6.13 presents these results graphically in a
cumulative histogram.
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Figure 6.13: Cumulative Absolute Rating
Figure 6.14 presents a two-way comparison of the categorical ratings of management
plans from TraumAID 2.0 and the actual care. In 51 cases, TraumAID 2.0 was
ranked better than the actual care by at least one category-di erence versus 13
cases in which the actual care was ranked better (p <10;6 by binomial test). In 14
cases, TraumAID 2.0 was ranked better by at least two categories versus 4 cases in
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0
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17

53
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4
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Figure 6.14: Comparison of Absolute Rating of TraumAID 2.0 and Actual Care
which the actual care was ranked better by two categories (p <0.0155). Finally, in
4 cases, TraumAID 2.0 was ranked better by three categories (p =0.0625), i.e. fully
acceptable versus fully unacceptable. The opposite did not occur in any of the cases.
Figure 6.15 presents a similar table for TraumAID 2.0 and TraumAID 1.0. In 35
cases, TraumAID 2.0 was ranked better than TraumAID 1.0 by at least one categorydi erence versus only 3 cases in which TraumAID 1.0 was ranked better (p <10;7).
TraumAID 2.0 was ranked better than TraumAID 1.0 by at least two categories in
10 cases, and was rated totally acceptable in one case in which TraumAID 1.0 was
rated as totally unacceptable (p <0.001). In none of the cases, was TraumAID 1.0
ranked better than TraumAID 2.0 by more than one category-di erence.
Judges were also asked to pairwise rank di erent management plans for each case
by preference. These comparisons were required to be consistent with their own
categorical ranking, i.e. if a certain plan was ranked NME and another was ranked
RES, then the former plan must be preferable to the latter. Any preference could be
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Figure 6.15: Comparison of Absolute Rating of TraumAID 2.0 and TraumAID 1.0
indicated within a category, i.e. if two plans were both ranked ACC, then the judge
was asked to either rank them, or note them as equally preferable.
In paired comparisons of all plans of all 97 cases, the judges had a signi cant preference for TraumAID 2.0 plans over actual plans by a ratio of 64 to 17 with 16 ties
(p <10;7 ). They had a signi cant preference for TraumAID 2.0 plans over TraumAID 1.0 plans by a ratio of 62 to 9 with 26 ties (p <10;10). Their preference for
TraumAID 1.0 plans to actual plans by a ratio of 43 to 38 with 16 ties was not
statistically signi cant (p >0.32). Figure 6.16 summarizes these results.
Figure 6.17 presents a more re ned comparison of the management plans of TraumAID 2.0 and the actual care. Cases are grouped by their categorical rating for each
of the two plans. Within a category-product, cases are grouped by the preference
margin, computed as the di erence between the number of judges preferring one
management plan and those preferring the other. Thus if one management plan was
preferred by two judges, and the other preferred by the third judge, then the former
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TraumAID 1.0 TraumAID 2.0 Actual Care
TraumAID 1.0
Preferred TraumAID 2.0
Actual Care

9
62
38

43
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17

Figure 6.16: Preference Ranking for All Three Management Plans
plan is preferred by a margin of 1. If the latter judge liked both management plans
equally, then the margin would have been 2.
Note that on rare occasions, there is an inconsistency between the categorical ranking
and the voted preference. In particular, notice the one case in which TraumAID 2.0
was ranked better than the actual care (NME vs. RES) but the overall preference
favored the actual care. This phenomenon is a result of a disagreement among the
judges in which two judges slightly favor one management plan, whereas the third
judge strongly prefer the other.
In general, TraumAID 2.0 plans were preferable for being methodical, organized and
avoiding errors of omission. In at least two cases, it is believed that the patient's
death could have been prevented had TraumAID 2.0's management been followed:

 Case 900425 { This 16 year old male presented unstable with a gunshot wound

to the back. The actual care was criticized by the judges for missing a heart
injury not aspirating the chest before inserting a chest tube and doing an unnecessary IVP. The patient died as a result of recurrent shock. TraumAID 1.0
was criticized for not taking an abdominal lm even though the bullet could
not be located on the chest X-ray. TraumAID 2.0 was judged perfectly acceptable by two of the judges and NME by the third. The judges thought that the
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Figure 6.17: Re ned Comparison of TraumAID 2.0 and Actual Care
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patient's death resulted from errors in the actual management.

 Case 900024 { This 30 year old female arrived at the emergency room unstable

with a stab wound to the back. The actual care missed a heart injury and a
persistent hemothorax. The patient died as a result of recurrent shock. TraumAID 2.0 was not ranked perfectly acceptable on this case due to disagreement
between the judges on whether or not to insert a chest tube in a patient who
is about to undergo a chest surgery on the same side of the chest.

While in some cases, errors of commission that were avoided by TraumAID 2.0 were
praised, there were a few cases in which TraumAID 2.0 was criticized for not pursuing
a diagnosis. Following is an examination of cases in which TraumAID 2.0 ranked
unacceptable and the actual care was acceptable at various levels:

 Case 900495 { This patient had two gunshot wounds to the abdomen, one

pointing up and the other down (in retrospect, this was a through-and-through
wound, i.e. a pair of entry and exit wounds). TraumAID 2.0 was criticized by
the judges for having the patient rushed to the operating room for a laparotomy
without evaluating the chest rst. TraumAID 1.0 did order an abdominal Xray, which was found normal, and the eventual treatment was the same. In
the domain expert's opinion, TraumAID 2.0's management was in fact better
since further examination couldn't have changed the recommended treatment.
TraumAID 2.0 may have outsmarted itself, and the judges, in this case.

 Case 900898 { In this case, too, the patient su ered a gunshot wound to the

abdomen, and TraumAID 2.0 was criticized for not taking a chest X-ray before
rushing the patient to the operating room. Here too, the domain expert believes
the management was correct. The patient su ered a simple hemothorax on
both sides, which was also missed in the actual care. The chest X-ray was
negative and it is believed that the hemothoraces developed post-operatively.
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 Case 900527 { The criticism in this case is very similar to the above two

cases. The patient was shot in the abdomen. After discovering the bullet in
the abdomen, TraumAID 2.0 called for a laparotomy. Two of the judges felt
that a chest X-ray should also have been taken (in the actual management,
a chest X-ray came out normal). The domain expert believes that this is
mostly a matter of routine and that TraumAID's recommendation was rational.
The third judge ranked all three managements unacceptable for lack of more
complete abdominal evaluation.

To summarize, in all cases in which TraumAID 2.0's recommendations were judged
unacceptable, it was due to di erences in opinion between the domain expert on
whose practices the rules are based and those of the judges and not due to a particular
weakness of TraumAID 2.0's methodology.
Figure 6.18 presents a re ned comparison of the management plans of TraumAID 2.0
and TraumAID 1.0.
There were only three cases in which TraumAID 1.0 was judged preferable to TraumAID 2.0 by at least one category di erence:

 Case 900088 { This case involves a patient with two stab wounds to the chest,
which was eventually only put on a periodic evaluation. There was little difference in the relative evaluation of TraumAID 1.0, TraumAID 2.0 and the
actual care. However, and despite the lack of complications, there was a serious disagreement between the judges about the general level of care provided.
In particular, one physician rated all three plans unacceptable (for lack of
sucient objective abdominal evaluation) whereas another rated all three acceptable with no major errors. TraumAID 1.0's plan was slightly preferred
over TraumAID 2.0's by the third physician (ACC vs. NME) for taking a
chest X-ray before covering the wounds. The third physician rated the actual
plan unacceptable.
124

TraumAID 2.0
NME
RES

ACC
ACC

NME

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

Neutral: 2
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 2
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

3

0

0

0

3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 12
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 12
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

4

33

2

0

39

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 1
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 9
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 10
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

9

20

20

1

50

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 0
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 2
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 2
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

1

0

1

3

5

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

Neutral: 2
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 13
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 9
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 2
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

Neutral: 26
TraumAID 2
1 2 3

17

53

23

4

97

1

RES

2

5

UNACC

1

4

1

Total

Total

TraumAID 1
1 2 3

1

TraumAID 1.0

UNACC

2

7

6

1

2

4

13

3

15

1

2

7

28

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

5

4

0

1

3

1

6

4

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

6

15

1

2

8

24

5

2

1

5

15

Figure 6.18: Re ned Comparison of TraumAID 2.0 and TraumAID 1.0
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 Case 900024 { While two of the physicians ranked both TraumAID 1.0 and

TraumAID 2.0 as NME and indicated slight preference for TraumAID 2.0,
the third physician did not like TraumAID 2.0 management and rated it as
UNACC. The disagreement was over whether to put a chest tube in a patient
su ering a hemothorax who is due to undergo surgery, or to skip it and rush
the patient to the operating room. TraumAID 2.0's planner will normally
suggest a chest tube insertion in patients su ering a hemothorax. However,
consistent with the opinion of the domain expert, a special optimizer was added
to override this recommendation in patients about to undergo a chest operation.
This optimization is also consistent with the opinion of two of the judges. As
an aside, the actual care was rated UNACC by all three judges.

 Case 900495 { see above.

To conclude, TraumAID 2.0 plans were judged to be signi cantly more acceptable
than either the actual care, or the plans proposed by TraumAID 1.0. It is also
interesting to note that among the case managements that had to be sent back to the
judges for reconsideration (cases in which there was no consensus among the judges),
33 were actual care, 41 were TraumAID 1.0 cases, and only 20 were TraumAID 2.0
cases. Thus, the judges were more consistent in their opinion about TraumAID 2.0's
plans. As a nal note, some of the cases were actually managed by members of the
panel, although except in one instance speci c cases were not recognized as such.
Thus, the surgeons often preferred TraumAID 2.0's management to same of their
own.
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6.3 Further Comparison of TraumAID 2.0 and
TraumAID 1.0
The rst version of TraumAID, TraumAID 1.0, was a rule-based consultation system
for multiple trauma management. Like TraumAID 2.0, its scope includes gunshot
and stab wounds to the chest and abdomen. Because rules were found to be inadequate as a single representation and reasoning vehicle, TraumAID 2.0's objective
was to augment TraumAID 1.0 with more principled reasoning about actions.
The main di erence between TraumAID 1.0 and TraumAID 2.0 is that while in the
former one has to explicitly encode diagnoses and responses to any combination of
injuries that can be sustained by a patient, the latter's ECM architecture allows
implicit coordination of local strategies.
Besides its new planner, this required modifying TraumAID 1.0's original rules to
be goal-directed so that they eectively post goals for the planner. Before, questions
and actions were presented to the physician in a pre-de ned, xed order. Questions
and diagnostic tests were collected, in a one-by-one fashion, throughout the interactive session. Therapeutic actions, excluding those that are both diagnostic and
therapeutic, were accumulated in a prescription list, also based on a xed order.
In TraumAID 2.0, the planner addresses combinations of goals. Complete plans are
presented, and adapted throughout the interactive session. These plans intersperse
diagnosis and therapy. Various diagnostic and therapeutic needs are coordinated in
a principled way by an implicit planning algorithm. Among the principles used in
TraumAID 2.0's planner are logistical considerations which were not at all present in
TraumAID 1.0. Finally, some other weaknesses of TraumAID 1.0 were also improved
upon in TraumAID 2.0.
The redesign of TraumAID's rules, particularly avoiding the need to explicitly reason
about many combinations of injuries, have simpli ed them signi cantly. The number
of antecedents per rule { an indicator of its complexity { has been reduced from an
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average of 2.80 in TraumAID 1.0 to an average of 2.32 in TraumAID 2.0's evidential rules and 1.69 in its goal-setting rules, even though TraumAID 2.0's domain is
somewhat more complex.
This simpli cation is, to a great extent, due to the fact that TraumAID 1.0 needed to
have complex rules to get around the xed order of actions in its management plans,
when the particular con guration of injuries needed to be treated di erently. A second simpli cation in the rules came from the use of inhibition clauses, implemented
in TraumAID 2.0 as a so-called hierarchy of goals, which are automatically compiled into the rules when they are loaded. Many of the goal-setting rules replaced
so-called suspect rules in TraumAID 1.0 which were used to control information
gathering. Other goal-setting rules were added for previously unhandled therapeutic
goals. TraumAID 2.0 uses 111 goal-procedure mappings and 79 procedure-action
mappings.
While developed, TraumAID 2.0 was validated using a collection of 270 theoretical
trauma cases which were hand-crafted by our domain expert during the development
of TraumAID 1.0 for its own validation. Following are a few cases from that collection
which exemplify some of the new features of TraumAID 2.0:

Case tp6-302b.
In this patient who was shot in the left lower abdomen, TraumAID 2.0 decided
not to pursue an arteriogram after the need for a laparotomy was established by
the identi cation of a bullet in the abdominal lm. The mechanism used for that
purpose is a goal-inhibition rule.

Case tp6-317c.
This patient was stabbed in the right lower abdomen. He was not in shock, and
was not obtunded. There were no adverse clinical signs (ileus, guarding, rebound
tenderness), and the pulses were normal. Blood in the urine, however, triggered
TraumAID 1.0 to request a series of tests: a cystogram, an IVP, and a peritoneal
lavage. TraumAID 2.0, given the stable condition of the patient, recommended
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replacement of the IVP and lavage with a single CT scan. The mechanism used
for that purpose is the planner's parsimonious set-covering model. In any case, the
results were negative and the patient was observed.

Case tp6-120g.
This patient was unstable after being stabbed in the upper abdomen (epigastrium).
The neck veins were not distended and there were no mued heart sounds. After the
chest X-ray was also negative, TraumAID 2.0 has focused on abdominal bleeding as
the cause of shock, and recommended proceeding with a lavage. TraumAID 1.0 rst
called for a pericardiacentesis, which was negative then it called for a local wound
exploration, which was obviously positive and only then recommended the lavage.
This case demonstrates a combination of possible injuries which was simply not
well covered by TraumAID 1.0. While normally attributed to chest wounds, here
one had to reason about the potential of a heart injury given an abdominal wound.
TraumAID 1.0 missed the lack of clinical signs and proceeded to aspire the pericardial
sac. In TraumAID 2.0, there is little need to encode the interaction and so the
heart injury hypothesis was simply ruled out on the basis of the regular clinical
examination. TraumAID 2.0 thus proceeded immediately to the abdomen. In the
abdomen, given that the patient was in shock, the outcome of the local wound
exploration was irrelevant to the continued treatment. TraumAID 2.0 was thus
instrcted to skip over it, using a goal-inhibition mechanism, and proceeded directly
to lavage the patient.

Case tp6-114g.
This patient was stabbed in the lower left abdomen. Compared to TraumAID 1.0,
TraumAID 2.0 did not ask for a local wound exploration, and replaced an IVP and
lavage with a single CT scan.
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Case tp56-303b.
This patient had two gunshot wounds on opposite sides of the lower chest. TraumAID 1.0 called for the diagnosis and treatment of a simple pneumothorax on both
sides, but did not pursue a possible abdominal injury. Since none of the bullets
were located, it is possible that both headed to the abdomen. Even if it were a
through-and-through wound, i.e. one of the wounds was an exit wound, it is still
possible that the abdomen was lacerated given that the wounds were very low in the
chest. TraumAID 2.0 would have called for interspersing diagnosis and, if necessary,
treatment of the abdomen, with the treatment of the pneumothoraces.

Case tp56-220b.
This case also illustrates improved completeness of the evaluation. The patient
was stabbed in the lower left chest, and unstable. TraumAID 1.0 asked for clinical
examination of the chest and left the patient untreated when it was all negative
(although no X-ray was taken!). TraumAID 2.0 recommended investigating both
the chest and the abdomen. Given the negative clinical examination of the chest, it
rst called for looking at abdominal bleeding as a possible cause of shock. (Given
the urgency, it chose a lavage for that purpose.) When the lavage was negative it
shifted its focus to a pericardial tamponade as an alternative cause of shock.

Case tp56-206.
This patient was shot in the upper left chest and in the abdomen, and was unstable.
A chest X-ray showed a single bullet in the chest and also a hemothorax. The
hemothorax persisted even though it was treated with a chest tube. TraumAID 2.0
requested an abdominal X-ray, to locate the other bullet, before transferring the
patient to the operating room. TraumAID 1.0 requested, in addition, an arteriogram
(thoracic), a barium swallow study, and a bronchoscopy. The mechanisms used
to prevent those are goal inhibition clauses and time constraints (arteriogram and
bronchoscopy are too lengthy for an unstable patient).
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Cases tp56-205, 204d.
In these cases, one patient was shot in the upper abdomen, the other was shot
twice in the chest and sustained an abdominal injury. In both cases, TraumAID 2.0
recommended overriding the need for an abdominal arteriogram given the already
established need for a laparotomy. The mechanism used was goal inhibition.

Case tp56-181.
This patient was unstable, after being shot in the upper abdomen, and was diagnosed
as su ering a pericardial tamponade. After an X-ray showed a left pneumothorax,
TraumAID 1.0 suggested decompression with a chest tube. TraumAID 2.0 suggested
skipping the chest tube insertion, and instead rushing the patient to the operating
room for a planned bilateral surgery. While preferable in the opinion of the domain
expert, this practice was occasionally criticized by one of the judges who prefers
to go ahead with the chest tube insertion (see Section 6.2). In TraumAID 2.0, the
prophylaxis is suppressed by one of the domain speci c optimizers.

6.4 Summary
I have presented TraumAID 2.0 { an implemented consultation system for the trauma
domain. TraumAID 2.0 implements an ECM architecture with a GDD reasoner and
a planner as described in Sections 3.9 and 4.3 respectively. JR's case, which was
used earlier to demonstrate important features of the multiple trauma management
domain, is also used here as an example. I then presented an empirical study in which
mangement produced by TraumAID 2.0 for real trauma patients was compared to
the actual care administered and to management proposed by TraumAID 1.0. In
the judgement of three trauma experts, TraumAID 2.0's plans were signi cantly
preferable (by ratios of 64:17 and 62:9 respectively). Cases in which TraumAID 2.0's
plans were judged to be weak are analyzed and explained. I also present cases which
demonstrate the improvements of TraumAID 2.0 over its predecessor TraumAID 1.0.
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Chapter 7
A Catalogue of
Diagnosis-and-Repair Strategies
7.1 Overview
The work reported in this dissertation started as an engineering project. Only after
TraumAID 2.0 was already up and running have I tried to identify the principles used
in its encoding and to formulate a theory that would account for these principles.
To close the loop, it was necessary to show that the new formalization is indeed (a)
useful and (b) natural.
Considering that the GDD implementation of TraumAID 2.0 is di erent from the
formulation of Chapter 3, the rst step involved implementing the new formulation
and testing it on pieces of TraumAID 2.0's knowledge that were transformed to the
new representation (cf. Section 3.7). Having done that, I embarked on a larger
study in which I tried to identify important diagnostic and therapeutic strategies.
In particular, I was searching for
1. strategies that commonly occur in diagnosis and/or diagnosis-and-repair domains
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2. strategy-segments that commonly serve as \building blocks" for such strategies
and
3. strategies that represent important diagnosis-and-repair \philosophies".
The original purpose of this study was to show that these strategies can be encoded
in the ECM framework, and that such encoding is natural, i.e. that these strategies are inherently goal-directed. From an engineering perspective, identifying such
strategies facilitates the creation of strategy templates for future use. From a scienti c perspective, this study has retrospectively resulted in an intriguing collection of
diagnosis-and-repair strategies.
Scientists have studied diagnostic and therapeutic strategies for a variety of reasons.
Many have studied medical decision making with the purpose of educating physicians
114, 42, 79, 39, 81]. Others, 96, 5, 23], have studied such strategies with the
objective of eventually teaching them to a machine. Yet others have used them
as insights on how to encode medical knowledge in computerized decision support
systems, e.g. the systems in 147, 22].
The notion of strategy is clearly useful, and is sometimes explicitly present in medical
management programs, e.g. the skeletal plans of oncocin 70, 92] and attending
104]. However, in my search, I found that diagnostic strategies are much better
studied and documented than ones in which diagnosis and therapy are mixed. This
is particularly true of references to abstract strategies. In Section 7.2, I present a
collection of primitive building blocks for abstract diagnostic strategies which I have
collected from the literature. I discuss the GDD encoding for those, and exemplify
them in two composite strategies.
I have been more interested in strategies that mix diagnosis and repair, which I
present in Section 7.3. Although most of these strategies were rst identi ed in the
trauma domain (the remainder being pointed out to me by colleagues working in
other domains), I believe that the principles demonstrated in them are of general
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importance to decision making in exploratory-corrective domains, and maybe other
domains as well. I found this catalogue of strategies, although somewhat murky and
de nitely incomplete, to be intriguing, and I further believe it should be of interest
to other workers in medical decision making and Arti cial Intelligence in general.

7.2 Building Blocks for Diagnostic Strategies
7.2.1 Hypothesis Generation
Throughout the course of management, and as early as the very rst bits of information become available, a diagnostician often hypothesizes which disease the patient
may su er, and then works to con rm, or refute, his hypotheses. This process was
observed in clinicians by Kassirer and Gorry 79]:
\Requesting and assessing new information, they rejected some of the
initial hypotheses, substituted speci c hypotheses for more general ones,
and selected a few speci c hypotheses for detailed and critical testing".
Similar observations were made by other researchers 42]. The set of current hypotheses is often referred to as the working hypotheses.
In the end, none of the hypothesized diseases may be present, but the role of exhaustive hypothesis generation is still important, as emphasized by Clendening and
Hashinger 25]: \the most brilliant diagnosticians of my acquaintance are the ones
who do remember and consider the most possibilities". Hilliard 71] notes that
1. In contrast to the way students are often taught, experienced physicians generate their hypotheses early on
2. A very limited number of hypotheses are considered at one time ve to seven
at most. They are then eliminated or retained depending on new information
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3. The most common error in the con rmation/elimination process is that of
overinterpretation. That is inappropriately attributing new information to a
current hypothesis, instead of generating a new one.
In general, it seems that knowledge-based systems can improve this process. Once
programmed, it is easier for a machine to produce and consider an exhaustive set
of hypotheses. A machine is also less prone to human weaknesses such as limited
ability to consider more than a few hypotheses 102] premature closure 81] and
poor ability to reason with probabilities 77]. In GDD, goal-setting rules can be
used to trigger new hypotheses in the form of \relevant" facts. For example, in JR's
case, the chest wound triggered the initial investigation of a possibility of tension
pneumothorax:
Chest Wound (Side=S)
> Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)

7.2.2 Generalization and Specialization
Two basic steps in diagnostic strategies are generalization and specialization. Given
a disease, a generalization strategy can be used to generate a more general class
of diseases to which that disease belongs. This is useful because there is often
more knowledge associated with more general classes, which might become useful
in the continued diagnosis and treatment of the current disease. In addition, in the
presence of uncertainty, other members of the general class should sometimes be
considered as alternative diagnoses given that they often have similar symptoms.
Specialization is the opposite process: a general class of diseases is specialized, or
re ned. Specialization is important where there are di erences in the treatment of
di erent sub-classes. If a general class is identi ed, more information may be needed
in order to specialize. This may require more tests.
Figure 7.1 presents an example used by Alpay 5] to demonstrate generalization and
specialization. It deals with diagnosing orthopedic back pain the ow indicates
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specialization of the diagnosis. Generalization works in the opposite direction.
Diseases

Mechanical causes
acute back pain

Prolapsed intervertebral disc
abnormal sensation

Prolapsed intervertebral disc between L5 and S1 vertebrae

Figure 7.1: Orthopedic Back Pain Diagnosis
Alpay discusses three types of errors that are common in generalizing/specializing:
(a) incorrect generalization/specialization steps, (b) overgeneralization or overspecialization, and (c) undergeneralization or underspecialization.
GDD-style encoding can help reduce errors of the latter two types. The basic GDD
encoding of a generalization strategy for this example is:
Prolapsed intervertebral disc between L5 and S1 vertebrae
) Prolapsed intervertebral disc
Prolapsed intervertebral disc
) Mechanical causes
Mechanical causes
) Diseases
Overgeneralization occurs when a too general conclusion is made. By the GDD principle, no generalization is too general unless it may lead to unnecessary or incorrect
action. Thus, if an overgeneralization step can lead to an unwarranted investigation,
then it is that investigation that should be inhibited, not the generalized conclusion.
For example, if the general Diseases conclusion leads to testing the possibility of
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either inammatory or mechanical causes, as in the following rules:
Diseases > Mechanical causes
Diseases > Inammatory causes

and if further the two are known to be exclusive, then there is no need to pursue the
inammatory causes path. To prevent that from happening, the above rules can be
augmented as follows:
Diseases ^
unless(Inammatory causes)
> Mechanical causes
Diseases ^
unless(Mechanical causes)
> Inammatory causes

Thus, the Diseases conclusion will remain while the unnecessary investigation will
be curbed. Alternatively, a goal-inhibition rule can be used, taking advantage of the
fact that the two specializations are mutually exclusive:
Diseases ^
Inammatory causes
) :Mechanical causes
Diseases ^
Mechanical causes
) :Inammatory causes
Undergeneralization will never occur if all generalization rules are explicitly written,
as above.

Specialization1 works in the opposite direction and may require additional information. In the above example, if the problem is believed to be of a mechanical nature,
1

The specialization strategy is also referred to as renement, e.g. 113].
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then the following rules can be used to further specialize:
Mechanical causes ^
Acute back pain
) Prolapsed intervertebral disc
Prolapsed intervertebral disc ^
Abnormal Sensation
) Prolapsed intervertebral disc between L5 and S1 vertebrae

For these rules to be applicable, additional information needs be gathered. The following goal-setting rules can be used to let the planner know such specializations
need be investigated. The planner will, in turn, call for action to make such information available.
Mechanical causes
> Prolapsed intervertebral disc
Prolapsed intervertebral disc
> Prolapsed intervertebral disc between L5 and S1 vertebrae

Alpay de nes overspecialization as specialization that is not supported by available
data. This particular form of overspecialization can be trivially avoided if the specialization rule is quali ed by that data. A more interesting case of overspecialization
not considered by Alpay is where diagnostic activity is wasted in gathering information for the purpose of unnecessary specialization. For example, if patients over the
age of 75 cannot safely be treated with surgery and if otherwise the treatment for
the particular Prolapsed intervertebral disc between L5 and S1 vertebrae disease is
the same as for the more general disease Prolapsed intervertebral disc, then gathering evidence of abnormal sensation is unnecessary. This can be prevented using the
following rule:
Age is over 75
> :Prolapsed intervertebral disc between L5 and S1 vertebrae
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Since a condition may often be concluded in a variety of ways, a specialized condition
may be concluded before its generalizations are. If that happens, we would often like
to prevent the latter from being actively pursued, even if they become relevant in
some later point in time. In the previously presented case, the generalization rules
will be e ective in preventing such activity: more general diseases are concluded
positive and labeled relevant (attitude=R), but known (belief=T or F). An alternative goal-inhibition approach is presented when scaled diagnosis is discussed, where
a similar situation occurs.
As with undergeneralization, underspecialization will never occur if all specialization
rules are speci ed.
As presented so far, the specialization strategy is driven by current hypotheses. Specialization can also be symptom-driven2. The application of a symptom-driven specialization is often based on the physician's own experience and/or on medical protocols. Given an observation, specialization is recommended, but not with a particular
hypothesis in mind. For example, a patient complaining about lower back pain will
often be asked about the nature of the pain, i.e. whether it was acute (i.e. occurred suddenly) or chronic. While there is probably a good, \deep" justi cation for
collecting such data (e.g. it may have been found useful in constraining the range
of considered diseases, the specialization step is better characterized (i.e. simpler,
more intuitive) as being primarily driven by the rst observation. In TraumAID, for
example, a chest X-ray is always requested for any patient with a gunshot or stab
wound to the chest. Thus, rather than enumerating all possible reasons (suspected
diseases), it is probably simpler to write a rule of the form:
Chest Wound (Side=S)
> Survey Chest X-Ray
Alpay 5] separates such strategies as problem renement strategies, but that terminology may
be confusing given that renement was previously referring to any specialization.
2
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The explore strategy 113] can be viewed as a special case of a symptom-based
specialization strategy. In that strategy, more information is gathered when there is
not enough information in the patient's case to generate hypotheses.

7.2.3 Con rmation and Elimination
During the course of diagnosis, a variety of competing hypotheses can be generated.
Hypotheses are often competing in that the presence of one rules out, of reduces the
chance of the presence of others. Similarly, the absence of one can con rm, or raise
the odds of others. Two types of steps are commonly taken to narrow down the
set of working hypotheses: conrmation and elimination. Con rmation uses data
to increase the perceived likelihood of a diagnosis whereas elimination uses data to
decrease the likelihood of other hypotheses. Discrimination, sometimes taken as a
third type, can often be viewed as a combination of elimination and con rmation. An
hypothesis can be con rmed via sucient, or necessary positive evidence. Likewise,
it can be eliminated via negative evidence or via the absence of necessary evidence.
In addition, hypotheses are sometimes eliminated due to insucient evidence. (Note
that the latter reects a negative bias).
The use of con rmation and elimination is demonstrated next using composite strategies.

7.2.4 Examples
Scaled Diagnosis
Scaled diagnosis is a strategy in which a sequence of steps is taken, until a diagnosis
is nally reached. The order in which steps are taken will often correspond to their
cost or risk to the patient. (as aside, it is often the case that more costly/risky steps
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are also more accurate predictors.) Thus, such a strategy may be used to screen
patients by rst using tests which are cheap, and less risky, but with possibly high
false positive rates, before using more de nitive tests. Steps requiring information
available via general physical examination, which is typically performed on every patient, will usually appear earlier in a scaled diagnosis strategy for a given problem.
Scaled diagnosis is frequently used in trauma management, where it involves proceeding from initial symptoms through a number of cautious information acquisition
steps until a hypothesis is either con rmed or ruled out.
Consider, for example, a patient with a gunshot wound to the chest which is investigated as possibly having a tension pneumothorax (this example was previously used
in Section 3.7 to illustrate the use of GDD rules). An hypothesis generation step,
modeled via a goal-setting rule, may call for the investigation of the possibility of
tension pneumothorax:
Chest Wound (Side=S)
> Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)

In response, an elimination strategy will be used to try to rule out that possibility.
Tests of increasing cost and risk, but also of increasing validity, will be taken in
sequence. If any of them fails, then the patient is determined not to have a tension
pneumothorax. Figure 7.2 portrays that process graphically.
First, given the initial hypothesis, information regarding shock and distended neck
veins will be called for. In turn, that information will be used to conclude positively:
Chest Wound (Side=S) ^
Shock
) Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
Chest Wound (Side=S) ^
Distended neck veins
) Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
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chest wound
and
shock, or
distended neck veins
Possibility of TP
decreased breath sounds
and
shock and distended neck veins
Likely TP
x-ray, or
needle aspiration of chest
TP

Figure 7.2: Scaled Diagnosis { Diagnosing Tension Pneumothorax

and to proceed to the next step in the strategy:
Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
> Likely Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)

Note that information and conclusions may be acquired and made asynchronously
to the particular diagnostic path, e.g. through concurrently pursued diagnostic and
therapeutic strategies. Thus, the patient may be known to be in shock at the time
when the Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax goal was rst set. In such case, the
reasoner would have already been able to conclude the rst step positively without
asking whether or not the patient su ers from distended neck veins. This demonstrates con rmation via sucient information.
To proceed with the strategy, information concerned with the patient's ability to
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breathe is required:
Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S) ^
Decreased breath sounds (Side=S)
) Likely Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
Likely Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
> Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)

In the nal step of the strategy, one of two tests need to be performed in order
to con rm or eliminate the Tension Pneumothorax diagnosis. Either an X-ray or a
needle aspiration will be chosen, depending on the patient's state.
X-ray shows Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
) Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
Needle aspiration shows pressure in chest(Side=S)
) Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)

In practice, con rmation/elimination need not always proceed sequentially within
the scaled diagnosis strategy. Suppose, for example, that an X-ray was taken to
evaluate another injury and has shown a tension pneumothorax. By the GDD principle, it would be wasteful to go after the decreased breath sounds sign, as it can
only contribute to an already determined diagnosis. To prevent such behavior one
can further qualify the goal-setting rules:
Chest Wound (Side=S) ^
unless(Likely Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)) ^
unless(Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S))
> Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
Possibility of Likely Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S) ^
unless(Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S))
> Likely Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
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or alternatively, one can impose a generalization strategy on top of the scaled diagnosis strategy:
Likely Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
) Possibility of Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)
) Likely Tension Pneumothorax(Side=S)

That way, even though earlier goals in the sequence will remain labeled \relevant",
their underlying concepts will be tagged known and thus not pursued actively.

Dierential Diagnosis
Di erential diagnosis (also referred to as discrimination strategy) also involves hypothesis generation, elimination, and con rmation. It has been used in several computer systems, e.g. internist-i 103, 123] (internal medicine), abel 112] (electrolyte and acid-based disturbances), and pathfinder 73] (pathological lymph node
tissue analysis.)
Typically, the process begins with one or more hypothesis generation steps in which
the physician lists all diseases which the speci c case can reasonably resemble. The
purpose of the process is then to eliminate all but one of the hypothesized diseases,
which is then con rmed. Tests are used to di erentiate among the multiple hypotheses, and a good strategy is one which is most ecient in the tests it uses. New
hypotheses can sometimes be generated, depending on the outcome of test results.
Figure 7.3 illustrates graphically a typical di erential diagnosis strategy.
Given the initial evidence e, four competing hypotheses are generated d1     d4 (and
let us assume that only one of the 4 diseases can be present). The rst test t1 can
be used to di erentiate the rst two from the last, e.g. d3, and d4 are ruled out
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Figure 7.3: Di erential Diagnosis
if t1 comes back positive, and otherwise d1, and d2 are eliminated. Depending on
the remaining hypotheses, another test (t2 or t3) is selected to pinpoint the actual
disease. In GDD, this strategy is captured by the following set of goal-setting rules:
e ^ t1 ^ t2 ) d1
e ^ t1 > g2
e ^ t1 ^ :t2 ) d2
e > g1
e ^ :t1 ^ t3 ) d3
e ^ :t1 > g3
e ^ :t1 ^ :t3 ) d4
Again, the problem is that there are often a number of methods to conclude various
diseases. In particular, it is possible that in a given scenario, d4 will be concludable
via some other inference mechanism. In such occasion, if the above rules are used
alone, the tests t1 and subsequently t3 will be pursued { clearly not a desirable
feature. The following goal inhibition rules can be used to curb unnecessary tests in
such instance:

d4 > :g1

d4 > :g2

d4 > :g3

Even if a diagnosis was not yet made, its treatment may have already been recommended for other purposes. Suppose, for example, that t1 came back negative, and
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that the treatment for both d3 and d4 was already suggested by other means, then
the following rule can prevent using t3 to test further:
Rx d3 ^
Rx d4 > :g3

In general, goal-setting rules shall be used to set relevant goals, and goal-inhibition
rules shall be used to suspend relevant, but non-contributing, goals.

7.3 Strategies that Mix Diagnosis and Therapy
Working in an exploratory-corrective domain, I was particularly interested in strategies that combine diagnosis and repair. With few exceptions, the strategies discussed next represent \philosophies" of diagnosis-and-repair, and were identi ed in
the trauma management domain.

7.3.1 The \Do No Harm" principle
A basic principle of medical diagnosis is avoiding the use of a diagnostic method
whose consequences may be harsher than the diagnosed condition itself. For example,
while a laparotomy can be used to diagnose renal injury, it would not be chosen for
that purpose alone rather a CT-scan or an IVP would typically be used. However,
on the occasion that a laparotomy is anyway necessary, e.g. to treat a lacerated
diaphragm, it is preferred to investigate the renal injury directly during the surgical
intervention rather than spend time on a lengthy and costly CT scan procedure.
Encoding this example in GDD, three rules will be used to infer renal injury from
any of the three alternative sources of information: CT-scan, IVP, and the surgical
procedure. Choosing the means for addressing a renal injury suspicion, one must
make sure that a surgical procedure is not chosen unless it is necessary anyway.
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One way to do so is to let the planner gure the most ecient method given the
co-present injuries and associated goals. Alternatively, goal inhibition can be used
to inhibit the diagnosis of a renal injury when a need for a laparotomy is perceived.
The \do no harm" principle extends to cases where the diagnostic method is harsher
than the treatment of the diagnosed condition. For example, while herpes encephalitis
can be diagnosed via a brain biopsy, it is less risky to prescribe a drug for its treatment
and then observe whether it works (empirical therapy)3.

7.3.2 Buying time
If a de nitive treatment requires an elaborate procedure that cannot be done immediately, there can sometimes be another procedure which although less e ective, is
quick and can provide a temporary relief. Buying time is particularly useful in patients su ering multiple injuries, where it can allow diagnosis and treatment of other
injuries. Consider, for example, an unstable patient su ering a tension pneumothorax. Temporary relief can be provided by decompressing the pressure. A more
de nitive chest tube procedure, and if necessary an operation, can then follow. In
TraumAID, such a strategy is encoded by separating two goal-setting rules: one for
the urgent treatment and the other for the more de nitive one. The de nitive goal
will only be instantiated after the urgent treatment has been accomplished.
In a slight twist, one may want to \buy time" for more accurate diagnosis. In a
space station domain, for example, it may be easy to identify that air is leaking but
hard to nd the precise cause of leakage. In the meantime, air can be temporarily
added to maintain habitability and allow for further investigation4.
3
4

This example was communicated to me by Chris Cimino.
This example was communicated to me by Ethan Scarl.
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7.3.3 All roads lead to Rome
Sometimes, it may not be known which of two or more diseases is present. However,
if both share the same treatment, then further di erentiation will have no e ect on
the choice of treatment and by the GDD principle should thus be avoided. In case
of abdominal injury, for example, it may sometimes be hard to determine which
of the internal organs were injured. However, since they all require a laparotomy,
the diagnostic process is ceased whenever one organ is determined to be injured.
Furthermore, a laparotomy will also be called for if there is enough non-specic
evidence for intra abdominal injury. In GDD, that strategy is encoded via goalinhibition rules.

7.3.4 Cover all bases
Related to the \All roads lead to Rome", is the strategy of treating all remaining
hypotheses. Once left with a small set of such hypotheses, it may well pay to treat
as if they were all present, rather than to re ne the diagnosis. This strategy was
used by mycin, where a set of antibiotics was chosen to cover all diagnoses above a
certain threshold.

7.3.5 Gambling
It may not always be possible to carry out a diagnostic process to its end, or it
may be too risky to do so. A decision has to be taken considering a number of
competing hypotheses that have not yet been con rmed, nor eliminated. Utility
theory tells us that for such a decision to be optimal, it should maximize the expected
utility as measured by preferences over possible outcomes. Indeed, utilities have
been used extensively in medical decision making (see 80, 116]). While some sort
of utility considerations can be identi ed in each of the above strategies, as well
as their instantiations in TraumAID 2.0, utilities are not explicitly represented in
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TraumAID5. Following are a few more strategies, identi ed in TraumAID, in which
probabilistic and utility-based considerations are involved:

 Gamble on best scenario | Consider a patient presenting unconscious from

shock with a suspected pericardial tamponade and/or lacerated abdominal
aorta. In the presence of some adverse condition (e.g. distended abdomen),
it may not be practical to further di erentiate the two hypotheses: de nitive
action is required.

In practice, regardless of which condition is more believable, the correct strategy is to treat the patient as if he had a pericardial tamponade. The justi cation for that choice is given in the outcome table shown in Figure 7.4:
pericardial tamponade is the only curable injury.
Patient Has
Pericardial Lacerated
Tamponade Aorta
Pericardial
Administered Tamponade
lives
dies
Treatment Lacerated
Aorta
dies
dies
Figure 7.4: Outcome table
In GDD, this strategy can be encoded by setting the goal of treating a pericardial tamponade and letting that goal override the former diagnostic goals.
Note however, that we do not conclude the presence of a pericardial tamponade we do not have enough evidence to support that conclusion. Rather,
we conclude to treat as if it were concluded.

 Picking order of attention { Consider an unstable patient (a patient in

shock), su ering a stab wound to the lower chest. The cause of shock may

As aside, if it were to be done, a utility-theoretic modeling of decision-making in trauma
management will necessarily be multi-attribute 84]. This is the result of the possible interaction
of concurrent decisions for multiple injuries.
5
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have to be urgently removed, yet three potential causes may be hypothesized:
tension pneumothorax (due to collapse of the lungs), pericardial tamponade
(due to bleeding in the pericardial sac), or abdominal shock (due to internal
bleeding in the abdomen).
With insucient information, the urgency of the situation dictates guessing
the cause of shock and administering partial treatment as if it was the actual
cause. Such guesses will be taken in a sequence until the shock is relieved. Of
course, the order in which the various hypotheses are tried is important. By the
utility-theoretic model, hypotheses should be tried in an order that maximizes
the expected utility. In practice, the order in which potential causes are tried
depends on accompanying signs, and on the expected outcome of the decision,
roughly following an informal utility-theoretic decision process.
It is interesting to note that goals instantiated in this process are typically
diagnostic. Yet, due to the urgency of the situation, the procedures that will
be recommended will typically be therapeutic in nature but will have the diagnostic side-e ect of con rming or rejecting the hypothesis, depending on their
outcome. For example, a needle aspiration of the chest will be ordered for
the diagnosis of a tension pneumothorax, thereby also providing an indication
as to whether (a) the condition was present, and (b) was the sole source of
shock. Thus, this procedure mixes diagnosis and therapy in a reverse order: a
condition is diagnosed after, and as a result of its treatment.
Gambling strategies are considerably a ected by the utilities attached to various
outcomes. Naturally, such utilities are patient-speci c, and thus, the appropriate
strategy may di er from one patient to another. The treatment of spinal cord trauma
with steroids, for example, may improve the chances of the patient walking again,
but may also cause complications, and even death, in certain patients. In trauma
management, using patient-speci c utilities is complicated by the fact that patients
can often not be asked for their preference.
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7.3.6 Treating causal chains
Chain e ects are common in physical systems. For example, a gunshot wound to
the back may injure the aorta. Then, blood accumulating in the chest cavity (hemothorax) may drive the patient into an unstable condition (shock).
On such occasions, one has to decide which to address rst: the problem (e.g. the
hemothorax), or its cause(s) (e.g. the injured aorta). More generally, given a causal
chain, one has to decide which problems on the chain to address rst. Unfortunately,
there is no single recipe. Such a decision is a ected by a number of factors, e.g.
1. The duration and persistence of the problem and cause. In particular, whether
the cause was a single event in the past, or is still present and continuing
to cause the problem. Similarly, the need to address the problem depends
on whether it will continue to be present, and its severity, once its cause is
removed.
2. The window of opportunity for xing the problem. If there is urgency in
addressing the problem, then it may be preferable to address it rst, even if
it is impossible to address it completely before its cause is permanently xed,
and even if signi cantly more work will be necessitated that way.
3. Lack of knowledge about the cause
4. Amenability of the cause to treatment, the risk associated with such treatment,
or potential drastic side-e ects of such treatment.
Given such considerations, following (and hybrids) are some possible strategies:
1. address the cause only, letting the problem take care of itself as a result of such
treatment
2. address the cause rst then take care of the problem
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3. iterate through staged therapy for both cause and problem
4. address only the problem, ignoring or probing the cause
5. address the problem then the cause (possibly while maintaining treatment for
the problem)
6. relieve the problem then address the cause then provide de nitive treatment
to the problem.
In GDD, we can use goal-inhibition rules to express order preference on therapeutic
goals. Each of the above strategies can be encoded in GDD using such rules.
A strategy for treating causal chains is proposed by 98]. To devise treatment, explicitly represented causal chains are traversed until a treatable cause is encountered,
which is then treated.

7.3.7 Causing new problems
Treatment, e.g. a drug, for a given problem may itself cause another problem, which
should then be addressed. In other circumstances, the other problem is created to facilitate the treatment to the former problem, e.g. lowering the blood potassium level
to stop the heart during an open heart operation. Even more common in practice is
risking new problems, as a result of treatment prescribed to other problems.
In GDD, the prescription of problem-causing treatment should trigger (via goalsetting rules) the therapeutic goals associated with the new problem. Where there
is risk of such new problems, one should make sure to instantiate diagnostic goals,
aimed at appropriate monitoring.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Summary of Contributions
This dissertation describes contributions of three types: (1) a design methodology
for exploratory-corrective agents which integrates diagnostic reasoning and planning,
including speci c frameworks to implement each of these reasoning sub-tasks (2)
a consultation system for the multiple trauma management domain in which this
methodology is implemented and (3) a collection of abstract diagnosis-and-repair
strategies which will have to be accounted for by any alternative methodology.

8.1.1 Exploratory-Corrective Management Architecture
To address the common interplay between exploratory and corrective reasoning and
activity, I have proposed a reasoning architecture which integrates diagnostic reasoning and planning, and which interacts in a feedback loop with an action/perception
component. In this Exploratory-Corrective Management (ECM) architecture, reasoning cycles between:
1. A diagnostic reasoner which is iteratively charged with characterizing what is
true (the diagnosis) what needs to be determined (the diagnostic goals), and
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what needs to be achieved (the corrective, or therapeutic, goals) and
2. A planner which is iteratively charged with mediating between competing diagnostic and therapeutic needs.
This architecture satis es the following requirements of the trauma management
domain:
1. It allows interleaving diagnosis and repair
2. In the beginning of each loop, it allows the diagnostic reasoner to set diagnostic
and therapeutic goals in the end of each loop, it allows it to monitor actions
and other events, verify actual goal achievement, and adapt goals as necessary
3. It positions the planner to mediate between concurrent diagnostic and therapeutic needs, and also to dynamically adapt plans according to changes in
goals and/or other knowledge.

8.1.2 Goal-Directed Reasoning and Diagnosis
I have presented a logical calculus for goal-directed reasoning in which, in addition to
the standard belief measure, propositions are also assigned an attitude measure. An
agent's attitude towards a proposition indicates the perceived relevance in acquiring
information about this proposition, or of achieving a state in which this proposition
holds, depending on the semantic interpretation of the particular proposition. The
combination of attitude and belief for a given proposition is used to determine its
goalhood.
Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD) is a formalization of the diagnostic task that is
based on this calculus. GDD begins from the principle that diagnosis is only worthwhile to the extent that it has the potential to aect subsequent repair decisions, and
similarly that repair is only worthwhile to the extent that it can positively aect the
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eventual outcome. The key in the GDD formalization is that explicit representation
and reasoning about goals can facilitate focusing on worthy exploratory-corrective
activity. Situated in the ECM architecture, goals also serve as a natural interface
with the planner. Furthermore, I have shown that the number of goals passed on to
the planner (and thus the complexity of planning) can often be reduced via goal-level
resolution within the GDD reasoner.

8.1.3 Progressive Horizon Planning
Progressive Horizon Planning (PHP) is an incremental partial-global planning framework in which the eventual plan is being shaped while it is executed. In particular,
intermediate plans, constructed in each cycle of the ECM architecture, are expected
to be partially followed before being adapted to reect new information and goals.
The intermediate plans themselves are partial in that not all goals are known, and
also in that they are each constructed via an approximate plan sketching algorithm
and then optimized to a horizon. Intermediate plans are, however, global in that
they each address all known goals. I have presented two variations of PHP planning:
one that is based on Korf's Real-Time A planning algorithm 89], and one which is
based on the TraumAID 2.0's planner. Assuming plans can be \sketched" quickly,
both variations are shown to run in polynomial time.

8.1.4 Planning as Means-Selection and Ordering
I have presented a functional decomposition of the planning task into two sub-tasks:
1. Selection of a set of procedures/actions that parsimoniously address the current
combination of goals and
2. Ordering these procedures into a single overall plan, taking into account a set
of preferences and constraints.
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I have argued that this approach for planning is particularly useful for domains
with limited interaction between goals. I have formalized the selection sub-task
as a set-covering problem whereas the ordering sub-task has been formalized as
constraint-based scheduling. Given the inherent dependency between the choice and
respective ordering of procedures, I have presented an algorithm which interleaves the
two. Within TraumAID 2.0's PHP framework, this selection-and-ordering algorithm
serves for sketching intermediate plans.

8.1.5 A Representation Methodology for ECM Agents
I propose a methodology for e ectively representing desired behavior in ECM agents.
Speci cally, in accordance with the way in which reasoning is decomposed in the
ECM architecture, I propose
1. that local patterns of behavior (or strategies) be explicitly encoded in GDD
rules, in pre-de ned local procedures, and in mappings from goals to the corresponding procedures and actions
2. that alternative choices of procedures for goals in each of these local strategies
be speci ed and ranked by their respective preferences
3. that constraints and preferences on combinations of goals, procedures, and
actions, be speci ed and nally
4. that given a combination of goals, these principles be used by the planner to
implicitly merge on-line the current combination of local strategies.

8.1.6 The TraumAID 2.0 System
A GDD reasoner and a PHP planner have been implemented in TraumAID 2.0,
a consultation system for the multiple trauma management domain. During its
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development, TraumAID 2.0 has been tested on 270 cases that were hand-crafted
to cover important features of the domain. TraumAID 2.0's plans have also been
retrospectively compared to those generated by its predecessor, TraumAID 1.0, and
to the actual care on 97 real trauma cases. Three independent trauma experts have
judged TraumAID 2.0's plans preferable to TraumAID 1.0's plans by a ratio of 62:9
with 26 ties (p <10;10 by binomial test), and to the actual care by a ratio of 64:17
with 16 ties (p <10;7 ). In at least two cases, it is believed that a patient's death
could have been prevented had TraumAID 2.0's management been followed.

8.1.7 A Collection of Diagnosis-and-Repair Strategies
Purely diagnostic strategies are much better studied and documented than strategies
that mix diagnosis and repair. I have compiled a collection of abstract diagnosis-andrepair strategies which represent various approaches to tackling such problems. Most
of these strategies were identi ed in the trauma domain, but appear in other domains
as well. Although murky and incomplete, I found this collection intriguing, and I
believe it should be of interest to other workers in medical decision making, and
Arti cial Intelligence in general. In particular, alternative methodologies for representation and reasoning in exploratory-corrective domains will have to be capable of
representing these strategies.

8.2 Extensions and Directions for Future Research
8.2.1 Extensions to GDD
Formalizing GDD in MVL opens the door to extending the paradigm via the use
of more expressive bilattices. In Section 3.8, for example, I presented a prioritized
default bilattice. One way to think of the truthfulness measures associated with
points in this bilattice is as qualitative probabilities. The calculus is somewhat odd
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in that the truth value with the highest knowledge content is simply adopted while
information with a lesser knowledge content is discarded, but it is nevertheless sensible. Similarly, points in a prioritized default version of the attitude bilattice can be
thought of as utility values, indicating the perceived utility in acquiring information
about the given proposition, or achieving a state in which it holds.
Extended bilattices can support more detailed models. In particular, a ner partition
of the belief and attitude bilattice can support a ner reasoning by the planner about
the relative relevance and current degrees of satisfaction of competing goals. As
noted in Section 3.8, fairly detailed default bilattices can be constructed. Ginsberg
58] discusses possible-worlds-based bilattices. Unfortunately, if done by hand, the
model-building process which is cumbersome to begin with, becomes even more so
with complex bilattices. Such extensions, however, can maybe be useful if models
can be built automatically (see Section 8.2.4). Probabilities can then be estimated
from frequencies, and utilities can be assigned via a crediting/reinforcement learning
process.

8.2.2 Extensions to PHP
The most obvious question in the PHP framework is how to determine the optimal
horizon. While TraumAID 2.0 currently uses a 1-action horizon, no justi cation for
this choice was provided, and there was no theoretical diculty with extending it to
an arbitrary depth. On one hand, there is an obvious computational cost associated
with deeper horizons. On the other hand, a deeper horizon is likely to result in plans
that are more likely to be closer to optimal1. Thus, it may be useful to be able to
determine the appropriate tradeo for a given problem.
Also, as so far described, the horizon was always set as a xed number of actions. In
reality, however, di erent actions may carry di erent weight in a ecting the course
of actions. Some actions, for example, are easily reversible whereas others may have
1

Note the double use of probability in this statement.
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a permanent e ect on the patient. Thus, the horizon can be more generally de ned
in terms of a domain-speci c evaluation function, prioritizing the space of possible
plan initiations.

8.2.3 Extensions to Selection-and-Ordering Planning
In developing the Selection-and-Ordering algorithm, it was assumed that goals interact mostly via the choice and ordering of actions, that procedures and actions interact
with each other via precedence and compatibility relations, and that procedures also
interact with goals via time constraints. In contrast, most of the work in planning
deals with much more intricate relations. An obvious question is thus whether the
selection-and-ordering framework can be gradually extended to accommodate more
complex scenarios, even if at a cost.
While for the most part, I leave this as an open question, I wish to point to an
extension of the framework that can deal with sub-goals. Sub-goals are goals that
when satis ed, at a certain order, result in the achievement of some high-level goal.
They are useful in problems that can be broken down into sub-problems which can
be solved separately.
One way to use sub-goals in the ECM architecture is to use GDD goal-setting rules
to set the sub-goals from the relevance of the high-level goal, and then use a GDD
evidential rule to conclude that the higher level goal is satis ed from the fact that
each of the sub-goals is satis ed. Alternatively, TraumAID 2.0 allows sub-goals
to be speci ed as part of a procedure. When the selection-and-ordering algorithm
places a chosen procedure into the plan, it simply recurs on its sub-goals. Surgical
procedures, for example, can often be sub-divided into pre-operative preparations,
the incision, and the particular repair. The purpose of the incision is to expose
the organs that need be repaired. To facilitate the choice of an incision that can
serve as many purposes as possible, TraumAID 2.0, represents the incision part as
a sub-goal. Figure 8.1 presents a procedure for repairing esophageal injury: rst,
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antibiotics have to be administered, then action has to be taken to satisfy the goal
of gaining access to the right chest cavity, and then the actual repair must be done.
Perform Upper
Esophagus Repair

Antibiotics

Need Access

Esophagus

Chest Cavity (Right)

Repair Drain

Figure 8.1: Procedure-Action Mapping for Esophagus Repair

8.2.4 Automating Knowledge Acquisition and Validation
My most important conclusion from my work on TraumAID 2.0 is that it is extremely
hard to hand-construct a model of expertise. Furthermore, once constructed, it is
even harder to maintain and extend such a model. This conclusion has led me
to explore ways to automate this process. I am currently developing a protocol
for recording trauma cases, or annotating existing ones, which will allow applying
standard machine learning techniques to automatically infer GDD-style models and
test their validity.
In short, the protocol records observations, conclusions, goals, and actions, in the
order in which they were reported, made, and taken respectively. Figure 8.2 presents
an example of part of such protocol. These case descriptions are rst broken into
a number of scenarios, each corresponding to a temporal snapshot. Each of the
scenarios describes an initial attitude-belief, the conclusions made, goals set, and
the next action to be taken. Every new action potentially de nes a new scenario.
The purpose of learning is to generalize a mapping from a scenario's initial attitudebelief to the set of conclusions (evidential rules) and goals (goal-setting rules). While
this protocol also records the actions taken, I have not yet tackled the problem of
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automatically acquiring planning knowledge2.

8.2.5 Extensions of TraumAID
Other Special Forms of Reasoning
Part of the motivation for this work was the fact that rules proved to provide poor
means for representing and reasoning about actions. The solution proposed in this
work was to modularize reasoning into that which is diagnostic in nature and that
in which a course of action has to be chosen. More research is needed to identify
areas of reasoning that can bene t from specialization, and to devise and implement
solutions which can be integrated into the current system. Current areas of research
in the TraumAID project include
1. Quantitative and qualitative models of the cardiovascular system which given
the state of the patient can project blood loss and blood pressure gures in
support of pre-operative decisions 110].
2. Spatial reasoning, using a 3D model of the body and kinematic models of bullet
and knife penetration to determine which internal organs have potentially been
injured in a more principled (and thus more scalable) fashion 83].

Improving the Delivery of Advice
For TraumAID's advice to be followed, it must win the physician's cooperation. Recall (Chapter 4.1) that gaining the physician's condence was an important factor in
preferring complete plans. Signi cant de ciencies in TraumAID 1.0's interface which
were observed when it was rst elded in the emergency room are currently being
While given a collection of scenarios it is theoretically simple to acquire a next-action model,
it seems much harder to acquire the knowledge necessary to construct complete plans.
2
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improved upon in a new HyperCard-based interface speech-based input devices are
also being experimented with.
More related to my work on planning is current work in the area of critiquing 56].
In many cases, residents commented that TraumAID's advice only reassured their
opinion. Thus, rather than telling the physician what s/he already know, a di erent
mode of interaction can be adopted in which the physician is only told when his plan
deviates signicantly from TraumAID's.

8.2.6 Other Exploratory-Corrective Domains
While developed speci cally for the multiple trauma management domain, I believe
the knowledge representation and reasoning methodology developed throughout this
dissertation can be applied in other exploratory-corrective domains as well. In addition to being exploratory-corrective, domains for which the methodology will t
best are likely to share more features with the multiple trauma management domain. I will not repeat these features here they are discussed when JR's case is rst
presented, and then elaborated upon in the appropriate technical chapters. I wish,
however, to mention two important assumptions which limit the use of the proposed
framework:

 First, I assume that the domain allows explicit formalization of the relation-

ship between beliefs, or what is known, and goals, both diagnostic or corrective.
Speci cally, it is required that given a set of observations and inferred knowledge, a corresponding agenda de ning all relevant information and physical
goals is well de ned.

 Second, I assume a limited interaction between multiple goals. I further assume
that a plan for satisfying each of these goals (or multiple alternative such
plans) is readily available, or can at least be computed without much e ort.
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Put di erently, I assume that planning is really a matter of choosing and
coordinating activities aimed at various goals.
Consider, for example, an autonomous robot who is charged with the diagnosis and
repair of problems aboard a submarine, or maybe a space station. Being also charged
with diagnosis, our robot will typically not be told what is the problem that has to be
addressed, but rather what symptoms it may have caused, e.g. \there is a reduction
in the level of oxygen in room B2", or \there is loss of power in the right engine".
Our robot will have to rst nd the source of the problem, and then act to repair it.
For this to happen, a local strategy will have to be written, using goal-setting and
evidential rules, to guide the robot through the investigation of the problem until it
is pinpointed, and then until it is repaired.
Our robot, however, may conceivably face multiple such problems at once in wartime,
for example, our submarine may be hit by several enemy's rockets. Alternatively, a
strategy for a single problem may consist of multiple parallel paths represented in
multiple concurrent goals, e.g. investigating multiple alternative diagnoses, or partial repair and continued re nement of a diagnosis. While local plans, or procedures,
for addressing each of the goals is assumed to be explicitly speci ed, it is virtually
impossible to pre-specify a composite plan for every possible combination of goals.
Thus, a set of high level principles must be used in combining the appropriate procedures. Precedence constraints implied by notions of urgency and priority, or the
logistic preference of avoiding having the agent run back and forth between rooms,
can be implemented as in TraumAID 2.0. Other constraints, such as on the cargo
the agent may carry, can be implemented using compatibility constraints.
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NEW_CASE
GIVEN
Radiography Available
WoundGunshot, Sternal, Unknown]
GIVEN_NEG
Shock
Distended Neck Veins
Muffled Heart Sounds
Hemoptysis
CONCLUDE
Chest Wall Penetration
PROJECTED_GOALS
Potential Occult Injury Pleural SpaceRight]
Potential Occult Injury Pleural SpaceLeft]
Clinical Possibility Of Bronchial InjuryRight]
Clinical Possibility Of Bronchial InjuryLeft]
Need Survey Chest X Ray Airway
Rx Chest Wall Penetration
GIVEN
Cover Wound Occlusive Dressing
GOALS_PURSUED
Rx Chest Wall Penetration
GIVEN
X Ray Bullet In Chest Midline
Bullet ImageChest Midline, Unknown LAT, 1]
Survey Chest X Ray (other results normal)
CONCLUDE
Thru Wounds0]
Potential Occult Injury Pleural SpaceLeft]
Potential Occult Injury Pleural SpaceRight]
PROJECTED_GOALS
RO Bullet In Mediastinum
Need Lateral Chest X Ray To Localize Bullet
Rx Observable Potential Pleural InjuryLeft]
Rx Observable Potential Pleural InjuryRight]
GOALS_PURSUED
Need Survey Chest X Ray Airway

Figure 8.2: Example of Protocol for Reporting a Trauma Case
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